Cleveland State University

EngagedScholarship@CSU
ETD Archive
2010

Housing Choice Voucher Program;Patterns and Factors of Spatial
Concentration in Cleveland
Miseon Park
Cleveland State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/etdarchive
Part of the Urban Studies and Planning Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Recommended Citation
Park, Miseon, "Housing Choice Voucher Program;Patterns and Factors of Spatial Concentration in
Cleveland" (2010). ETD Archive. 230.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/etdarchive/230

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted
for inclusion in ETD Archive by an authorized administrator of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information,
please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.

HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM:
PATTERNS AND FACTORS OF SPATIAL CONCENTRATION IN CLEVELAND

MISEON PARK

Bachelor of Engineering
Hongik University, Seoul, Korea
February, 1994

Master of City Planning
Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea
February, 1997

Submitted in partial fulfillment of requirement for the degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN URBAN STUDIES AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
at the
CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY
DECEMBER, 2010

This dissertation has been approved
for the Department of URBAN STUDIES
and the College of Graduate Studies by

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------Dissertation Chairperson, W. Dennis Keating

----------------------------------------------------Department & Date

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sugie Lee

----------------------------------------------------Department & Date

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------Seong-Kyu Ha

----------------------------------------------------Department & Date

Dedicated to my father who inspired me with his sense of humor, positive outlook on life,
and enthusiastic pursuit of knowledge.

Acknowledgments

I have many people who I would like to acknowledge without whose help, this
dissertation would not have been possible. I would like to express my gratitude to my
committee, Dr. Dennis Keating, Dr. Sugie Lee, and Dr. Seong-Kyu Ha, for their
dedication and commitment to seeing me through the completion of this dissertation.
From the time that I entered the dissertation process, Dr. Keating has made himself
available, has answered questions, and has been very supportive. My journey would have
been so much more difficult without his guidance and consideration ensuring the ultimate
completion of the study. I also would like to thank Dr. Lee for always having an open
door and for listening and providing advice throughout my degree program. I am also
indebted to Dr. Ha for his thoughtful advice, encouragement, and assistance. I truly could
not have completed my dissertation without my committee, and I am truly grateful to
them.
I would like to also thank my professors, Dr. Brudney, Dr. Elvery, Dr. Stivers, Dr.
Liggett, and Dr. Jang, for shaping and molding me as a researcher and academic; they all
have truly made an impact on my life and have improved my time at CSU. Friends have
provided crucial assistance, and I thank them for their willingness to share time with me.
For their well-intended and intelligent commentary as well as for sharing my stress, I am
indebted to Dayoung, Eunah, Karen, Fran, and Deborah who all contributed in both large
and small, but always significant ways.

Last, but certainly not least, I am deeply thankful to my family. My parents raised
me to think independently and allowed me to explore all my interests. Their balance of
discipline with freedom has truly shaped who I am today. Thank you for always
encouraging me to follow my heart. I am especially indebted to my sister, brother, and
sister-in-law for their tireless dedication to help and support me throughout this process. I
am grateful to my parents-in-law for their kindness and generosity. My deepest gratitude
goes to my husband, Jeongwoo, and my adorable daughters, Kowoon and Dasom. This
dissertation would not have been possible without Jeongwoo‟s sacrifice, unconditional
love, patience, and encouragement that truly helped me reach my goals. I owe so much to
his love as well as support in life for anything I do. Finally, I am truly grateful to my
wonderful daughters, whose love and smile helped make this process more enjoyable and
held me accountable when I could not see the light at the end of this tunnel.

HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM:
PATTERNS AND FACTORS OF SPATIAL CONCENTRATION IN CLEVELAND

MISEON PARK
ABSTRACT
Housing Choice Voucher Program is the single largest housing subsidy program
in the USA with the goal of poverty deconcentration and race desegregation. This study
aims to identify the presence and locations of voucher holders‟ spatial concentration, and
to investigate the factors associated with the location outcomes of voucher recipients in
Cleveland from 2005 to 2009. Analyzing voucher recipients‟ information from Cuyahoga
Metropolitan Housing Authority, this dissertation found meaningful results for the
voucher program performances.
Hotspot analysis indicated that location patterns of voucher recipients do not
show even distribution over the study area. Additionally, voucher holders have clustered
together and their concentrations have changed during the five years. Voucher recipients
were highly concentrated in the east part of Cuyahoga County, and over time,
concentration patterns spread out from the central city to suburbs. Spatial concentrations
were significantly different by race and ethnicity, but not by income.
Regression analysis identified several factors associated with voucher recipients‟
concentration, which include race, availability of affordable housing, poverty rates,
vacancy rates, and accessibility to public transportation. The spatial error model
estimation and Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR) account for spatial
autocorrelation and spatial heterogeneity. The GWR model substantially improved the
vi

explanatory power compared to the OLS and spatial models, and revealed spatial
variation of estimated coefficients. Factors showing a spatial non-stationarity were
confirmed by Monte Carlo tests.
Results from the dissertation presented the limited potential of the voucher
program since voucher holders are still clustered in specific neighborhoods, even though
they tend to move in less poor neighborhoods over time. However, in terms of poverty
deconcentration, the voucher program has been successful to disperse low-income
households in suburbs. On the other hand, desegregating minority population seemed to
be hard to achieve through the voucher program alone because voucher holders are found
in neighborhoods where minorities are predominant. A promising tendency is that they
tend to move in suburban neighborhoods where white population is the majority. In order
to overcome these limitations, policy makers should consider ways to encourage
landlords‟ participation in the program, and to make neighborhoods accessible to public
transportation.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research background

Since the 1970s, housing policies in the United States could be characterized by a
turn away from the direct provision of large scale public housing by government and a
turn towards indirect subsidies of low-income families using market mechanisms
(Schwartz, 2006; Katz &Turner, 2007; Grigsby & Bourassa, 2004). During the 1970s and
1980s, there were growing concerns over the negative effects of concentrated poverty and
resistance to locating public housing projects; HUD had increasingly turned to tenantbased rental assistance rather than constructing new public housing developments as the
primary means of expanding the stock of housing affordable to very-low income
households. Emphasis of housing policy has been shifted from supply side provision to
demand side subsidies (Orlebeke, 2000; Grigsby & Bourassa, 2004).
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Initially launched in 1974, the Housing Choice Voucher program is the single
largest housing subsidy in the United States, enabling almost two million low-income
households to choose their residence in the private rental housing markets (Goering &
Feins, 2003). This program is seen as a way of delivering poverty deconcentration and
race desegregation through the use of a portable voucher. Expected to address the
problems of public housing, the voucher program was understood as a mechanism for
freeing public housing tenants from poverty and segregation. As Utt (1996) noted,
In contrast with public housing, vouchers allow the assisted family to choose its
place of residence from private landlords in the community, provided that the
required rent stays within the established limits. This freedom allows assisted
families to escape the worst urban communities. (p.2)

Stimulated by William Julius Wilson‟s (1987) contentions about the deleterious
consequences of concentrated poverty, substantial literature has addressed the negative
effects of poverty concentration (Massey & Denton, 1993; Ellen & Turner, 1997;
Jargowsky, 1997). Policy makers have considered various ways of creating diverse
environments of neighborhoods (Lane, 1995; Hoffman, 1996). Residential mobility
programs, which help low-income families move to low-poverty areas, are one approach,
which is being studied in Chicago‟s Gautreaux program (Rosenbaum, 1995) and in the
national MTO program (Hanratty, McLanahan, & Pettit, 1998; Katz, Kling, & Liebman,
1999; Ladd & Ludwig, 1997). With mobility, the voucher program allows low-income
household to live in mixed-income neighborhoods expecting positive outcomes for the
underprivileged. Expected benefits have encompassed social, economic, and educational
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opportunities, such as providing social role models and social control, reducing antisocial behavior, increasing employment, school performance, mental health, and
neighborhood satisfaction (Katz, Turner, Brown, Cunningham, & Sawyer, 2003;
Arthurson, 2002; Sarkissian, 1976; Mills et al., 2006; Tunstall & Fenton, 2006).
Changing living environments from high-poverty, racially segregated to low-poverty,
racially mixed neighborhoods will be expected to lead behavioral changes of the poor.
On the other hand, the dispersal policy aimed to mitigating the degree of poverty
concentration has been criticized as a social engineering approach assuming that the
underprivileged will change their behavior simply because they have been exposed to
different physical environments such as neighborhoods with better schools and low
poverty rates. Dispersal program is not the program to address the poverty concentration
issue, rather it simply the poor invisible by spreading out over space. On this regard, it is
no surprise that the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) demonstration found no effects on
employment after four years (Orr et al., 2003) and the use of a voucher had no effect on
employment over a 3.5 year time frame (Mills et al., 2006).
However, scholars and policy analysts have become concerned that voucher users
are increasingly moving into certain low-income and minority neighborhoods (Husock,
2004; Galster, Smith, Santiago, & Petit, 2003). Based on this reason, vouchers have been
a target of criticism of producing a reconcentration of poverty, rather than serving as a
way of deconcentrating poverty. Here is the importance of examining spatial patterns to
assess the program‟s achievement, whether the voucher program contributes to poverty
deconcentration and race desegregation, and which factors affect the spatial outcomes of
voucher recipients.

3

1.2 Previous research

Studies on location outcome of vouchers have been conducted by comparison of
neighborhood poverty levels and racial composition by different time, different
geography, and/or different types of housing programs. Analyses at the level of national
aggregation presented that the voucher program seemed to achieve its poverty
deconcentration goal (Devine et al., 2003; Varady & Walker, 2000; Patterson et al., 2004;
Mills et al., 2006). Also, many research reported that the voucher program had at least
some effect on diminishing minority concentration (McClure, 2008; Teater, 2008; Gubits,
Khadduri, & Turnham, 2009; Mills et al., 2006). Moreover, a comparison between
project-based programs made a convincing argument that this program is successful in
desegregating minorities and deconcentrating poverty (Newman & Schnare, 1997;
Hartung & Henig, 1997; Deng, 2007). On the other hand, recent evidences tend to reveal
that vouchers are not helping renters locate in low-poverty areas any more effectively
than other project-based program (McClure, 2008; Williamson, Smith, & StrambiKramer, 2009; DeFilippis & Wyly, 2008; Guhathakurta & Mushkatel, 2000; Climaco,
Finkel, Nolden, & Vandawalker, 2006). However, those approaches are characterized as
a-spatial, simply comparing non spatial cross tabulation across geographies. Recently,
more research have been done considering spatial aspects of voucher locations (Oakley &
Burchfield, 2009; Wang & Varady, 2005; Wang, Varady, & Wang, 2008; Wyly &
DeFilippis, 2010). The researchers have attempted to find whether there is spatial
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concentration of voucher recipients and where they are clustered. When considering
spatial aspects, research findings revealed that voucher holders still tend to cluster to
some degree and in specific neighborhoods depending on several factors.
Studies on factors affecting vouchers‟ location outcomes have mainly identified
three categories: personal preferences, racial segregation, and market conditions. As
residential segregation is caused by both voluntary and involuntary processes (Bourne,
1981), voucher holders‟ personal preferences and non-personal barriers play a significant
role in their location outcomes. Voucher recipients choose their residence simply because
of proximity to family, friends, churches, and services (Varady, Walker, & Wang, 2001;
Varady & Walker, 2007). At the same time, due to their income level, they are inevitably
constrained by a location choice in an area served by public transportation (Varady et al.,
2001; Popkin & Cunningham, 2000). A second influencing factor is related to race such
as racial discrimination, segregation, fear, or preference of the same race. Many voucher
holders expressed their fears of encountering discrimination when they began to search
for housing (Popkin & Cunningham, 2000; Basolo & Ngyugen, 2005). The severity of
racial segregation even outweighed the influence of the weak market conditions in terms
of voucher concentration (Deng, 2007). A third set of studies examined the effect of
market conditions on voucher location. Market conditions refer to various indicators
depending on the focus of the research. However, market conditions can be divided into
three groups in terms of factors affecting vouchers‟ location based on previous
researches: the availability of affordable housing, vacancy rates, and landlords‟
participation in the program, which are related to each other. Generally, weak markets
tend to provide more opportunities to finding voucher housing in areas other than the
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central city (Finkel & Buron, 2001; Deng, 2007). Since weak markets show low housing
sales prices, high vacancy rates, and low rent levels, landlords have an incentive to
participate in the program that ensures stable rent based on the fair market rent, which
would not be expected otherwise (Turner & Cunningham, 2000; Cunningham, Sylvester,
& Turner, 1999; Finkel & Buron, 2001). One of the most important factors influencing
location pattern is the availability of affordable housing. Location patterns of voucher
families tend to mirror the geographic distribution of affordable rental housing units.
Several studies confirm the relationship between voucher location and the availability of
affordable housing (Devine et al., 2003; Ladd & Ludwig, 1997; Turner & Wilson, 1998;
Turner & Cunningham, 2000).

1.3 Limitations of previous study

Various attempts have been made to examine the locational outcomes and factors
limiting voucher recipients‟ spatial choice. The majority of research tried to evaluate the
performance of the voucher program by comparing neighborhood indicators with
different time or different types of housing projects (Devine et al., 2003; Newman &
Schnare, 1997; Hartung & Henig, 1997; Deng, 2007; Pendall, 2000a; Guhathakurta &
Mushkatel, 2000; Williamson et al., 2009; McClure, 2008; Basolo & Ngyuen, 2005;
Kingsley, Johnson, & Petit, 2000). However, only a relative handful of studies (Oakley &
Burchfield, 2009; Wang & Varady, 2005; Wyly & DeFilippis, 2010) have utilized spatial
approach and specifically identified the spatial clusters of voucher households in several
areas including Chicago, Cincinnati, and New York.

6

Research efforts have been also devoted to identifying the factors important to
account for voucher holders‟ spatial choice: personal preferences, racial discrimination,
and market conditions (Popkin & Cunningham, 2000; Goetz, 2003; Finkel & Buron,
2001; Turner, 2003; Varady et al., 2001; Turner & Wilson, 1998; Ladd & Ludwig, 1997;
Cunningham et al., 1999). However, not much has tested the significance of the factors
(Finkel & Buron, 2001; Oakley & Burchfield, 2009; Pendall, 2000a; Wyly & DeFilippis,
2010). Furthermore, most analysis focused on one of the factors such as race (Oakley &
Burchfield, 2009), poverty (Wyly & DeFilippis, 2010), vacancy rate (Finkel & Buron,
2001); they failed to incorporate comprehensive impact. Specifically, despite the
emphasis on public transportation in voucher holders‟ location (Varady et al., 2001;
Popkin & Cunningham, 2000), no research has been conducted to examine the
significance and the degree of effect on voucher locations.
Furthermore, most of the research that adopted regression analysis did not
properly deal with spatial issues: spatial autocorrelation and spatial heterogeneity. Data
on voucher recipients have spatial characteristics. Yet, regression analysis without
considering spatial issues when dealing with spatial data cannot provide unbiased
estimates, thus misleading the results of analysis. However, research utilizing spatial
regression did not detect spatial variation or local differences of parameter estimates
since OLS and spatial regression provide one estimate for each independent variable with
the assumption that the effect of the variable is constant over space. Given the intrinsic
uniqueness of space, sophisticated analysis is necessary to detect the local variations of a
factor.

7

1.4 Importance of the study area

Cleveland, as a case study area, is a unique example of weak housing markets as
well as severe racial segregation. Cleveland area has experienced declining population in
its central city, an unprecedented foreclosure crisis, and high rates of abandoned and
vacant properties. Cleveland as a central city of Cuyahoga County has lost more than a
half of its residents during the last six decades, decreasing from over 900,000 in 1950 to
less than 400,000 in 2008. Recently, the number of foreclosure filings has quadrupled
from 1995 to 2007, which puts already vulnerable neighborhoods at a further
disadvantage (Coulton et al., 2007; Coulton et al., 2010). The Cleveland area ranked in
the top ten foreclosure filings in the nation (Schiller & Hirsh, 2008). At the same time,
Cleveland has suffered weak economic conditions and stagnant housing prices, which
leave almost one out of five its inhabitants living below the poverty level (U.S. Census
Bureau, 2009). Furthermore, Cleveland has left a substantial portion of its land vacant;
vacancy rates reach 22% in Cleveland as of 2008, generating negative externalities for
the community (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009). More specifically, rental vacancy rates
around the Cleveland metropolitan area have ranked high among 75 largest metropolitan
areas. Rental housing vacancy rates in the fourth quarter of 2009 are 14.2% in ClevelandElyria-Mentor MSA, which is above the national average of 10.7% (U.S. Census Bureau,
2010).
Locational outcomes of the voucher holders have been affected by tightness of the
local housing market and the severity of racial segregation. Weak market conditions
would provide voucher recipients with more chances to find housing, since landlords are
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less likely to find tenants under the conditions of high vacancy rates, especially when
rental vacancy rates are high (Finkel & Buron, 2001). On the other hand, the severity of
racial segregation tends to affect the residential choice negatively (Deng, 2007). The
scarcity of information on the spatial outcomes of the voucher program in Metropolitan
Cleveland, Cuyahoga County, is regrettable. This is because Cleveland has been
recognized as a highly segregated area in the country (Abramson, Tobin, & VanderGoot,
1995; Glaeser & Vigor, 2001; U.S. Census Bureau, 2002), even though there is evidence
that the absolute level of segregation in U.S. metropolitan areas has declined since 1970s
(Glaeser & Vigdor, 2001). Furthermore, efforts have been devoted to reduce racial
segregation and promote racial integration in housing in the suburbs of metropolitan
Cleveland since 1960s (Keating, 1994). However, Cleveland is one of the places that
residential segregation remains strikingly high (Massey & Denton, 1989, 1993; Logan,
Stults, & Farley, 2004; Chandler, 1992). Hence, Cleveland is the place that needs the
program to promote racial and economic integration in neighborhoods. Nonetheless,
knowledge is very limited thus far on where the voucher families are located and which
factors contribute to their spatial concentration in Cleveland metropolitan area.
Without knowing where the voucher families live, it is hard to confirm whether
the voucher program achieves its goal to deconcentrate poverty and contribute to making
neighborhoods diverse. Thus, this study will examine the spatial patterns of voucher users
and examine the factors that are influential to spatial outcomes in Cuyahoga County,
which includes the central city of Cleveland. In doing so, this study will fill the gap in
paucity of research and provide policy makers with useful information on how the
voucher program works in a unique place which needs race and income integration.
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1.5 Uniqueness of the study

This study will identify the location of voucher clusters over space, changing
patterns over time, and the factors associated voucher locations using a case of
Metropolitan Cleveland. In doing so, there are three distinguishing components of this
analysis from previous researches: block group as a unit of analysis, spatial approach, and
spatial regression analysis. First, a finer geographic level than previous researches will
highlight a more detailed picture of voucher locations. The majority of researches have
adopted census tract as a unit of analysis when investigating voucher location outcomes.
Specifically, all of previous researches considering spatial aspects analyzed census tract
level or a higher level such as community area (Oakley & Burchfield, 2009). Even
though census tract is the most widely used geographic level as a proxy for a
neighborhood, finer geography such as block group will provide more rich analysis and a
clearer picture of voucher locations. Thus, this dissertation will adopt block group as a
unit of analysis, enabling richer results and capturing more in detail.
Second, spatial analysis will be considered to identify the spatial concentration.
Contrary to the traditional a-spatial approach usually comparing poverty rates in census
tract, this research will incorporate spatial consideration using the exploratory spatial data
analysis approach. Not only will this study utilize the traditional a-spatial approach to
describe the relationship between voucher concentration and the level of poverty, and
racial composition in block group, but it will also incorporate the spatial approach to
identify the locations of spatial concentration over space, as well as to analyze the change
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of spatial patterns over time. This study will employ several techniques including dot
mapping, density map, and hot spot analysis.
Last but not least, spatial regression and Geographically Weighted Regression
(GWR) analysis will shed light on the impact of factors affecting voucher locational
outcomes. Not much has been done to identify the factors constraining voucher locations
employing statistical analysis. Studies on factors influencing voucher location have often
used focus group interviews or surveys. Even though many research efforts pointed out
that the accessibility to public transportation plays a critical role in voucher holders‟
location choice, no research has been conducted to confirm the statistical significance of
this factor. Thus, this study will test the degree of several factors affecting voucher
locations with the regression model. Moreover, considering the characteristics of voucher
data, spatial aspects should be taken into account. Spatial regression and GWR account
for spatial autocorrelation and spatial heterogeneity which OLS regression often fails to
carry out when dealing with spatial data.

1.6 Research issues and approach

The purpose of this study is to examine how the voucher program works in terms
of poverty deconcentration and race desegregation in Cuyahoga County. The research
questions being asked in the dissertation consist of two parts: patterns of voucher
recipients‟ spatial concentration and factors associated with their spatial concentration in
Cuyahoga County, Ohio. Thus, this research seeks to;
(1) Identify the presence of spatial clustering of voucher recipients.
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(2) Identify the locations of spatial concentration of voucher recipients by their
races, ethnic backgrounds, and income levels.
(3) Examine the factors associated with voucher recipients‟ spatial concentration.
(4) Examine the spatial variation of influencing factors.

The remainder of the dissertation starts with evolution of public housing policy
which provides background to understand how the housing choice voucher program was
initiated. Also, brief overview on characteristics and performance of the voucher program
is presented in Chapter II. This chapter is followed by theoretical backgrounds and
literature review in Chapter III. Theories are categorized into seven groups in explaining
residential segregation by income and race. These are Chicago school‟s invasionsuccession (Park & Burgess, 1925), personal preferences (Schelling, 1971; Granovetter,
1978), economic and structural aspect (Wilson, 1987), cultural explanation (Lewis, 1966),
racial discrimination (Massey & Denton, 1993), government role (Schill & Watcher,
1995), and resistance of landlords and neighborhoods. The following literature review
focuses on the locational outcomes of voucher recipients in terms of whether the voucher
program has been successful in terms of poverty deconcentration and race desegregation.
This chapter is also devoted to identifying factors affecting voucher recipients‟ location
outcomes. Chapter IV explains methodologies adopted in this dissertation, including
hotspot analysis, spatial regression analysis, and GWR. Next, Chapter V investigates
patterns of spatial concentration of voucher recipients from 2005 to 2009, utilizing
hotspot analysis as well as description of voucher holders‟ demographic characteristics
and neighborhood conditions. Chapter VI identifies factors associated with voucher
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recipients spatial concentration and spatial variation of these factors over space. A series
of regression analyses is conducted from traditional OLS, spatial error model estimation,
to GWR. Final chapter concludes with summary findings of the study, policy implication,
limitations, and further research issues.
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CHAPTER II
HOUSING POLICY AND HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER
PROGRAM

2.1 Public Housing Policy

The public housing program in the United States was authorized by the U.S.
Housing Act of 1937. It was the first major federal program aimed at providing low-rent
housing to low-income families. Although housing problems had been acknowledged for
decades, it was not until the Great Depression in the 1930s that the federal government
became involved with housing on a large scale. The U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) administers federal aid to local public housing authorities
(PHAs) that manage the housing for low-income residents at rents they could afford.
Public housing was to be limited to low-income families and individuals.
The Housing Act of 1949 reauthorized the public housing program and committed
the nation to build 810,000 units over the subsequent six years, which did not reach the
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goal until 1970 (Schwartz, 2006). Racial segregation, crime, unemployment, and social
isolation among residents increased greatly in the 1970s and 1980s since high-rise, highdensity, and large scale public housing projects were often built on cheap and undesirable
land. In the past three decades, more resources have gone to the preservation and
redevelopment of public housing projects than to the production of new public housing
(Schwartz, 2006).
According to Katz and Turner (2007), public housing policies in the United States
have evolved with three distinct programs: public housing production programs, tenantbased assistance programs, and place-based transformation programs. Since the 1930s,
production programs have stimulated the construction of millions of publicly subsidized
housing units. Since the 1970s, tenant-based assistance programs have helped millions of
renters to live in neighborhoods with better quality access to public services. In addition,
since the mid-1990s, the place-based, demolition and replacement of distressed public
housing has transformed the economic and physical landscape of the most distressed
projects in the United States.

2.1.1 Public housing production program
As a major source of providing affordable housing for extremely low income
families, public housing production programs have evolved in three distinct phases.
During the first phase, from the 1930s through the 1960s, the federal government
financed the construction of over 1 million public housing units through contracts with
PHAs. These contracts required the PHAs to maintain the affordability of public housing
units in perpetuity. During the second phase, dominant from the 1960s to the early 1980s,
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the federal government subsidized the construction of over 1.3 million units of privately
owned affordable housing through a combination of below-market financing, income tax
preferences, and operating support. Under these programs, the federal government
executed contracts directly with for-profit and non-profit developers of affordable
housing rather than with local PHAs. The current phase of federal production policy,
dominant since the mid-1980s, has delegated key decisions to state and local
governments. These governments have a responsibility for allocating federal tax credits
and block grant funding in accordance with federally mandated affordability plans. In
general, these federal resources have been used to produce quality affordable housing in
low-income neighborhoods often through community-based housing providers. The key
subsidy programs of this period were the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC)
program, the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG), and the HOME investment
Partnership Program (Katz & Turner, 2007).
Public housing was originally intended to provide decent and affordable
accommodations to low-income families for whom market rents were out of reach.
Overall, public housing production programs have been successful in terms of stimulating
the production of the affordable housing. The public housing stock reached its peak of 1.4
million units in 1994; as of 2004, it had declined by 12% to 1.23 million units (Schwartz,
2006).
However, by the end of the 1980s, public housing was widely considered as a
failure. The problems due to mass concentration of public housing included extreme
racial and economic segregation and inadequate public services. Due to historical
discrimination, deliberate neglect, and prejudice, public housing tenants suffered from
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racial and economic segregation from outside of the society. In addition, poor
construction, inadequate management and maintenance, high crime and disorder in public
housing aggravated the problem. The combination of intense poverty, physical
deterioration, and social disorder called for a radical approach to revitalization of public
housing policy in the United States. Responding to the failure of public housing, housing
programs increasingly tried to blend low-income households with more affluent
neighbors. Governments responded in two basic ways. One approach, called the dispersal
program or tenant-based assistance program, helps underprivileged public tenants and
low-income households move into middle-income, often suburban neighborhoods. The
other tries to put households with varying levels of income within the same building or
development (Schwartz, 2006). Housing choice voucher programs are an example of the
former, HOPE VI (Homeownership Opportunities for People Everywhere) program can
be the latter.

2.1.2 Tenant-based assistance program
Several poverty dispersal programs have been implemented in the US over the
last several decades, beginning with the Gautreaux Program, which served as a model for
a tenant-based dispersal approach. The 1976 Gautreaux Demonstration was the first
large-scale attempt at reversing a history of discriminatory housing practices (Rubinowitz
& Rosenbaum, 2000). The Gautreaux program resulted from the U.S. Supreme Court
ruling, which charged the Chicago Housing Authority had employed racially
discriminatory policies in the administration of low-rent public housing programs with
the tacit approval of HUD. As a result, between 1976 and 1998, over 7,000 African
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American families moved, over half of them to suburban communities. A new round of
the Gautreaux program began in 2002, and until recently, it has moved hundreds of
families (Duncan & Zuberi, 2006).
A recent study showed that both Gautreaux programs provided beneficial
outcomes: female-headed African American families moving from Chicago‟s housing
projects to predominantly middle-class white suburbs secured better jobs for themselves
and better schooling for their children than mothers placed within Chicago‟s city limits.
In terms of poverty rates, Gautreaux One played a substantial role in reducing
neighborhood poverty rates by more than half; on average, families came from
neighborhoods with poverty rates of 42%. They have since moved to neighborhoods with
poverty rates of 17% (Duncan & Zuberi, 2006). However, the new Gautreaux program
fails to confirm the suburban advantages found in the previous experience. In terms of
criminal records of Gautreaux children, suburban placement helped boys but not girls
(DeLuca, Duncan, Keels, & Mendenhall, 2010). Nevertheless, the latest research on the
new Gautreaux program revealed that families moved back into poor segregated
neighborhoods because they felt social isolation, had poor integration into new
neighborhoods, struggled with distance from relatives, and children faced negative
reactions to their new neighborhoods (Boyd, Edin, Clampet-Lundquist, & Duncan, 2010).
The Gautreaux program endeavored to place families in low-poverty, racially integrated
neighborhoods; however, about one-fifth of families was placed in high-poverty, and
highly segregated neighborhoods due to the difficulties of finding neighborhoods that met
these criteria. Since participating families have moved into better communities, their
neighborhood conditions have significantly improved.
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Moving to Opportunity (MTO) is a more recent example of a people-based
poverty deconcentration program. The MTO program, first implemented in the early
1990s, provided Section 8 vouchers to public housing residents so that they could move
into low poverty areas. The goal of the experimental program was to examine the impact
of the new neighborhoods on the life chances of participants through an experimental
design. Participants in the MTO demonstration were randomly assigned to three different
situations: an experimental group that had received vouchers, counseling, and had to
move to neighborhoods with less than 10% poverty; a comparison group that had just
received vouchers; and a control group that had remained in public housing (Briggs,
Popkin, & Goering, 2010).
The MTO demonstration program has to date shown mixed results: encouraging
evidence for security, safety, and health; at the same time, no significant effect on
employment, education, and boys‟ behavior. As a result of the strength of the initial
design, interim evaluations of the MTO program provide strong evidence of some of the
merits of moving from high poverty to low poverty neighborhoods over the short to midterm (1-6 yrs) (Orr et al., 2004). Positive MTO findings include dramatic improvements
in housing and neighborhood conditions; enhancing sense of safety and security;
significant improvements in both mental and physical health of adults; significant mental
health improvements and less risky behavior in girls ages 15 to 19; significant but small
effects on the characteristics of the schools children attended, (although most families
remained within the same, central-city school district). However, several less than
desirable outcomes were also witnessed, including no significant impact on educational
performance, employment, earnings, or welfare receipt; and worse mental and behavioral
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outcomes in teenage boys. And lastly, un-counseled subsequent moving was more likely
than for the treatment group, and they were more likely to be return to high-poverty areas
than the comparison or control groups (Orr et al., 2004).
In order to answer the unexpected results of the social experiments, researchers
focused on MTO families‟ experiences in detail, adopting qualitative interviews and
ethnographic field research (Briggs et al., 2010). The findings revealed the discrepancy
between planners‟ ideal expectation and families‟ desperate needs. Unexpected positive
outcomes in regards to security and safety could be explained by the primary motives of
the MTO participants who wished to escape their former public housing in order to be
safe, and not to get better schools or job opportunities. However, planners of the program
expected that moving to opportunity neighborhoods that have lower poverty rates would
give participants better chances of living in terms of housing, education, and employment.
This was the typical example of the planner‟s expectations which were apart from reality.
Rather, the poorest and most vulnerable families were considered only with living in a
safe environment. As Briggs et al. (2010) noted, “many MTO parents were focused on
safety first, last and always, viewing getting away from the pervasive violence and
disorder as the most important thing they could do for themselves and their children”
(p.89).
A kin-centered community played a pivotal role not only in organizing social life
around MTO families but also in pulling them back to high poverty neighborhoods. Any
benefits gained by living in safer communities could be quickly lost once MTO families
return to those distressed neighborhoods. Hence, researchers took the kin-oriented
relationship as a mixed blessing at best (Briggs et al., 2010).

20

Compared to the Gautreaux program, the MTO program creates modest changes
in participants‟ living conditions: MTO participants moved shorter distances, into
neighborhoods with higher poverty and unemployment rates, more disproportionate
minority rates, and poorer school systems (Rosenbaum & Zuberi, 2010). Different
outcomes could be explained by the different program designs (Rosenbaum & Zuberi,
2010), different motives of participants, or different support systems enabling participants
to stay in better neighborhoods (Briggs et al., 2010). Merely changing neighborhoods
does not necessarily guarantee the success that policy makers were hoping for, such as
more work and higher earnings, greater independence from welfare, and intergenerational
success (Duncan & Zuberi, 2006).
In any case, tenant-based dispersal programs have limited potential, considering
the heavy reliance on market mechanisms and choices available to participants. Finding
affordable housing in lower poverty neighborhoods is significantly hindered by both
supply and demand. As for the supply side, the scarcity of affordable housing and a
landlord‟s voluntary participation in the program are critical. As for the demand side,
participants‟ preferences, lack of information, and kin-oriented relationships constrain
their location choice.

2.1.3 Place-based transforming program
In the past decade, the federal government has endeavored to change the face of
public housing: demolish the worst public housing projects and replace them with
housing that is more economically mixed, better designed, less dense, and integrated into
local neighborhoods. The HOPE VI program has had success meeting four goals: (1)
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demolition of severely distressed housing units, (2) replacement with higher quality units,
(3) increased sense of safety and well being, (4) and a reduction in poverty rates.
However, the program has had failures in the following: (1) a low rate of returnees, (2) a
reduction of public housing stock, (3) and less frequent social interaction than expected.
The HOPE VI program has accomplished its most basic goal to demolish severely
distressed housing units and to replace them with new, high quality mixed income
housing containing innovative design, management, and financing. The HOPE VI
program, funded with annual appropriations of $300 to $500 million, has been central to
the transformation of public housing since the early 1990s. Focusing on the most
distressed public housing development, HUD allocated a total of $4.55 billion from 1993
to 2002 to demolish 78,000 units of public housing and to transform these projects into
mixed income housing developments (Schwartz, 2006).
HOPE VI relocation has provided former residents with safety benefits. Through
HOPE VI, many former public housing residents received vouchers and were able to
relocate to better housing in safer neighborhoods (Popkin et al., 2004). More recently,
HOPE VI Panel Study illustrated that HOPE VI movers have gained a dramatically
improved sense of safety and a reduced fear of crime through relocation to the private
market or new mixed-income developments (Popkin & Cove, 2007). 1 Similar to the
MTO experiences, successful participants with vouchers reported improved mental health
1

The HOPE VI Panel Study and the HOPE VI Tracking Study are the first systematic, multi-city studies

commissioned by the US Congress in 1999, in order to examine what happened to the original residents of
HOPE VI developments. The Tracking Study was intended to provide a snapshot of living conditions and
well-being of former residents of eight HOPE VI sites where redevelopments began between 1994 and
1998. The HOPE VI Panel Study focused on the longer-term effect in five sites, in terms of neighborhood
conditions, physical and mental health, and socioeconomic outcomes for 887 original residents (Popkin,
2006; Buron et al., 2002).
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and less behavior problems among their children (Popkin, 2010).2 In addition, HOPE VI
has generated benefits for the neighborhoods surrounding public housing (Popkin et al.,
2004).
At the neighborhood level, HOPE VI redevelopments have a positive impact on
residents‟ living environments, including poverty rates. Nationwide research on HOPE
VI developments in 48 cities confirmed that the majority of relocates from the HOPE VI
program moved to neighborhoods that have lower poverty rates than those they left
behind (Kingsley et al., 2003). Percentage of relocates by the type of neighborhoods
indicated that most of residents (91.5%) lived in neighborhoods where the poverty rates
are at least over 30% before HOPE VI developments; while after development this figure
decreased to 38.7%. In contrast, the percentage of relocatees living in better
neighborhoods with poverty rates below 10% has increased from 0.2% to 12.5% due to
HOPE VI projects. In a study of 9,200 mixed income multifamily federally funded
housing projects, Khadduri and Martin (1997) concluded that successful mixed income
housing was more likely to succeed in low poverty neighborhoods than in high poverty
ones. However, they also found that mixed income projects might work in high poverty
areas in tight market conditions where there is little alternative accommodation for
working families.
Several issues have resulted from the implementation of the HOPE VI program:
the low rate of returnees, reduction of public housing stock, and less frequent social
interaction than expected. The first issue related to the HOPE VI program is whether the
original tenants would return to the new mixed-income housing. Studies revealed that
2

On the contrary, movers to another traditional public housing did not gain the similar benefits of

increasing a sense of safety (Popkin, Levy, & Buron, 2009).
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only a relatively small number of residents had moved into new housing, varying from
less than 10% to 75%; while government expected 46% of residents to return on average
(Buron, Popkin, Levy, Harris, & Khadduri, 2002; Holin, Buron, Loke, & Cortes, 2003;
Popkin et al., 2004). There are diverse reasons that original residents did not return. The
low level of return is partly by design itself: most HOPE VI sites built fewer public
housing units than they demolished. Other reasons relate to personal preferences, and
regulations on eligibility contribute as well. Former tenants of public housing decided not
to come back since they are happy with their new housing, do not want to move again,
and simply distrust promises that the new housing will really be better (Popkin, 2010).
However, former residents could not move back due to the strict screening criteria
requiring employment history, no criminal records, and no history of delinquency of
paying bills as well. 3 Often, long periods of time delay between demolition and
completion of the new developments are associated with low rates of return (Wilen &
Nayak, 2006; Popkin, 2010).
Another reason to prohibit returning is attributed to loss of affordable housing
units available for former residents. HOPE VI developments typically have fewer public
housing units than the projects they replace by demolishing high-rise public housing
projects into a smaller scale and mixed-income projects. Only about half of the public
housing units demolished under HOPE VI were replaced with new public housing. The
217 HOPE VI redevelopment grants involved the demolition of 94,500 public housing
3

Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) requires tenants to meet the criteria for moving into the new mixed-

income developments. Under the CHA‟s minimum tenant selection plan, families must be up to date on
their rent and utilities, have no outstanding debts or lease violations, pass a three-year criminal background
check, provide documents that all children are attending school on a regular base, and require that all
household members over the age of 18 must be employed at least 30 hours a week (Popkin, 2010).
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units from 1993 through 2003, and the replacement of 95,100 units. However, only
48,800 of these new units can be considered equivalent to public housing necessary to
support households with very low incomes (Schwartz, 2006).
Infrequent social interaction undermines the weights of mixing different groups of
residents in proximity. HOPE VI research showed that there was relatively little
interaction between higher- and lower-income residents, and also that the interactions that
did occur were relatively superficial (Popkin et al., 2004). Similar outcomes appeared in
Chicago where residential segregation is severe and place-based programs are active
(Rosenbaum, Stroh, & Flynn, 1998). There have been efforts in an attempt to identify the
factors curtailing active social interaction. For example, a study in the case of Seattle
indicated several factors influencing the interaction among residents: proximity within
the development, community events, and the presence of children in the household.
Differences in socioeconomic background including language and family composition
impede social interaction between households of different incomes and housing tenures
(Kleit, 2005). HOPE VI residents‟ tracking study revealed similar results and causes of
low level social interaction. The low levels of interaction were associated with a lack of
opportunity, language or cultural barriers, and personal preferences for keeping social
distance from neighbors (Buron et al., 2002). Another research focused on mixed-income
developments in Chicago, also confirmed a lack of social interaction across income levels.
Joseph (2008) examined the reasons in several aspects from physical design to lack of
common interests. Minimal shared public space did not provide a chance of interacting.
Plus, homeowners expressed reluctance in living with former public housing residents in
close proximity. In an effort to build community in mixed-income developments,
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Chaskin and Joseph (2010) suggested that resident meetings, associations, common
interests, and shared needs would function in bringing residents together as a catalyst for
social interaction.
The place-based transforming program is both promising and controversial. On
one hand, it provides an opportunity and the resources to improve the terrible living
conditions of many public housing residents. On the other hand, these efforts have
significantly reduced the number of permanent public housing units, and disrupted the
lives of residents at many sites. Plus, they cost millions of dollars of public money with
little evidence that lower poverty neighborhoods help achieve the desired favorable
outcomes such as frequent social interactions.

2.2 Housing Choice Voucher Program

2.2.1 Origin and evolution
Beginning in the mid-1970s, housing vouchers have emerged as the most
substantial subsidized housing program in the United States. Vouchers are the most direct
way to deal with the affordability problems of the poor since vouchers allow the
recipients to decide where to live. As Goering and Feins (2003) asserted, the housing
voucher program can be utilized to mitigate racial and economic segregation by reversing
the historic practice of concentrating poor minority households in distressed
neighborhoods. By helping families relocate from high-poverty to low-poverty
neighborhoods, the housing voucher program has the potential to lead to significant
improvements in their living conditions and well-being.
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By 1974, Congress was convinced that tenant-based housing assistance was a
viable alternative to public housing. The Housing and Community Development Act of
1974 authorized the Section 8 program. The Section 8 program included two different
forms: Section 8 New and Section 8 Existing. The former refers to Section 8 projectbased assistance for existing, which is for newly constructed or rehabilitated housing. The
latter refers to Section 8 existing housing program, which is a newly created housing
assistance program to be administered by PHAs provided tenant-based subsidies. The
Section 8 existing program was also known as the rental certificate program. By mid1980s, the rental voucher program was formally authorized as a program in the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1987. The program was similar to the rental
certificate program, but it allowed families more options in housing selection. Major
differences between the rental certificate and rental voucher programs were: (1) the rental
voucher program did not have a fair market rent limitation and (2) the rental voucher
program provided assistance to families based on a pre-determined amount of assistance.
The 1998 Public Housing Reform Act authorized the merger of the certificate and
voucher programs into a single program with a single set of regulations. The change
started the housing choice voucher program, effective October 1, 1999 (HUD, 2000;
HUD, 2001).

2.2.2 Program overview
Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) play a central role in administering the
voucher program. Appropriated by Congress, funding for the voucher program is
provided by HUD to PHAs. The annual contributions contract between HUD and PHA
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specifies the PHA‟s responsibilities, obligations, and funding for housing assistance to
very-low income households. Under the contract with HUD, the PHAs are responsible for
the voucher program‟s administration such as determining family eligibility; maintaining
the waiting list and selecting eligible families; calculating family portions of rent and
housing assistant payments; approving units with housing inspections and rent
reasonableness tests; and conducting outreach to landlords (HUD, 2001).
The voucher program includes several steps, such as application, selection of
eligible family, housing searching, unit inspection and approval, housing subsidy contract,
and annual reexamination. In order to receive rental assistance through the voucher
program, families should apply to the waiting list. An applicant has to be added to the
waiting list and be selected as an eligible household since the voucher program is a
discretionary program, not entitlement. Entitlement will allow everyone who has an
income below a certain income level with high rent the right to apply for housing support
and to receive a housing benefit irrespective of the funding levels (Priemus, Kemp, &
Varady, 2005). Due to the need for housing assistance and limited budgets, it takes time
to be selected to receive housing subsidies. As of 2008, the average waiting time was 26
months (HUD, 2010c). Eligibility for the voucher program is based on family definition,
income limits, citizenship status, and eviction history for drug-related criminal activity.
Considering the criteria, applicants are selected by priority or by random choice. Income
limits are determined by HUD, based on family size and the metropolitan area where the
PHA is located. HUD also announces the income targeting requirements: at least 75% of
the families who are admitted to PHA‟s voucher program during the PHA fiscal year
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must be extremely low-income where their income is at or below 30% of the area median
income (HUD, 2001).

Figure 2-1 Relationship in the Housing Choice Voucher Program
Congress
(Appropriates Funding)

HUD
(Provides Funding to PHAs)
Program regulations and annual contribution contract
specify PHA obligations and voucher funding

PHA
(Administers program and
Distributes Funds)
Voucher specifies
family obligations

Housing assistance
payment contract specifies
owner and PHA obligations

Low-income family
(Program participants)

Property owner
(Landlord)

Lease specifies tenant
and landlord
obligations

Source: Adapted in part from HUD (2001, p.1-12)

Once the eligible families are selected, they receive the voucher, which is a
document issued by the PHA given them for admission to the program. This indicates the
terms of the voucher, authorized bedroom size, and family obligations. Using the voucher,
families start to find housing units to meet their needs and rent level. When the family
finds a housing unit, the unit should pass the inspection that ensures the housing quality
standards. In addition, the rent level should be at or below the Fair Market Rents (FMRs)
level that is determined by HUD annually. FMRs represent the 40th percentile value of
rents, which is the dollar amount below 40 % of the standard quality rental housing units.
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4

FMRs vary by bedroom size, and include utility costs. The 40th percentile rent is

obtained from the distribution of rental units occupied by movers who are renter moved
into their unit within the past 15 months (HUD, 2007a). As of 2010, FMRs in ClevelandElyria-Mentor MSA is $735 for two bedroom housing unit (HUD, 2010d). HUD‟s
published FMRs are based for calculating housing assistance payments that the PHA pays
to the owner on behalf of the family leasing the unit. Average FMRs for a two bedroom
unit has increased from $625 in 2000 to $899 in 2009 as shown in Table 2-1.

Table 2-1 U.S. Average two bedrooms Fair Market Rent
Year

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

FMR

$625

$646

$696

$735

$754

Year

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

$786

$812

$861

$889

FMR
$762
Source: HUD (2010d), FMR History

Fair Market Rents vary by housing markets. In fiscal year 2010, the FMR for a
two bedroom unit ranged from $ 399 in Puerto Rico to $1,800 in Stamford-Norwalk,
Connecticut, followed by $1,760 in San Francisco, California. FMRs tend to be higher in
the nation‟s major metropolitan areas. As shown in Table 2-2, the mean FMR for the 50
largest metropolitan areas in 2010 is $1,045 for a two bedroom unit, and almost a half of
these areas have FMRs greater than $1,000. As described, FMRs are flexible since they
vary by regions and housing sizes; however, they also limit residential choice because of
FMRs ceiling.
4

Standard quality rental housing units have the following attributes: occupied rental units paying cash rent;

specified renter on 10 acres or less; with full plumbing; with full kitchen; unit more than 2 years old, and
meals are not included in rent (HUD, 2007a).
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Table 2-2 2010 Fair Market Rent in 50 largest metropolitan areas
Metropolitan Area

FMR($)

Metropolitan Area

FMR($)

San Francisco, CA

1760

Austin-Round Rock, TX

954

Orange County, CA

1594

VA Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC

934

Nassau-Suffolk, NY

1592

Denver, CO

921

Washington, DC-VA-MD

1494

Phoenix-Mesa, AZ

919

San Jose, CA

1438

Atlanta, GA

912

Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA

1420

Minneapolis-St.Paul, MN-WI

899

Bergen-Passaic, NJ

1379

Dallas, TX

894

Oakland, CA

1377

Houston-Baytown-Sugar Land, TX

892

New York, NY

1359

Fort Worth-Arlington, TX

861

Fort Lauderdale, FL

1358

Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI

858

Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH

1357

Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA

839

San Diego, CA

1324

Salt Lake City, UT

836

Newark, NJ

1279

Kansas City, MO-KS

834

Miami, FL

1206

Nashville, TN

807

Baltimore, MD

1203

Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC-SC

806

Riverside-San Bernardino, CA

1108

Detroit-Warren, Livonia, MI

796

Philadelphia, PA-NJ

1095

San Antonio, TX

796

Hartford, CT

1095

St. Louis, MO-IL

771

Las Vegas, NV

1063

Indianapolis, IN

754

Seattle-Bellevue, WA

1056

Columbus, OH

750

Orlando-Kissimmee, FL

1052

Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, OH

735

Sacramento, CA

1039

Pittsburgh, PA

730

Chicago, IL

1015

Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY

728

New Orleans, LA

982

Cincinnati-Middleton, OH-KY-IN

726

Tampa-St.Petersburg-Clearwater, FL

959

Greensboro-High Point, NC

703

Source: HUD (2010d), FMR History

Under the voucher program, voucher holders locate a suitable rental unit in the
private market and generally pay 30% of their adjusted gross income directly to the
landlord for rent. The voucher program subsidizes the remaining portion of the contract
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rent that is the difference between 30% of the tenant‟s income and the FMR for the area.
So, the housing choice voucher program provides flexibility and options, by issuing
vouchers to eligible households to help them pay rent in privately owned apartments of
their choice. Additionally, HUD requires annual reexamination of the voucher
participants and the units: the family must be recertified to determine continued eligibility
for the program, and the housing units must be inspected and meet housing quality
standards annually (HUD, 2001; CMHA, 2009b).

2.2.3 Program performance and characteristics of voucher recipients
The housing choice voucher program has experienced significant growth not just
in size, but in importance as an appropriate method for providing housing assistance for
very low income families (HUD, 2000). Since 1970, HUD‟s housing voucher program
has grown from about 30,000 households to about 2 million vouchers today. Table 2-3
shows the growth of vouchers from 1975.5 For many years, the primary source of
increased assistance for very poor households was new annual appropriations for
additional vouchers, called incremental vouchers. Since 1990s, however, no incremental
vouchers were funded during 1995 through 1998, and from 2003 to 2007. After 2007,
Congress appropriated funding for 15,000 incremental vouchers in fiscal year 2008;

5

A total of 225,000 non-incremental vouchers were included from 1995 to 2004 periods. During the

periods, half of the voucher growth derived from increases in the number of new, incremental vouchers,
and other half reflected transfers of households from public housing and other project-based subsidy
programs to the voucher program (Schwartz, 2006).
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13,000 new vouchers in FY 2009; and 11,000 new vouchers in FY 2010 (National Low
Income Housing Coalition, 2010).6

Table 2-3 Cumulative issuance of Section 8 Certificates and Vouchers, 1975-2010
Year

Period total

Cumulative total

1975-1980

624,604

624,604

1981-1985

287,334

911,938

1986-1990

301,523

1,213,461

1991-1995

186,544

1,400,005

1996-2000

110,000

1,510,005

2001-2005

338,000

1,848,005

2006-2010
39,000
1,887,005
Sources: HUD, 2000; Schwartz, 2006; National Low Income Housing Coalition, 2010

According to resident characteristics reports in the HUD PIH information center,
in the United States, a total of 1,885,987 units received voucher subsidies as of June 30,
2010. Since the voucher program is one of the major federal programs intended to bridge
the gap between the cost of housing and the household income, the households have low
income levels. The average household annual income is $12,644, and the majority (66%)
of households falls into extremely low income categories (HUD, 2010a). The low income
level of voucher recipients reflects federal eligibility standards that give priority to
extremely low income households. As Table 2-4 illustrates, less than 1% of recipients
have income above the low income level.

6

For FY 2010, the housing choice voucher program is funded at $18.18 billion (National Low Income

Coalition, 2010).
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Table 2-4 Voucher recipients‟ income level
Income category

Extremely low

Very low

Low

Above low

Unavailable

Count

1,238,863

383,412

77,650

4,796

181,264

0

10

Percent
66
20
Source: HUD (2010a), Resident Characteristic Report
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In addition, over 70% of families have income less than $15,000 per year, and
less than 10% of families earn over $25,000 annually.

Table 2-5 Voucher recipients‟ income distribution
Income
level

$0

$1$5,000

$5,001$10,000

$10,001$15,000

$15,001$20,000

$20,001$25,000

Above
$25,000

percent

3

10

32

24

14

7

8

Source: HUD (2010a), Resident Characteristic Report

As the voucher program intended, participants tend to pay about 30% of their
income for rent. Total Tenant Payment (TTP), typically consists of 30% of voucher
recipients‟ income, which is $294 per month on average. Female-headed households with
children pay $307 TTP per month. Families of elderly with children tend to pay more rent
than other types of families.

Table 2-6 TTP by family type
No Disabled
No Children

Disabled

Elderly

Non Elderly

Elderly

Non Elderly

$301

$286

$279

$254

$385

$347

With Children
$403
$303
Source: HUD (2010a), Resident Characteristic Report

34

As Table 2-7 shows, slightly over half of families are white (51%), followed by
African American 45%. Less than one out of five (18%) recipients report their ethnicity
as Hispanic or Latino.

Table 2-7 Distribution of family race
Race
category

White
only

Black/ African
American only

Asian
only

American Indian or
Alaskan Native only

Other
race

Percent

51

45

2

1

<1

Source: HUD (2010a), Resident Characteristic Report

The voucher program is successfully serving different types of families. Of the
1,885,987 families currently being served, 52% have children, and 39% are persons with
disabilities. Specifically, almost half (49%) of families are female-headed families with
children.

Table 2-8 Distribution of family type
No Disabled
Elderly
No Children

128,829

7%

Disabled

Non Elderly
193,123

10%

Elderly

Non Elderly

207,594

11%

367,352 19%

With Children
7113
0% 812,478 43% 13,344
Source: HUD (2010a), Resident Characteristic Report

1%

156,154

8%

Two bedroom housing units are the most commonly found types of housing for
families with vouchers (36%), followed by 3 bedrooms (31%) and then 1 bedroom (24%).
Finally, Table 2-9 shows how long voucher holders have resided within their current
units. About 30% have been in the same place for 5 to 10 years, 24% for 2 to 5 years, and
19% for more than 10 years, while 16% of families moved in their homes last year.
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Table 2-9 Voucher recipients‟ stay period
Stay
period

Moved in
past year

1–2
years

2–5
years

5 – 10 years

10 – 20
years

Over 20
years

Count

309,157

216,474

449,065

551,602

293,136

61,477

16

3

Percent
16
11
24
Source: HUD (2010a), Resident Characteristic Report
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2.3 Conclusion

Since the 1970s, providing public housing has widely recognized as a failure in
American public housing policy. In response to residential segregation by income, race,
and geography (central city versus suburbs), public housing policy has adopted radical
approach, resulting in demolition of older, dysfunctional public housing projects and
dispersal of subsidized households (Goetz, 2010). The Housing Choice Voucher program
intends to mitigate residential segregation by utilizing a portable voucher that gives
families a choice in their house in the private market. Funded by HUD, PHAs administer
the voucher program within their jurisdiction. HUD provides FMRs annually, which set a
standard for rental subsidies. FMRs vary by regions and tend to be higher in the nation‟s
major metropolitan areas. Voucher holders find their housing unit that meets the
requirement of proper rent levels and housing quality standards.
The voucher program has expanded its volume and importance. As a single
largest housing program, the voucher program serves about 2 million households today.
Also, the voucher program plays an important role in providing decent house for
vulnerable households. The majority of voucher recipients fall into extremely low36

income households; almost half of them are female-headed families with children; and a
significant portion of families are elderly or person with disabilities. As Sard (2001)
noted, the voucher program should be a major component of future housing policy for the
lowest income families since the voucher program meets the needs of and provides
flexibility for those families who, unless otherwise, have hardships in living in decent
house.
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CHAPTER III
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1 Theoretical Background of Spatial Segregation

Large metropolitan areas in the United States are segregated (Massey & Denton,
1987), in the face of significant efforts to mitigate housing discrimination. From 1960 to
1990 the poor were becoming increasingly concentrated by race and income into ghettos,
barrios, and slums (Jargowsky, 1997). Research efforts have been devoted to explain the
cause of spatial separation by income and race. None of factors can exclusively explain
the cause of the residential segregation. Yet, mechanisms of spatial separation fall into
following seven categories: natural process (Park & Burgess, 1925), personal preferences
(Schelling, 1971; Granovetter, 1978), economic and structural aspect (Wilson, 1987),
cultural aspect (Lewis, 1966), racial discrimination (Massey & Denton, 1993),
government role (Schill & Watcher, 1995), and resistance of landlords and
neighborhoods (Turner, Popkin, & Cunningham, 2000; Saints, Flavell, & Fox, 2009).
This section reviews the major theoretical perspectives on causes of residential
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segregation by income and race. These theoretical backgrounds illustrate how the housing
choice voucher program was structured to counteract the concentrated poverty and
minority population in the central cities.

3.1.1 Natural process: Invasion and succession
The Chicago school of sociologist used the term “invasion-succession” to
describe the replacement in one neighborhood with different racial or income groups.
Borrowing the concept from ecology, scholars of the Chicago school proposed human
ecology to explain the process of city growth. Burgess (1925) illustrated the typical
process of the expansion of a city as a series of concentric circles; the loop, zone in
transition, zone of workingmen‟s homes, residential zone, and commuters‟ zone. In this
model, working class homes are closely located to the central business district and
affluent households reside further from the city center. The expansion of cities was
explained by the process of invasion-succession. As a city grows, demand for space push
into the next outer ring (invasion), and residents who lived in the inner ring take over the
space of next zone (succession). Park (1936a) explicitly referred succession as the
movement of immigrant groups from the settlement near the centers of cities to areas of
second and third settlement, toward the periphery of the city. According to Park (1936b),
the driving force behind invasion-succession is competition between culturally defined
groups over land use.
As a result of invasion-succession process, residential areas were inevitably
segregated and poverty tended to concentrate in the area close to the central city while
suburbs were occupied by residents who can afford larger single family house and
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commuting costs. Even though Park and Burgess (1925) did not explicitly point this out,
their work implied the racial conflicts during succession process since the current
residents of the inner zone, minorities, tend to invade, succeed, and eventually occupy the
outer zone where whites were once the majority.
Developed at a time when the city grows quickly with the influx of new
immigrants, the human ecological model provided a logical explanation for the process of
city expansion and residential differentiation. However, the human ecological perspective
has been criticized for its linear nonreversible view on residential change. As Aldrich
(1975) argued, “succession generally begins with invasion along a fairly coherent line of
expansion, and, once begun, the process is rarely, if ever reversed” (p.334). Such a
conclusion may be correct when dealing with areas that are transforming from primarily
white to black or Hispanic dominant neighborhoods. However, the expansion of lowerincome groups may be halted or even reversed when middle-class groups reoccupy those
areas through the urban revitalization or gentrification process (Hudson, 1980).
The Chicago school explained residential differentiation as a natural process of
city growth; however, the residential segregation is also explained by the personal
preferences of others to live near people of similar backgrounds.

3.1.2. Personal preferences: Tipping point hypothesis and threshold

3.1.2.1 Schelling’s residential segregation model
Individual preferences are attributed to residential segregation either by race or by
income. Schelling (1971) contends that racial change is purely driven by preferences.
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Schelling (1971) was the first to suggest that threshold effects could play a significant
role in neighborhood change. He created a theoretical model that showed that different
racial groups prefer to be surrounded by different percentages of other racial groups, with
their group being the majority. When a certain threshold share of another group is
reached, tipping will occur as one or more of the other racial groups depart.
According to Schelling (1972), tipping is the mechanism that occurs “when some
recognizable minority group in a neighborhood reaches a size that motivates the other
residents to begin leaving” (p.157). Schelling (1972) asserted that tipping is not merely a
phenomenon that causes change in neighborhood occupancy, but is a mechanism or
process that generates the observable departure of the group that was formerly the
majority. For example, racial makeup of a white neighborhood will dramatically change
once the percentage of blacks in a neighborhood exceeds some threshold level; the black
population in the area will continue to increase until the neighborhood becomes mostly
black. Through individual preference, Schelling‟s model explains how neighborhoods
change their racial composition, furthering residential segregation. Schelling‟s
neighborhood segregation model has become widely cited and examined since residential
segregation is a serious social and political issue in the USA.
One of the most remarkable aspects is that Schelling‟s model accounts for
individual motives that give rise to change at the aggregate level. Even if some people
wished to live in mixed neighborhoods, the sum of the individual free choices would
generate still segregated communities. Not only is Schelling‟s model unusually simple,
but it also illustrates the idea of unintended consequences resulting from the interaction
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between individuals. Segregation occurs even though no individual explicitly chooses
this.

3.1.2.2 Granovetter’s threshold model of collective behavior
In addition to Schelling, Granovetter also demonstrated how collective outcomes
can be paradoxical and inconsistent with the intentions of the individuals. As Schelling
(1972) suggested, the tipping point represents a threshold (percentage of non-white
residents) at which whites are no longer comfortable moving into a racially mixed
neighborhood. Granovetter (1978) defined threshold as “the point where net benefits
begin to exceed net costs for … particular actor” (p. 1420). Based on this definition,
Granovetter showed how collective results occurred regardless of individuals‟ motives.
Granovetter (1978) argued that knowing the norms, preferences, motives, and
beliefs of participants in collective behavior can only provide a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for the explanation of outcomes. This is because outcomes cannot be
determined by any simple counting of preferences. So, he provided the model that the
collective outcomes can seem paradoxical, inconsistent with the intentions of the
individuals who generate them.
In his threshold model of collective behavior, Granovetter (1978) set several
assumptions. Actors have two distinct and mutually exclusive behavioral decisions. The
individuals are assumed rational; they act so as to maximize their utility. The crucial
concept is that individuals have a different threshold when they decide to move or not.
Thus, the threshold is that “point where the perceived benefits to an individual of doing
the thing in question exceed the perceived costs” (Granovetter, 1978, p. 1422).
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This model is valuable in helping to understand situations where outcomes do not
seem intuitively consistent with the underlying individual preferences. These collective
behaviors can be applied to explain residential segregation and neighborhood change as
well as migration patterns and rioting.
After Schelling and Granovetter‟s work, many researchers have tried to identify
the tipping point that causes racial segregation in a neighborhood (Goering, 1978; Clark,
1991; Galster, Quercia, & Cortes, 2000; Quercia & Galster, 1997; Laurie & Jaggin, 2003;
Granovetter & Soong, 1988; Galster, 1990). In the review of empirical research
conducted prior to 1978, Goering (1978) did not find concrete evidence in support of or
against the racial tipping hypothesis because there are other significant factors affecting a
household‟s decision to move that would cause a shift in neighborhood racial
composition. However, the tipping points for whites in the articles reviewed ranged from
a neighborhood black population reaching 25 to 30 percent. More recently, Galster
(1990) examined residential turnover rates in the Cleveland area. As a result, Galster
found that census tracts with 55 percent or more black population in 1970 experienced
the highest rate of racially motivated turnover in 1980. Also, tipping points varied from 2
to 47 percent black within one standard deviation of the mean level of white‟s
segregationist sentiments. The tipping points or threshold effects that have been widely
adopted in explaining neighborhood change or social disorder are income, unemployment
rate, crime rate, high school dropouts, welfare recipients, and housing investments
(Quercia & Galster, 2000). Based on the evidence of racially motivated neighborhood
change, scholars pointed out the importance of integration policy at the neighborhood
level (Glaster, 1990; Keating, 1994).
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However, the tipping point hypothesis was criticized by the presence and stability
of racially mixed neighborhoods since it assumed that once the black population exceeds
certain point, the threshold, then the neighborhood will inevitably become mostly
segregated black (Ottensmann, 1995; Ellen, 1998; Ellen, 2000). Due to the fact that
poverty concentration and racial segregation in urban space are not solely driven by
individual preference level, scholars attempted to explain the segregation and poverty
phenomenon considering structural, economic change as a whole.

3.1.3 Structural aspect of poverty concentration
As opposed to aforementioned theories that the neighborhood spatial segregation
are caused by natural process and personal preference, Wilson (1987) argued that poverty
concentration should be understood in the context of urban structural change.
Wilson (1987) explained the process of poverty concentration and racial
segregation in inner city neighborhoods as the result of economic structural change. An
influx of young minority population in central cities occurred at a time when the basic
economy transformed from production to a service oriented structure. The flow of
migrants was associated with age structure and unemployment since black migrants in
central cities had been relatively younger, predicting lower probability of high income
than for whites. Also, a young demographic structure would explain disproportionately
increasing rates of social dislocation in the central city such as crime. At the same time,
unskilled minority workforces were vulnerable to economic shifts that require higher
levels of education. The structural economic changes included the “shift from goodsproducing to service-producing industries, the increasing polarization of the labor market
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into low-wage and high-wage sectors, technological innovation, and the relocation of
manufacturing industries out of the central cities ” (p.39). As a consequence, there were
significant job losses in industries with lower education requirements while job growth
concentrated in industries requiring higher levels of education. Furthermore, the
movement of middle and working class black professionals from the inner city had
resulted in a concentration of disadvantaged black poor, which Wilson called the ghetto
underclass. Thus, under the environment of economic shifts and residential movement,
unprepared young minorities had less chance to survive and find stable job opportunities,
and were left behind in central cities resulting in spatially concentrated poverty and racial
segregation.
Wilson (1987) stressed the importance of middle and working class families
whose presence acts as role models in ghetto neighborhoods. The author referred to those
families as a social buffer that help demonstrate the importance of regular employment
and education as well as prevent concentration effects. The presence of a sufficient
number of working- and middle-class professional families acts to “absorb the shock or
cushion the effect of uneven economic growth and periodic recessions on inner-city
neighborhoods” (p.144).
The concentration effects were used to capture the differences in the experiences
of low income families who live in the inner city areas from the experiences of those who
live in other parts of the central city. As a result of social transformation of the inner city,
a disproportionate uneducated and poor black population was concentrated. Along with
the social buffer, concentration effects are important to understand the significance of
structural change of the inner city. As Wilson (1987) defined,
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Concentration effects refer to the constraints and opportunities associated with
living in a neighborhood in which the population is overwhelmingly socially
disadvantaged – constraints and opportunities that include the kinds of ecological
niches that the residents of these communities occupy in terms of access to jobs,
availability of marriageable partners, and exposure to conventional role models.
(p.144)

Those vulnerable poor minorities in the inner city have less chance to get stable
jobs, resulting in joblessness, poverty, female-headed families, and welfare dependency
in the face of economic change since 1970, despite the creation of several new policies
such as Great Society programs and antidiscrimination and affirmative action programs.
Wilson (1987) suggested policy implications to alleviate the problems of
concentrated inner city poverty. The most realistic approach would be to provide the
disadvantaged families with the resources that promote social mobility, which will lead to
geographic mobility. In addition, elimination of government practices that enhance
poverty concentration will improve the economic and educational resources of inner city
residents; those practices include the location of public housing in poor neighborhoods
where the minorities are concentrated and the manipulation of zoning and land use
controls to prevent construction of affordable housing. Confronting conservative
arguments which are skeptical to this approach and favorable to the culture of poverty
concept, Wilson asserted that “cultural values emerge from specific circumstances and
life chances and reflect an individual‟s position in the class structure” (p.158).
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Wilson‟s (1987) work sheds light on the importance of urban structural change in
understanding the cause of poverty and minority concentration in the inner city.
Consistent exposure to an environment that lacks role models reinforces social
dislocation and constrains social mobility of poor people. Researchers have empirically
confirmed a consistent relationship between spatial isolation and social dislocation such
as high rates of teenage pregnancy, poor school performance, and welfare dependency
(Jargowsky, 2003; Clark, 1991; Crane, 1991).

3.1.4 Racial discrimination
Massey and Denton (1993) stressed the importance of racial discrimination as a
major motive of poverty concentration. As illustrated earlier, Wilson (1987) pointed out
the role of neighborhood sorting, one of the causes contributing to the concentration of
poor minorities in inner city, which refers to the flight of working- and middle-class
black populations from the inner city resulting in poverty concentration and economic
segregation. Massey and Denton (1993), however, challenged this hypothesis. They
claimed that racial discrimination and segregation play a pivotal role in poverty
concentration, not the economic segregation that Wilson proposed. Massey (1990)
illustrated the mechanism of how racial segregation acts to concentrate poverty without
the movement of middle-class minority members from the ghetto.
According to Massey and Denton (1993), many Americans view the residential
segregation of blacks as a natural outcome of impersonal social and economic forces;
however, they argue that this is not the case,

47

This extreme racial isolation did not just happen; it was manufactured by whites
through a series of self-conscious actions and purposeful institutional
arrangements that continue today. (p.2)

Due to residential segregation, blacks inevitably face an environment that is
abundant in poverty, joblessness, out-of-wedlock birth, welfare dependency, educational
failure, and social and physical deterioration, which are similar to what Wilson called
social dislocation. As Massey and Denton (1993) argued, the effect of persistent exposure
to this destructive environment on personal well-being is not individual but structural. It
limits the opportunities of black people beyond individual motivations and personal
characteristics. Even further, Massey and Fischer (2000) provided the evidence that the
degree of racial and ethnic segregation can cause differences in the effects of changes in
socioeconomic structure. Hence, racial segregation is of central importance in
understanding residential segregation.
Based on empirical analysis, however, Jargowsky (1997) contended that racial
segregation plays a lesser role than Massey and Denton purported, because they failed to
explain why increases in concentrations of poverty occurred despite reduction in racial
segregation during the 1970s and the 1990s. According to Jargowsky (1997), although
racial segregation is fundamental in understanding the presence of poverty stricken black
neighborhoods, the empirical evidence to support their thesis that racial segregation plays
a direct role in the increase of such neighborhoods is mixed at best. Instead, Jargowsky
(1997) argued that “racial and economic segregation play secondary roles, and their
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importance varies depending on whether we are examining the levels of ghetto poverty in
1970, 1980, and 1990 or the changes in ghetto poverty in recent decades” (p.144).
Nonetheless, a series of studies to address residential segregation by race
confirmed the presence of racial discrimination and geographic steering that cause
residential segregation. From the results of paired testing conducted over the last several
decades confirmed the presence and significance of housing discrimination based on race
and ethnicity. As a tool to enforce fair housing laws that outlaw discrimination in housing
on the basis of race and ethnicity, paired testing used a pair of employees who acted
actual home-seekers with the same financial ability, expressing the same preference but
the only differences between the two were the race and ethnicity. They separately visited
real estate or rental agents to ask about available housing.
Two previous paired-tests, conducted in 1977 Housing Market Practice Study and
the 1989 housing discrimination study, revealed a significant degree of racial and ethnic
discrimination in the housing market, both rental and sales, nationwide. The recent study
in 2000, launched by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
was conducted in twenty two large metropolitan areas with rigorous design. Each house
or apartment was randomly selected through local advertisements; one white and one
minority tester were assigned to visit each house or apartment to visit; they were identical
with the same level of income, debt, and assets except the race or ethnicity (Turner &
Ross, 2005).
The housing discrimination study in 2000 indicated that minorities still face
significant discrimination even though the level of discrimination has generally declined
since 1989. The presence of housing discrimination is not place specific but rather is a
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national phenomenon. More importantly, geographic steering was identified as an
important form of discrimination while other measures of discrimination were less
prominent when compared with the previous study. Minorities are steered to mixed or
minority neighborhoods: African Americans are told about fewer neighborhoods overall;
are shown less homes in predominantly white neighborhoods; hear favorable things about
less affluent neighborhoods. On the contrary, whites are encouraged to consider more
affluent neighborhoods and more predominantly white neighborhoods than comparable
blacks or Hispanics (Turner & Ross, 2005). The presence of geographic steering may
help create and sustain residential segregation by race and ethnicity.

3.1.5 Cultural explanation
One of the explanations of the causes of persistent poverty is the cultural aspect.
Cultural explanations for the poor can be traced to the work of Oscar Lewis who
identified a culture of poverty. Based on observations and life history data in Latin
American poverty, Lewis (1966) described the culture of poverty as “both an adaptation
and a reaction of the poor to their marginal position in a class-stratified, highly
individuated, capitalistic society” (p.21). However, Lewis also viewed the traits of culture
of poverty as intergenerational influence, stating
Once the culture of poverty has come into existence it tends to perpetuate itself.
By the time slum children are six or seven they have usually absorbed the basic
attitudes and values of their subculture. Thereafter they are psychologically
unready to take full advantage of changing conditions or improving opportunities
that may develop in their lifetime. (p.21)
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Because the members of the marginal communities believe success is impossible
to achieve, they respond to their hopelessness and despair in a way that is called culture
of poverty, typified by a lack of impulse control, a strong present-time orientation, and
little ability to defer gratification. Hence, culture of poverty as a subculture of ghetto
communities has been internalized and influenced behavior over the generations.
Although Lewis stated the connection between these cultural traits with structural
conditions in society, Lewis‟ explanation has been widely criticized as “blaming the
victim” because he argued that the culture of poverty had intergenerational influence, and
it became an independent cause of poverty. In addition, Lewis‟s culture of poverty thesis
has been criticized for being too deterministic and diverting attention away from the
structural causes of poverty (Curley, 2005). According to Massey and Denton (1993),
black disadvantages were attributed not to a defective culture but to the persistence of
institutional racism in the United States. Wilson (1987) also criticized that the culture of
poverty by placing strong emphasis on the autonomous character of the cultural traits
once they come into existence. As Jargowsky (1997) pointed out, “neighborhood poverty
is not primarily the product of „the people who live there‟ or a „ghetto culture‟ that
discourages upward mobility” (p.193). Rather, the cultural traits of the poor should be
viewed more appropriately as symptoms and consequences, not as the root cause of
poverty and community distress (O‟Connor, 2001).
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3.1.6 Government’s role in concentrated poverty and creating housing
segregation
The government has played a significant role in the concentration of poverty and
minority populations through its implementations of housing policy. Public housing has
historically been located in the poorest neighborhoods and contributed to poverty
concentration due to the income limitations that usually accompany subsidized housing
projects. Schill and Wachter (1995b) examined how the public housing program has
contributed to the concentration of poverty in the inner city. They pointed out several
factors affecting poverty concentration in the central city such as government structure,
local mismanagement, and income limitations. First of all, the federal government was
removed from the decision of where to place public housing after the Louisville case in
1935, which decided that providing housing for low income workers was “not a public
purpose and beyond the scope of the government‟s eminent domain powers” (p.1291).
After this court decision, local governments became responsible for choosing the location
of public housing in their jurisdiction. Instead of being dispersed through metropolitan
governments, public housing was primarily placed in the central city since most suburban
authorities did not accept construction of housing for the poor. Along with suburban
reluctance to participate in the program, the requirement known as “equivalent
elimination” also played a role in excluding suburbs because this provision mandated that
one unit of substandard housing should be eliminated for each unit of public housing
constructed. Suburban governments were sometimes unable to participate in the public
housing program simply because most suburbs did not have enough substandard housing
(Schill & Wachter, 1995b).
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Locating public housing in central cities often resulted in high density
developments since the land values in central city were relatively higher than the
periphery. Mass construction of high density towers ensured anonymity among residents,
causing security problems and losing sense of community. Along with poor management
by local public housing authorities, public housing have also been isolated from outside
of the projects and often occupied by minorities. In addition, income requirements
exacerbated the situations. Contrary to the intention to provide decent housing for the
poor, income limitations ensured the poor would live in housing that was already filled
with poor households. Plus, the income ceiling forced those who exceed maximum
income levels to move out of the public housing (Schill & Wachter, 1995b). Through
those processes, the inner city has been overconcentrated with a poor minority population,
especially in public housing sites. Contrary to their poor investment in underprivileged
areas, the federal government has actively promoted home ownership among the working
poor and the middle class through mortgage assistance programs. According to Schill and
Watcher (1995b), these programs have sometimes had the effect of destabilizing innercity communities and contributing to their transformation into ghettos.
Goetz (2003) also made a similar argument to Schill and Watcher (1995b). Goetz
identified the implementation of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 as a contributor to the
flight of the black middle class from inner cities. Plus, homeownership assistance
programs provided middle class blacks and whites the opportunity to move to new
suburbs, while the poor were left behind in the inner city neighborhoods with few
resources that could help stabilize neighborhoods or help them move to the suburbs.
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At the local government level, the practice of zoning systems is also attributable
to residential segregation. Local governments have utilized zoning ordinances to maintain
socially and economically homogeneous neighborhoods, resulting in a stable tax base.
Common use of zoning ordinances includes minimum lot size, minimum floor space,
restriction of building multi-family housing, maximum density limitations, and other land
use controls. Zoning regulations affect the land prices that comprise a substantial portion
of housing prices. Under the circumstances, the construction of affordable housing
becomes costly, and limited, or sometimes prohibited; effectively excluding low income
minorities (Seitles, 1998).
Downs (1991) indicated three reasons that local governments‟ regulations exclude
affordable housing in their jurisdictions. The reasons are economic, social, and political
motivation. The economic reason is that homeowners fear the lower-priced housing in
proximity to their own, which would reduce the market prices of their homes. Since
housing is the single largest asset of most homeowners, they tend to be afraid of lowering
value of that asset. The second motive is primarily social. Invasion of low-income
residents might produce negative externalities in mostly middle and upper-income
suburbs. Undesirable consequences include rising crime rates and drug use. In addition,
construction of high density housing could cause congestion of local facilities. Hence,
residents in affluent suburbs support local regulations that cause residential and economic
segregation. The third motive is more political and fiscal. Local governments desire
ensuring a community‟s tax base by keeping local housing prices rising steadily. By
excluding high-density housing for lower-income residents, the local governments can
maintain a tax base without increasing tax rates. As Downs (1991) mentioned, “this gives
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the members of local government itself a strong motive for maintaining high housing
prices in their communities” (p.1116).
The underlying structure enabling local government to restrict housing for lowincome households lies in the fragmented political system that has resulted in
independent local governments. The issue about land use remains in the hand of state
governments because the U.S. Constitution says little about it. Historically, land use
decisions delegated to local governments from state governments. Local governments
have been responsible to handle the local zoning regulations. Initially started from desires
of landowners and municipalities to restrict nuisance, local land regulations have evolved
to separate people of different income and color, to stabilize property values, and to
protect single-family homes. Only recently they have begun to embrace regional
approaches such as growth management. Only a few states, such as California,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Oregon, require local governments to provide housing
opportunities to all income groups (Nelson, Pendall, Dawkins, & Knaap, 2002; Pendall,
Puentens, & Martin, 2006).
Researchers found that there is a relationship between the types of land use
regulations and the availability of affordable housing. Metropolitan areas that adopt
traditional land use regulations are more likely to have low densities and less likely to
provide housing opportunities for lower-income residents than those that have embraced
growth management tools (Pendall et al., 2006). Specifically, Pendall (2000b) referred to
the process as “chain of exclusion”. Discriminatory results of land use controls affect the
housing market, excluding minorities from wealthy communities. As a consequence,
areas that utilize restrictive land use control, such as low-density zoning, tended to reduce
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rental housing in their jurisdiction, and substantially limit minority residents as well
(Pendall, 2000b).

3.1.7 Landlord’s resistance and NIMBY phenomenon
In reality, residential separation is caused by individual discrimination or
collective action of neighborhoods. Low-income households with rental subsidies have
faced landlords‟ rejection in renting an appropriate house. More collectively, residents in
wealthier neighborhoods have resisted locating housing projects for lower-income
households through land use politics.
Since the voucher program has operated based on voluntary participation of
landlords, many voucher holders have had hardships in finding their house when
landlords discriminate voucher holders. Even though participating in the voucher
program ensures landlords stable rents, it has not been enough to appeal many landlords
to accept voucher holders. The Census Bureau (1998) reported several reasons on this
issue. According to a survey conducted in 1995 for property owners and managers who
have rental units, over 42% of property owners responded not to accept voucher holders.
One of the most frequently mentioned reasons of refusing subsidized tenants involved the
program structure itself. Participating in the voucher program requires landlords to
comply with regulations such as housing quality standards and periodic inspections.
Landlords pointed out “too many regulations” and “too much paperwork” as the causes
of reluctance to join the program. Additionally, the survey found out that many landlords
were not well informed with the program: less than one in six owners of rental units were
familiar with the voucher program. Even further, property owners of affordable units
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were less likely to be familiar with the program than owners of more expensive ones.
This fact is consistent with findings from Kennedy and Finkel (1994). Using focus group
study, they concluded that most participants ended up renting from the same set of
landlords who are familiar with the voucher program.
At the same time, discrimination against voucher holders is related with
behavioral problems and stereotypes. The survey (Census Bureau, 1998) pointed out that
landlords expressed concerns about problems with tenants. In particular, landlords fear
that renting to poor families would cause property damage, noise, crime, overcrowding,
and illegal activities, since voucher holders tend to have many children and are more
likely to stay at home all day because of unemployment (Turner et al., 2000; JohnsonSpratt, 1999). Furthermore, as Beck (1996) described, voucher recipients faced
discrimination simply because of receiving rental subsidies.
Regardless of their eventual success or failure in finding housing, most recipients
experience discrimination from at least one landlord because of their Section 8
status. Possession of a Section 8 subsidy marks its holder as a low-income person,
a status that with it a multitude of negative stereotypes. (pp.161-162)

In response, several states and local governments prohibit discrimination against
voucher holders based on the source of income. For example, city ordinances, county
ordinances, or state statutes are providing in some jurisdictions of California, Maryland,
and Washington. However, these protections have faced judicial challenges, questioning
whether such laws are appropriate (Sterken, 2009).
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In addition to individual landlords, the NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard)
phenomenon, especially in the suburbs, has effectively limited most lower-income
housing to inner cities. Saints et al. (2009) described this process as land use politics.
Zoning regulations are created, amended, and enforced at the local level, which makes
zoning a local issue. Local land use is mostly controlled by local ordinances and local
boards. Local politicians do their best in response to residents in order to reelect or keep
their position safe. Local residents oppose a project that would adversely affect their
property, which is usually the single most important investment for their lives. Citizens
raise their voices based on their perceptions and accordingly act to oppose change in their
neighborhoods. These changes, so called LULU (locally unwanted land uses), usually
include public housing projects and affordable housing for low-income households. As
Saints et al. (2009) noted,
Land use proposals affect people‟s perceptions – and in politics, perception is
reality. His perception of the potential danger is real, and it is irrelevant whether
the perception reflects objective truth. What counts is that the person believes it
and acts accordingly. … What people think and believe informs how they act,
speak, and vote, even (or especially) if they are, objectively speaking, wrong. (pp.
3-5)

As a result, individually or collectively, property owners have tried to limit
exposure to externalities, reduce competition for public services, keep neighborhood
homogeneous, and protect their property values, consequently excluding poor minority
households.
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3.1.8 Conclusion
As reviewed above, residential segregation by income and race cannot be solely
explained by a single theory since it has involved various aspects encompassing from
individual preferences and prejudice, economic structural changes, institutional
discrimination, to policy practices and land use regulations. The Housing Choice
Voucher Program was created to challenge race and economic segregation by
encouraging program participants to move into mixed income, racially diverse
neighborhoods which are usually located in the suburbs. Residents living in
neighborhoods with high poverty and minorities would be consistently exposed to the
risk of being unemployed, poor, and dependent to welfare. As Wilson (1987) asserted, in
order to alleviate the problems of concentrated poverty, one of the pragmatic approaches
is to give the poor a chance to live outside of the distressed neighborhoods in the inner
cities. The voucher program is designed to counterbalance previous federal policies that
caused poverty and minority concentration in the inner city.

3.2 Literature Review

3.2.1 Introduction
The Housing Choice Voucher Program seeks to promote choice or mobility
among its recipients by enabling them to select the housing of their choice and to
promote economically mixed-income neighborhoods by utilizing the private market to
provide housing for low-income individuals and families (U.S. House, 2003). Due to
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portability, the voucher program enables qualified families to choose their place to live,
expecting to move into more affluent neighborhoods than they lived before. Many
believe that the voucher program offers recipients greater locational choices, contributing
to poverty deconcentration and race desegregation.
There are broadly two categories of literature relevant to answering the questions
regarding whether the voucher program has contributed to achieving deconcentration and
desegregation goals: location outcomes of voucher recipients and factors affecting their
location outcomes. Numerous studies have attempted to find the location outcomes of
voucher recipients from the onset of the program. The majority have analyzed location
outcomes of vouchers using traditional a-spatial analysis, while spatial analysis has been
utilized more in recent literature to identify the location of concentrations.
Research efforts have identified the factors limiting or enlarging voucher holders‟
location choice; these factors include individual needs of voucher households,
accessibility to public transportation, availability of affordable housing, race, market
conditions, and landlords‟ participation in the program.

3.2.2 Location outcome of voucher recipients
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has encouraged
housing voucher families to relocate to low-poverty neighborhoods through housing in
the private market. Often, this goal has been regarded as a success, while sometimes the
findings do not confirm the goal has been achieved. The evaluation of the voucher
program has usually been conducted by a comparison of the poverty rate and a proportion
of minority groups in the census tract by different time, and/or different types of housing
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projects. The extent to which the housing choice voucher program meets the goal of
deconcentration of poverty varies by location, such as the inner city or suburban areas,
and is relatively positive when compared to public housing residents. To date, vouchers
appear to have been less effective in promoting racial and ethnic integration than in
helping to deconcentrate poverty.
However, the majority of studies are a-spatial since they compare several
indicators in a format of simple cross tabulation. Recently, the spatial approach has
increased in use when identifying the location of voucher concentrations over space
(Oakley & Burchfield, 2009; Wang & Varady, 2005; Wang et al., 2008; Wyly &
DeFilippis, 2010). In the following section, research efforts are reviewed as to how well
the voucher program contributes to poverty deconcentration and race desegregation,
incorporating the traditional a-spatial approach and the spatial approach.

3.2.2.1 Poverty deconcentration
The voucher program has effectively addressed some of the serious shortcomings
of traditional, project-based housing programs. Many research efforts have found that the
voucher program has contributed to poverty deconcentration of residents, specifically
compared to public housing residents. One of the recent comprehensive researches from
HUD, Devine, Gray, Rubi, and Taghavi (2003) investigated the locational patterns of
housing voucher recipients residing in the 50 largest metropolitan areas using the
Multifamily Tenant Characteristics Study and the 1990 census data. They discovered that
almost 30% of voucher recipients live in the low poverty census tract with poverty
concentrations below 10%, and less than 10% of voucher holders live in the high poverty
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census tract with poverty concentrations above 40%. However, the poverty
deconcentration also varied by location; central city residents were more likely to live in
a high poverty area. Only 6% of residents who live in suburban areas live in the high
poverty census tract with poverty concentration above 30% compared to more than 33%
of recipients in the central city.
In research to evaluate the Welfare to Work Voucher program, Mills et al. (2006)
also reported that voucher recipients had a better residential location such as lower
poverty rate, lower minority concentration. HUD intended to assess the net impacts of the
Welfare to Work Voucher program on housing conditions, employment outcomes, and
family well being. This was the result from the five-year research period using total
sample of 8,371 families who was randomly assigned over the six sites in the country.
Varady and Walker (2000) found that households relocated from four distressed
developments in Baltimore, Newport News, VA, Kansas City, MO, and San Francisco
resided in less impoverished neighborhoods. Likewise, Patterson et al. (2004) discovered
that participants in the Welfare to Work Voucher Program moved to better
neighborhoods with voucher subsidies.
Early evidence suggests that Section 8 vouchers can be successful in helping
public housing residents relocate to low-poverty neighborhoods. Kingsley et al. (2003)
found that public housing residents who received vouchers as a result of relocation
through the HOPE VI program moved to neighborhoods that were less distressed than
their original neighborhoods.
When compared to project-based housing, voucher housing is likely to be located
in lower poverty neighborhoods. One of the most distinguished results was from

62

Newman and Schnare‟s (1997) work. They discovered that only 5.3% of voucher
recipients nationwide lived in high-poverty neighborhoods, while 36.3% of public
housing and 12.6% of other HUD-assisted units did. In addition, Hartung and Henig
(1997) analyzed the census tract data for racial deconcentration and economic integration
of tenant-based housing and public housing in the Washington D.C. Metropolitan area.
They found that voucher holders tend to be located in census tracts with higher median
household incomes compared to public housing, while public housing tends to be located
in census tracts of low median household incomes. Also, they discovered that voucher
recipients were more evenly spread throughout the city and suburbs than project based
housing units. In addition, Devine et al. (2003) also reported the similar results. Whereas
22% of tenant-based voucher families live in neighborhoods that are at or above the
moderate-poverty threshold, close to 46% of those participating in project-based section 8
and fully two-thirds of those participating in the public housing program live in such
neighborhoods. In fact, almost one-half of public housing families live in neighborhoods
above the 40% poverty threshold. Similarly, Turner and Wilson‟s (1998) study in six
metropolitan areas indicated that, compared with public housing residents, voucher
holders are less likely to live in high-poverty neighborhoods.
As shown above, there are several results supporting the facts that the voucher
program helps low-income families move into low-poverty areas; however, there are also
different outcomes of the voucher holders‟ location pattern. When Feins and Patterson
(2005) examined the geographic mobility of families with children who entered the
voucher program between 1995 and 2002, they found inconclusive results. Overall, about
75% of the families moved during the same period and moving at least once was

63

associated with small improvements in neighborhood quality. Voucher families with
children moved to neighborhoods which have a slightly lower poverty concentration than
the ones from which they moved. However, the degree of change in concentrated poverty
was very small; based on this study, it is hard to confirm that the voucher program
contributes to poverty deconcentration. In addition, a comparison with Low Income
Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) did not provide evidence as to how well the voucher
program facilitates poverty deconcentration. Comparing the effect of vouchers and
LIHTC in six metropolitan areas, Deng (2007) found that voucher recipients were less
likely than LIHTC tenants to live in very low-income neighborhoods, but more likely to
live in low-income neighborhoods.
On the contrary, there is also contradictory evidence that voucher holders tend to
cluster in specific neighborhoods which are not significantly different from public
housing residents. Guhathakurta and Mushkatel (2000) examined the locational patterns
of three types of subsidized housing, including conventional project-based, Section 8, and
shelter plus care supported housing in Phoenix, Arizona. The results showed that these
programs were reinforcing the existing concentration of subsidized housing in some
neighborhoods, and voucher programs did not achieve the goal of deconcentration of the
poor. Rather, the census tract with the concentration of voucher housing reflected the
similar socioeconomic attributes of project-based public housing concentration, such as
low incomes, high percentage of minorities, and high unemployment.
Research on public housing relocates also found that even though voucher
contributed to relocate former public housing tenants to low-poverty neighborhoods, they
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tended to cluster in minority neighborhoods with moderate poverty rates (Kingsley et al.,
2003).
Combined with LIHTC projects, voucher holders tend to live in poverty
concentrated neighborhoods which provide incentives to construct LIHTC projects. One
of studies discovered that almost one half of all LIHTC developments had at least one
resident with a voucher (Climaco et al., 2006). In addition, a recent study also showed
that over 30% of LIHTC units in poverty concentrated neighborhoods had voucher
holders. The LIHTC housing in poverty concentrated areas was more likely to be
occupied by voucher recipients. This location outcome of vouchers may cause even
greater concentrations of poor households in troubled neighborhoods that already suffer
from a high concentration of the poor (Williamson et al., 2009). The LIHTC is a potential
source of housing for voucher holders; however, it is difficult to prove that living in
LIHTC housing constructed in troubled neighborhoods supports the policy goal of
dispersal of voucher holders away from areas of concentrated poverty. Even further,
analysis of national datasets across several housing programs revealed that vouchers were
not helping renters locate in low-poverty areas any more effectively than were current
project-based subsidies (McClure, 2008).
While participating in the voucher program gives families an advantage over
those in place-based subsidy program, the residential choice of voucher families are not
significantly different from those of unassisted families. When compared with unassisted
rental households, voucher participants were not much different in terms of their ability
to avoid poverty concentrated neighborhoods (Newman & Schnare, 1997; Devine et al.,
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2003). Voucher families were only slightly more likely to live in high-poverty
neighborhoods than unsubsidized tenants living in affordable units (Devine et al., 2003).
There is a recent study supporting the evidence that vouchers were closed tied to
neighborhood poverty (DeFilippis & Wyly, 2008). To examine the relationship between
poverty and vouchers, they conducted the regression analysis. The result revealed that the
link between housing assistance and neighborhood poverty was strongest for vouchers,
not for project-based units. Based on the findings, they concluded that the voucher
program clearly failed to break the link between neighborhood poverty if poverty was
used as the indicator of program success, at least for the case of New York City.
Different from the traditional approach reviewed above, recent efforts have
considered the spatial pattern and location of clusters of voucher households (Oakley &
Burchfield, 2009; Wang & Varady, 2005; Wang et al., 2008; Wyly & DeFilippis, 2010).
As far as the policy goal is concerned, Wang et al. (2008) did not find enough evidence
that the voucher program had contributed to poverty deconcentration. Using hot spot
analysis in eight U.S. metropolitan areas, Wang et al. (2008) concluded that there was
little evidence that the voucher program was promoting poverty or minority
deconcentration. They failed to find the supporting evidence that the voucher program
had contributed to promoting income and race diversity since the proportion of voucher
households in high-poverty and high-minority block groups remained stable during the
2000 to 2005 period. They also indicated that although voucher recipients were becoming
less concentrated in hot spots in Chicago and Phoenix, the opposite was true in the other
metropolitan areas, especially in New York, Cincinnati, and Baltimore. Based on their
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findings, it is hard to confirm that HCVP has positively affected neighborhood diversity
and contributed to deconcentration of poverty.
Using spatial analytic techniques, Oakley and Burchfield (2009) analyzed the
spatial pattern of voucher holders who relocated from public housing projects in Chicago.
They identified significant spatial clustering of voucher holders, and this pattern
negatively related with factors indicating neighborhood disadvantages, such as, poverty
rate, unemployment rate, and minority composition. Their findings showed that voucher
housing tends to be clustered in poor African American neighborhoods where the
majority of relocated public housing residents settle.
A more recent study in New York revealed disappointing results regarding how
the voucher program fails to achieve poverty concentration. Wyly and DeFilippis (2010)
analyzed three types of housing programs in New York including conventional public
housing, project-based Section 8, and housing voucher holders. Contrary to program
expectations, voucher holders are more likely to live in poverty stricken neighborhoods
than public housing residents. More than 40% of voucher recipients live in
neighborhoods where there is a significant spatial clustering of severe poverty, while less
than 30% of public housing residents do so. A more rigorous analysis to disentangle the
relative effects of different types of housing on neighborhood poverty confirms the
spatial pattern of concentration. In this study, several models were utilized from ordinary
least squares regression (OLS), through spatial models, to geographically weighted
regression. Yet, all models confirmed that even after controlling for racial composition
and spatial autocorrelation, vouchers had a stronger link to the neighborhood poverty rate
than all the other types of housing projects. Specifically, voucher holders‟ location choice
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was inevitably confined to the outlying parts of the city, implying that vouchers play a
significant role in poverty reconcentration in these areas.
On the other hand, even though clustering of voucher recipients is a cause of
concern in several neighborhoods, national research suggests that clustering is not a
widespread problem. Devine et al. (2003) indicated that vouchers are occupied in only a
small portion of the total occupied housing stock. Similarly, Kingsley et al. (2003) stated
that only a few sites witnessed the clustering, which means a large number of relocated
households were living in the same census tracts as when they analyzed HUD
administrative data.

3.2.2.2 Race desegregation
While many efforts have been devoted to finding out whether the voucher
program helps poverty deconcentration, researchers have also been interested in the
location outcomes of race. A recent study discovered that the voucher program helped
prevent minority concentration in poor neighborhoods (McClure, 2008). An analysis
using the national database of LIHTC and voucher holders indicated that race and
ethnicity appeared to play a significant role in how well the voucher program promotes
movement to low-poverty areas. Minority voucher households did not locate in lowpoverty tracts at the same rate as others. In this analysis, only 17% of black and 19% of
Hispanic voucher households lived in low-poverty census tracts, which were well below
the percentage of affordable units, total black households, and total Hispanic households:
30%, 26%, and 29% respectively.
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Also, a case study of Columbus, OH implied that racial desegregation has been
successful in that area (Teater, 2008). The researcher analyzed the survey data of
residential mobility and found that the mobility of voucher recipients did not predict a
change in poverty, and a recipient‟s race did not predict a change in racial composition.
The findings suggested that poverty deconcentration and racial desegregation had been
achieved in the study area.
Hartung and Henig (1997) compared location outcomes of the voucher programs
and project-based programs in the Washington, DC area. They reported a positive result.
The authors found that voucher and certificate holders were less concentrated in poor and
minority neighborhoods than residents of project-based public housing. They also
specifically focused their research on whether vouchers promote racial integration and
the dispersal of low-income residents throughout a metropolitan area. They discovered
that both public housing and project-based subsidized housing were far more
concentrated in the District of Columbia than certificates and vouchers. Vouchers were
more evenly spread throughout the city and suburbs.
Furthermore, nationwide study conducted by Newman and Schnare (1997) also
provided a positive outcome. When neighborhoods were defined as segregated, more
than 40% of households were headed by minorities, the vouchers appeared more
integrated than public housings and other HUD subsidized units: 26.4%, 55.4%, and
34.5% respectively. In a study of six metropolitan areas, Turner and Wilson (1998) also
found that black and Hispanic voucher recipients are more likely to live in high-poverty
neighborhoods than their white counterparts.
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However, analyzing data from the experimental design study of the Effects of
Housing Vouchers on Welfare Families, Gubits et al. (2009) reported that the voucher
program had some effect on diminishing racial concentration by enabling African
American families to move to more racially diverse neighborhoods. However, the effects
were modest in size and concentrated among black families who started in the poorest
and most racially segregated neighborhoods. Based on their findings the authors
remarked that “we cannot rely on vouchers by themselves … to reduce racial
concentrations” (p.3).
Moreover, many research efforts have also shown that the voucher program did
not work well in race desegregation. One of the studies found that minority voucher
recipients were more likely to end up in high-poverty neighborhoods than nonminority
recipients, even after controlling other factors (Basolo & Ngyuen, 2005). Based on the
findings, they concluded that “the assumption that choice will result in deconcentrating
poverty and minorities is not strongly supported by our data” (p.319). Similar result
found in other site. DeFilippis and Wyly (2008) compared project-based and tenant-based
housing assistance in New York City. They reported that the voucher program as a
deconcentration mechanism, did not work better than project-based programs. The racial
composition of each program‟s clients closely mirrored the neighborhoods in which they
live. Combined together, those findings strongly suggest that the voucher program did not
promote the deconcentration of poverty or the desegregation of people of color, relative
to the project-based housing program.
Furthermore, Polikoff (1995) found evidence that voucher recipients were simply
relocating to neighborhoods with similar racial characteristics. Specifically, 7,500
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voucher recipients in 19 public housing agencies were tracked and census data used to
compare characteristics of their pre-program and post-program neighborhoods. The level
of concentration at the neighborhood level did not change when pre-program and postprogram locations were compared.
In addition, McClure‟s (2004) study showed that in Kansas City, voucher
recipients did not use vouchers to move to areas of greater employment opportunity, but
rather, remained in racially concentrated areas with fewer job prospects. Still, voucher
concentrations were most likely to be found in predominantly minority communities with
high proportions of poverty rate. Black and Hispanic voucher holders were more likely
than White households to live in census tracts with poverty concentrations above 30%
(Devine et al., 2003). Even though minority voucher holders were less likely to be found
in low-poverty areas compared to the total minority population, the degree of fostering
deconcentration was not an impressive amount (McClure, 2008). With an analysis of
national databases, McClure (2008) concluded that the project-based LIHTC program has
been more effective in deconcentrating low income households into low-poverty areas
than the household-based voucher program.
Despite conflicting results, the voucher program seems to perform relatively
better than place-based housing programs in terms of poverty deconcentration and race
desegregation. This is no surprise considering the origin and the characteristics of the
voucher program; the program was developed to address the deep rooted problem of
poverty concentration in public housing. The voucher program enables low-income
households to move out of poor neighborhoods through portable vouchers allowing
freedom of choice to reside. However, recent studies also identified the poor performance
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of the voucher program in dispersing poor residents over a wider geographic area.
Several factors were attributed to reasons why voucher holders tend to concentrate or
inevitably choose to live in poor neighborhoods: voucher holder preferences (individual
needs), the accessibility to public transportation, the availability of affordable housing,
market conditions, and landlords‟ participation in the voucher program. These factors
will be examined in the following section.

3.2.3 Factors affecting voucher recipients’ location outcome
As Tiebout (1956) implies, households sort themselves into communities with
similar tastes and incomes. People tend to live in neighborhoods with similar socioeconomic characteristics and backgrounds. This natural tendency results in voluntary
segregation, while barriers to enter specific neighborhoods cause involuntary residential
segregation. Voucher holders have also experienced similar obstacles in locating
appropriate residences. Although HUD has encouraged low-income families to relocate
to more affluent areas, often this goal has not been achieved in many cases. Many
voucher recipients make short-distance moves, often to areas of concentrated poverty
with high proportions of minorities or to fragile neighborhoods experiencing racial
change (Goetz, 2002; Khadduri, 2001; Popkin & Cunningham, 2000). Previous literature
suggests that voucher concentrations are most likely to be found in predominantly black
communities, in areas with high proportions of families in poverty, and in communities
with abundant low-cost rental properties (Hartung & Henig, 1997).
These locational outcomes and clustering reflect several factors including
personal preference, market conditions, and discrimination. With personal preferences,
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voucher holders may demonstrate an unwillingness to move away from friends, relatives,
and accessible public transportation. Market conditions may be tight causing a lack in
availability of affordable rental housing. Discrimination may occur through a
combination of unwilling landlord participation, race, and voucher status (Goetz, 2003;
Finkel & Buron, 2001; Penall, 2000; Popkin & Cunningham, 2000; Turner, 2003; Varady
et al., 2001). The next section will discuss these factors affecting voucher holders‟
location outcomes.

3.2.3.1 Personal preferences
One of the main factors influencing residential choice is the desire to be close to
family, friends, and/or services such as desirable schools. Voucher holders exhibit these
same personal preferences when they search for housing. Since the voucher program
explicitly leaves the final decision about location up to the particular families, their needs
and preferences play a critical part in explaining patterns of geographic clustering.
Varady et al. (2001) provided the survey results of voucher mobility in four cities:
Baltimore, MD; Newport News, VA; Kansas City, MO; San Francisco, CA. They found
that distance played an insignificant role in the neighborhood satisfaction of voucher
recipients. The results showed that short distance moving decision were attributed to the
proximity of friends, family members, schools, public transportation, and surrounding
neighborhoods. Voucher recipients sought to remain in or close to their neighborhoods to
be near friends and relatives and a familiar public transportation system. Thus, long
distance moving toward suburban areas does not necessarily guarantee a high level of
neighborhood satisfaction. According to this study, voucher recipients who made short-
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distance moves were just as likely to be satisfied as those who made longer-distance
moves. Recipients making short-distance moves can be very satisfied with their new
home because they know the neighborhoods, their children do not have to change schools,
and they are close to friends, family, jobs, and public transportation, even though the new
neighborhood is essentially the same as their former one.
In addition, according to McClure (2001), voucher holders often made shortdistance moves, and as a result, lived in neighborhoods where the proportions of poor
residents and minorities were only slightly lower than that at their previous location.
Specifically, researchers discovered that the majority of recipients stayed within five
miles of their original place of residence. This result came from the comparison of the
preprogram and destination addressed for a one-year cohort of new Section 8 recipients
in the District of Columbia and its suburbs (Cunningham et al., 1999).
Focus group interviews in Chicago, Popkin and Cunningham (2000) also found
that the lack of transportation acts as a barrier to searching for housing. Since many
voucher holders had very low incomes and no cars, they inevitably relied on public
transportation. Popkin et al. (2000) confirmed that voucher holders had concerns about
lack of transportation or services in suburban neighborhoods. Thus, the availability and
accessibility of public transportation plays a critical role in voucher holders‟ locational
outcomes.

3.2.3.2 Race factors
Race plays a significant role in spatial patterns of voucher recipients. To some
degree, locational outcomes of vouchers reflect the racial discrimination or preferences of
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the same race. Studies on residential mobility indicated that minorities were less likely to
move to predominantly White neighborhoods and more likely to move to minority or
racially mixed neighborhoods (Stearns & Logan, 1986; South & Crowder, 1998).
However, in another case, few Blacks expressed a preference for living in predominantly
Black neighborhoods (Harris, 2001). For Asians and Hispanics, voluntary ethnic
clustering appeared to play a role in explaining neighborhood outcomes (Alba, Logan, &
Stults, 2000).
Personal preferences have been invoked as one of the factors that explain the
patterns of racial segregation in cities (Clark, 1986). The preferences hypothesis argues
that residential segregation reflects the different preferences of blacks and whites.
According to this hypothesis, both races desire to live in neighborhoods where they are
numerically dominant. Hence, blacks and whites would live in different neighborhoods
even though they have similar incomes because of their different tastes not discrimination.
Based on survey in the Los Angeles metropolitan area, Clark (1992) concluded that the
expressed preference for own race/own ethnicity was likely to maintain present patterns
of separation in U.S. metropolitan areas.
Farley, Fielding, and Krysan (1997) confirmed that racial preferences affected
residential choices. They analyzed the residential preferences of a sample of Blacks and
Whites in four metropolitan areas, using several tests to evaluate preference for and
comfort with neighborhoods of different racial makeup. They found that Whites‟
willingness to move into a neighborhood was inversely related to the density of Blacks
living there. Black preferred integrated neighborhoods, but ones with a substantial
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representation of Blacks. Only 35% of the Black was willing to move into an all-white
neighborhood.
While racial discrimination is often subtle, most voucher recipients expressed
their fears of encountering discrimination when they began to search for housing. Using a
focus group study in Chicago, researchers found that many voucher holders experienced
discrimination when searching neighborhoods due to their race. Many families expressed
concerns about potential discrimination if they were to move (Popkin & Cunningham,
2000). Another research confirmed that voucher families seeking to move to lowminority areas had to overcome several barriers including a fear of experiencing
discrimination in predominantly white areas (Popkin et al., 2000). A mail survey of
voucher holders in California revealed that voucher recipients faced significant budget,
supply constraints, and most likely discrimination (Basolo & Ngyuen, 2005).
At the same time, mixed with fear of possible racial discrimination, there was a
personal preference and comfortability remaining near the same race. Although African
Americans appear to prefer an integrated neighborhood to an all-black one, they also
prefer an all-black neighborhood to a mostly white one. Even though racially integrated
stable neighborhoods exist (Ellen, 1998), they are more the exception than the case
(Pendall, 2000a).
The severity of racial segregation also affects residential choices. Deng (2007)
found that the more segregated an MSA, the more likely a voucher-assisted family is to
live in a highly segregated neighborhood. In addition, the degree of racial segregation
even outweighed the influence of weak market conditions in terms of voucher
concentration (Deng, 2007). While the severity of racial segregation persisted, personal
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preference, fear, and lack of information available to minority voucher holders also
contributed to the concentration of minority voucher holders.

3.2.3.3 Availability of affordable housing
The geographic choice of voucher recipients has been limited by the availability
of affordable housing. To some degree, location patterns of voucher units may simply
mirror the geographic distribution of affordable rental housing. There are two aspects
constraining a voucher holders‟ location choice: the voucher program itself and land use
regulation.
As far as the program requirements are concerned, there are several steps be for
voucher holders can lease a unit: finding a unit under the specific rent level, landlord‟s
willingness to accept vouchers, and ensuring housing quality standards for a unit.
Qualified voucher families should find a unit at or below the local payment standard.
Payment standards are set by local housing authorities and can range between 90 and
110% of Fair Market Rent (FMR) by HUD. HUD releases FMR every year for
metropolitan areas based on rent levels in the local housing market. Finding a unit at or
below the local payment standard can be difficult in tight housing markets where
landlords can lease their units for rents above the FMR. However, finding a unit below
the FMR does not necessarily mean the voucher household can lease the unit. The
landlord still has a choice whether to accept the voucher. Plus, the unit should pass the
housing quality standards.
Among those factors, availability of affordable housing units is crucial in locating
voucher recipients. Turner and Wilson (1998) analyzed six metropolitan areas and found

77

that Section 8 recipients were significantly less widely dispersed geographically than the
below fair market rent stock in four out of six metropolitan areas and that affordable
housing is relatively more plentiful in the central city than in the suburbs. In the
aggregate, the ratio of affordable housing to occupied housing units in central cities was
about double what it was in suburban areas (Devine et al., 2003). Similarly, Ladd and
Ludwig (1997) estimated that only 15% of the dwellings in suburban Baltimore have
rents below the HUD-established limits, compared with 30% of dwellings in the city.
However, the ratio of vouchers to all affordable housing units showed little difference
when comparing the central city and the suburban areas, 6.2% in the former and 6.4% in
the latter (Devine et al., 2003). Low-cost rental housing units are not always in desirable
neighborhoods.
On the other hand, many affluent suburbs have utilized zoning and land use
regulations to limit the development of rental housing in order to maintain their property
tax base and social homogeneity. As a consequence, the rental housing stock tends to be
located in the central cities, older suburbs, and less- affluent neighborhoods. Thus,
voucher recipients may be effectively excluded from some desirable neighborhoods by
the absence of affordable rental housing in these communities (Turner & Cunningham,
2000). In many cases, voucher holders are constrained to living in less-affluent
neighborhoods.
Pendall (2008) also argued that local land use regulations are critically important
in the location of subsidized households because local governments have the authority to
approve or disapprove sites for subsidized housing. Hence, families with vouchers cannot
live in areas without rental housing and are unlikely to choose jurisdictions whose
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policies have raised rents above fair market rents. A case representing these local land
use regulations is Parma, OH. This large Cuyahoga County suburb was given a federal
housing integration order in 1980 due to the patterns and practices of intentional racial
discrimination. The court order required the city of Parma not to use its planning and
zoning powers to exclude low- and moderate-income rental housing development
(Keating, 1994).

3.2.3.4 Market conditions
Market conditions are another factor affecting voucher recipients‟ location
outcomes. Families participating in the voucher program were more likely to find
housing units in soft market conditions than in tight housing markets (Finkel & Buron,
2001). However, soft housing markets did not necessarily guarantee the success of
helping voucher holders find housing out of distressed neighborhoods (Pendall, 2000a).
In a study of six MSAs, the soft market conditions did not grant voucher families more
choices of quality neighborhoods. Specifically in Cleveland, persistent racial segregation
diminished the positive outcome for voucher families (Deng, 2007).
In general, voucher holders are expected to have more chances to search for
housing in less poverty stricken neighborhoods when housing market conditions are not
tight. However, Deng (2007) indicated that voucher holders in soft markets live in either
very low or low income neighborhoods, and they are more likely to do so than the
voucher families in the tight housing markets. To examine the local market environment,
Deng (2007) considered two factors: rental vacancy rates and job-housing balance, which
is the ratio of job growth to new housing construction.
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Finkel and Buron (2001) used several indicators to determine local housing
market conditions, including estimates of vacancy rates, PHA assessments of the local
market, and local FMRs and payment standards. First, the vacancy rates consisted of two
measures: the estimated vacancy rates and the census vacancy measure. The former
included estimated vacancy rates in the portion of the market available to voucher
holders; the latter was the census vacancy rates for metropolitan areas, using a three-year
weighted average of the rental vacancy rate to smooth out the data. Their findings
suggested that the tighter the market conditions, the harder it was for voucher recipients
to find housing. Specifically, vacancy rate was the most significant indictor to predict the
success of finding units by voucher recipients.

3.2.3.5 Landlord’s participation
Related to market conditions, landlord participation also limits or enlarges the
choice of voucher location. The voucher program encourages landlords to participate in
the program, benefiting stable payments and ensuring fair market rental rates. However,
landlords who own rental property in desirable neighborhoods might not be motivated to
participate in the voucher program, especially when the market demand is strong. In
addition, some landlords report not wanting to join the program due to the bureaucratic
procedures of public housing agencies (Turner & Cunningham, 2000).
Many landlords either lack information about the voucher program or find
participation unattractive. To rent a unit to a voucher recipient, the landlord must submit
to unit inspection and other paperwork that would not be necessary to rent to an
unsubsidized tenant. One of extensive surveys showed the attitudes of landlords toward
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the voucher program. 7 Only about one in six owners of single-family rental units was
very familiar with the voucher program; however, owners of multifamily rental properties
were much more aware of the program. The landlords who would not accept voucher
tenants most often cited three reasons: “potential problems with tenants, too many
regulations, and too much paperwork” (HUD, 1997, p.9). Likewise, based on focus
groups with participating landlords, Kennedy and Finkel (1994) found that most
participants ended up renting from the same set of landlords who are familiar with the
Section 8 market and choose to rent to Section 8 recipients.
Moreover, many of the landlords who participated in the voucher program
reported that they made only part of their units available to voucher families, while other
units were not available for vouchers. This pattern has been verified in the Washington,
D.C. and Chicago areas (Cunningham et al., 1999).
Generally, the landlord participation in the voucher program will be higher when
the market condition is weak. As housing prices and rent have decreased, landlords have
had difficulty finding tenants or leasing their units at market rate. In other cases, in weak
market conditions homeowners have had difficulties selling or have been reluctant to sell
their housing units, so they have decided to participate in the voucher program waiting
for a market recovery since participating in the voucher program ensures fair market rent.
Not much has been done to measure the degree of landlords‟ participation in the
program as a predictor of voucher locations. Considering landlord participation in the
voucher program, Finkel and Buron (2001) estimated the success rate of voucher

7

U.S. Housing Market Conditions (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, February 1997)

reported on information about the Section 8 tenant-based program collected in the Property Owners and
Managers Survey (POMS) conducted for HUD by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.
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recipients. Success rates were higher in markets where PHA staff assessed landlords‟
acceptance of the program was high. Most voucher holders were found in local market
areas in which PHA staff thought there was a moderate degree of landlord acceptance of
the program. Rate of success in finding an appropriate housing unit within specific time
frames seemed to be high when more landlords participated in the program. However,
there are two caveats of this result. First, the difference between the markets with high
and moderate acceptance rates was not statistically significant. The proportion of
households in the market with high and moderate acceptance was 30% and 68%
respectively; the success rate of each group in each market was 73% and 67%,
respectively. So, while fewer households lived in highly acceptable markets, the
possibility of finding housing in them was higher than voucher households living in
moderately acceptable market conditions. Second, the variable used in the regression
model to represent landlord acceptance was based on personal judgment of staff in each
public housing authority during a telephone interview. The survey instrument showed
there are three options to this question: perception of landlord acceptance of Section 8 is
“high”, “moderate”, and “little or no acceptance”. Only one out of 48 PHAs in the study
answered this question as “little or no acceptance”. Even though the authors tried to
consider the effect of the degree of landlord participation on vouchers, the results were
not statistically significant and were not free from the generalization problems.

3.2.4 Conclusion and limitations of previous research
As reviewed earlier, there is growing literature on the distribution of voucher
recipients. However, these studies showed mixed evidences on the success of vouchers
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allowing poor households to move into neighborhoods which are less segregated and
more affluent. To data, the voucher program appears to be less effective in promoting
racial integration than in helping to deconcentrate poverty. Moreover, many of these
research pieces have focused on national aggregations and there has been little
consideration of spatial aspects of location outcome.
Most of aforementioned studies have focused on the poverty rates and/or minority
composition in a given geographic areas in order to show that voucher holders tend to
live in less poverty stricken and less racially segregated neighborhoods over time (Devine
et al., 2003; Hartung & Henig, 1997; Kingley et al., 2000; Polikoff, 1995). In another
case, comparisons between project-based programs and the voucher program made
convincing arguments that the voucher program is successful to minority desegregation
and poverty deconcentration (Newman & Schnare, 1997; Hartung & Henig, 1997). Both
of these approaches are a-spatial, simply comparing non spatial cross tabulation across
geographies. Recently, more researchers have been considering spatial aspects of voucher
locations (Oakley & Burchfield, 2009; Wang & Varady, 2005; Wang et al., 2008; Wyly
& DeFilippis, 2010). They have sought to determine whether there was spatial
concentration and where the vouchers were clustered. Examining spatial aspects of
voucher locations revealed that voucher holders still tended to cluster, to some degree, in
specific neighborhoods depending on several factors. Hence, exploratory spatial data
analysis is needed to identify the presence of spatial concentrations and the locations of
clusters to uncover the spatial patterns of voucher holders‟ location outcomes over space
and over time. This analysis also should be disaggregated by race and by income to
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answer the questions regarding whether the voucher program helps race desegregation
and poverty deconcentration.
Several factors were identified in influencing the location outcome of voucher
holders, including personal preferences, market conditions, and racial segregation.
Residential segregation was caused by both voluntary and involuntary processes (Bourne,
1981). Voucher holder‟s personal preferences and non personal barriers played
significant roles in location outcomes. Often voucher holders chose their residence
simply to gain proximity to family, friends, churches, and services (Varady et al., 2001;
Varady & Walker, 2007). Likewise, their income level caused them to limit location
choices to areas served by public transportation (Varady et al., 2001; Popkin &
Cunningham, 2000). Race played a significant role in the spatial patterns of voucher
recipients. To some degree, locational outcomes of vouchers reflect the racial
discrimination or preference of the same race to cluster in neighborhoods. Many voucher
holders revealed their fears of encountering discrimination when they began to search for
housing (Popkin & Cunningham, 2000). In addition to race, market conditions limited or
enlarged the choice of voucher location. Generally, weak markets tended to provide more
opportunities to finding voucher housing in areas other than the central city (Finkel &
Buron, 2001). Since weak markets slows housing sales prices, increases vacancy rates,
and lowers rent levels, landlords have an incentive to participate in the program that
ensures them stable rent based on the fair market rent, which would not be expected in
stressed economic times. One of the most important factors influencing location pattern
was the availability of affordable housing. The location patterns of voucher families tend
to mirror the geographic distribution of affordable rental housing units. Several research
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pieces confirmed the relationship between voucher location and the availability of
affordable housing (Devine et al., 2003; Ladd & Ludwig, 1997; Turner & Wilson, 1998;
Turner & Cunningham, 2000).
As illustrated earlier, even though many research efforts found that the
accessibility to public transportation played a critical role in voucher holders‟ location
choice, no research has been conducted to estimate the effect on location outcomes. In
addition, many researchers suggest that market conditions affect the choice of location
for voucher families, but only part of them examined the statistical significance, so it was
hard to exclude the confounding effects other than market condition factors (Finkel &
Buron, 2001; Oakley & Burchfield, 2009; Pendall, 2000a; Wyly & DeFilippis, 2010).
Also, previous research showed that there was no consensus of factors representing
market conditions: vacancy rate, ratio of job growth to housing construction, affordable
housing units under FMR, the absolute level of the FMR itself, PHA‟s assessment of the
local market, adequacy of local payment standards are all used in the literature (Deng,
2007; Pendall, 2000a; Finkel & Buron, 2001). Among those indicators, vacancy rates and
availability of affordable housing at or below FMRs were the most commonly used as
relevant variables to explain vouchers‟ location outcomes.
Thus, this study will test the significance of several factors explaning voucher
locations using the spatial regression model. This study will incorporate factors identified
as influential to location outcome: the accessibility of public transportation, availability
of affordable housing, vacancy rates, and racial composition. Furthermore, spatial
regression and geographically weighted regression will account for spatial
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autocorrelation and spatially varying relationships, which OLS regression analysis fails to
capture when dealing with spatial data.
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CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY

4.1 Hypotheses and Model

4.1.1 Research questions and hypotheses
The purpose of this study is to examine how the voucher program works in terms
of patterns and factors influencing spatial concentration in Cuyahoga County. There are
two sets of research questions and hypotheses. The first set is to address the questions on
spatial patterns of voucher recipients. The second set is to identify the factors affecting
voucher holders spatial concentration.
First, the voucher program is expected to achieve deconcentration of poverty by
utilizing mobility of voucher holders. If the voucher program properly achieved its
deconcentration and desegregation goals, voucher recipients would be shown in scattered
patterns, not concentrated in specific neighborhoods. Thus, it could be hypothesized that
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voucher recipients in Cleveland would not concentrate in poor neighborhoods. The first
set of research questions and corresponding hypotheses are as follows.
First, is there spatial clustering of voucher recipients?
Ho: There is no spatial clustering of voucher recipients.
Ha: Voucher recipients concentrate spatially.

Second, is there spatial clustering of voucher recipients with different races,
different ethnic backgrounds, and different income levels?
Ho: There is no difference of spatial patterns of voucher recipients by different
races, ethnic backgrounds, and income levels.
Ha: Spatial patterns of voucher recipients vary by different races, ethnic
backgrounds, and income levels.

Third, are spatial patterns of voucher recipients changing over time?
Ho: There is no difference of spatial patterns of voucher recipients over time.
Ha: Spatial patterns of voucher recipients change over time.

Exploring spatial patterns will be followed by specific questions pertaining to
factors associated with location outcomes of voucher households. These factors include
public transportation, affordable housing, market conditions, race, and poverty.
Accessibility to public transportation plays a critical role in choosing residence for
voucher recipients due to their low income level. Availability of affordable housing
turned out pivotal elements to limiting or enlarging residential choice of voucher holders.
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In addition, voucher recipients would have more choices in a weak market than in a
strong one. Since the weak market shows high vacancy rate and low rent, landlords have
an incentive to participate in the program. Thus, the regression model in this study will
examine five hypotheses on which factors are attributable to spatial concentration of
voucher holders.
First, voucher recipients are limited their location choice by the availability of
affordable housing whose rent levels do not exceed the Fair Market Rents (FMRs). I
expect therefore a significant positive relationship between the proportion of voucher
households and the proportion of affordable housing below FMRs in block groups.
Research question and corresponding hypotheses are as follows:
Does availability of affordable housing affect voucher holders‟ concentration?
Ho: There is no relationship between concentration of voucher recipients and
availability of affordable housing.
Ha: Concentration of voucher recipients is related positively with the availability
of affordable housing.

Second, I expect that voucher holders‟ race will influence the spatial
concentration. Preferences for the same race as well as racial segregation would affect
minority concentration. Considering the fact that the majority of voucher holders are head
by African American in Cuyahoga County, I expect a significant relationship between
minority and voucher concentration in neighborhoods. If the relationship is statistically
positive and significant, it would imply racial preferences and segregation influence the
voucher concentration. Research question and hypotheses are posed as:
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Does race affect voucher recipients‟ concentration?
Ho: There is no relationship between concentration of voucher recipients and
racial composition in neighborhoods.
Ha: Concentration of voucher recipients are positively related with minority
concentration in neighborhoods.

Third, voucher holders‟ concentration is expected to relate positively with the
rental vacancy rate. When a large proportion of the rental stock is vacant, tenants have
more choices and landlords have fewer incentives to discriminate against voucher holders.
In this situation, landlords have more incentives to participate in the voucher program.
Hence, voucher recipients will have more chances to find housing units in neighborhoods
showing higher vacancy rates. Thus, research question and null and alternative
hypotheses are stated as follows:
Do rental vacancy rates affect voucher recipients‟ locations?
Ho: There is no relationship between concentration of voucher recipients and the
rental vacancy rates.
Ha: Concentration of voucher recipients are positively related with the rental
vacancy rates.

Fourth, concentrations of voucher recipients have related with neighborhood
poverty rates. In general, low income households tend to live in high poverty
neighborhoods. However, the voucher program subsidizes rents for low income
households to live in less distressed neighborhoods, and the program tries to contribute to
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poverty deconcentration. Considering those characteristics, if successfully implemented,
the poverty rates and voucher concentrations would have a negative relationship. On the
other hand, if the program is not successful to disperse low income voucher holders, the
result would have a positive relationship between voucher concentration and
neighborhood poverty rates.
Does poverty rate affect voucher recipients‟ location?
Ho: There is no relationship between concentration of voucher recipients and the
poverty rate.
Ha: Concentration of voucher recipients are related with the poverty rate.

Finally, voucher recipients will locate residences where public transportation is
accessible. Voucher holders are low-income households: the average income is $10,886
as of 2009 in Cuyahoga County. Therefore, the chance of having a car is very low and
their location choice is inevitably limited by the accessibility of public transportation.
Thus, I expect a significant positive relationship between voucher holders and the
accessibility of public transportation. Research question and a pair of hypotheses are as
follows:
Does the accessibility of public transportation affect voucher recipients‟ location?
Ho: There is no relationship between concentration of voucher recipients and the
accessibility to public transportation.
Ha: Concentration of voucher recipients are positively related with the
accessibility to public transportation.
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4.1.2 Model
How can we explain the concentration of voucher recipients? Here is a formal
model based on the literature and theories discussed earlier for attempting to answer this
question:
Y   0  1 AFFORDH   2 BLACK   3 ASIAN   4 HISPANIC 

 5VACANCY   6 POVERTY   7TRANPORT  u
Y represents the dependent variable, which is the percentage of voucher units among the
total occupied housing units in a block group. AFFORDH is the proportion of rental
housing units below FMRs in a block group. BLACK, ASIAN, and HISPANIC are,
respectively, the proportion of Black, Asian, and Hispanic population. VACANCY is the
rental housing vacancy rate, which is calculated as vacant dwelling available for rent
divided by the total number of occupied rentals and vacant for rent dwellings. POVERTY
is the proportion of persons living below the poverty level. TRANSPORT is the
proportion of area accessible to public bus stops within a quarter mile distance, which is
first defined by Clarence Perry (1929) in Neighborhood Unit concept as a desirable
walking distance for daily-routine.8

4.2 Data

8

Clarence Perry (1929) introduced a concept of “neighborhood unit” as an ideal residential neighborhood

with school, churches, and recreational areas. The neighborhood unit design allowed residents to walk no
more than a quarter mile to reach these community facilities and discouraged unwanted through traffic.
School was placed in the center of the neighborhood so children could reach school within a quarter mile
distance without crossing a major arterial street. Major arterial streets along the perimeter defined and
distinguished the neighborhood. Since its inception, the neighborhood unit has widely served as the
primary design concept for new residential development.
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This study will investigate the voucher program‟s effect as a case study of
Cuyahoga County. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA) is the housing
agency that administers the Housing Choice Voucher Program in Cuyahoga County.
Chartered in 1933, CMHA is the first housing authority in the United States, and it is one
of the ten largest housing authorities in the country. CMHA provided the voucher
information of address, income, race, and rent level from 2005 to 2009. At the end of
2009, a total of 14,043 vouchers were issued by CMHA in Cuyahoga County.
In addition to voucher information, 2000 census data at a block group level will
be used in regression analysis to get neighborhood characteristics such as poverty rates,
vacancy rates, minority proportions, and affordable housing units. The U.S. Census
Bureau data is available at the block group level to account for neighborhood
characteristic variables.
Lastly, this study needs public transportation data which identify the routes and
bus stops in Cuyahoga County. Northeast Ohio Areawide Coordinating Agency
(NOACA) provided the information as of 2009. Information from NOACA will be used
to calculate the proportion of area in each block group that is accessible to public
transportation within a quarter mile distance.

4.3 Hotspot analysis

To investigate the first set of questions pertaining to locational outcomes, this
study will utilize spatial analyses, including dot mapping, density mapping, and hot spot
analysis. First, the spatial pattern of voucher holders, over time, will be examined
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employing hot spot analysis followed by geocoding voucher addresses. This analysis is
useful to examine changes of voucher recipients‟ spatial concentration patterns for a
particular area over time (Wang & Varady, 2005). Dot mapping and density mapping will
show the difference of results and highlight the relevance of hotspot analysis. Getis-Ord
G statistics will indicate the presence of spatial concentrations, measure the degree of
concentrations, and identify the locations of hotspots where voucher recipients cluster. In
order to answer the first set of research questions, this study will conduct hotspot analysis
by race, by income, and by ethnicity from 2005 to 2009, analyzing the differences of
spatial patterns by different characteristics of vouchers and the changing patterns over
time.

4.3.1 Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis
Exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA) is the method of exploratory data
analysis that takes into account the spatial aspects of the data. Anselin (1999) defines
ESDA as, “a collection of techniques to describe and visualize spatial distributions,
identify atypical locations or spatial outliers, discover patterns of spatial association,
clusters or hot spots, and suggest spatial regimes or other forms of spatial heterogeneity”
(p.258). Hence, ESDA should focus on the analysis of spatial aspects of the data in terms
of spatial dependence and spatial heterogeneity.
Contrary to traditional data that does not have spatial aspects, spatial data need
special consideration due to the spatial dependence, which implies that the value of a
variable is spatially associated with its value in neighboring geographic areas. Tobler‟s
First Law of Geography captures this phenomenon as, everything is related to everything
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else, but near things are more related than distant things (Tobler, 1970). There are two
types of spatial effects: spatial dependence and spatial heterogeneity. Spatial dependence,
often referred to as spatial autocorrelation, results from Tobler‟s First Law of Geography.
Due to the spatial clustering of observations, the results from the geographic data will not
be independent. This violates the assumption of traditional multiple regression models
that assume independent observations. Spatial heterogeneity is related to the intrinsic
uniqueness of each location itself. None of the traditional tools of exploratory data
analysis (EDA) are geared to dealing with spatial data. Many EDA techniques explore the
correlation between variables that generate measures of fit and of significance. This
becomes invalid in the presence of spatial dependence (Anselin, 1996).

4.3.2 Global and Local index of spatial autocorrelation
The magnitude of the spatial effects can be measured using a number of statistics
of spatial autocorrelation. Two kinds of statistics, global and local, are utilized to capture
the presence and the magnitude of the spatial structure. Global statistics can identify the
presence of spatial structure such as clustering, autocorrelation, and uniformity; however,
they do not identify where the clusters are, nor do they quantify how spatial dependency
varies from one place to another. On the other hand, local statistics can quantify spatial
autocorrelation and clustering within small areas (Jacquez, 2008). Clustering is a global
aspect of the spatial pattern and is measured by a single statistic. In contrast, clusters are
local in nature, which can identify specific locations where the values are more similar
than usual (Anselin, 2005a). Many local statistics have global counterparts that often are
calculated as functions of local statistics. Specifically, the sum of local indicator of
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spatial associations for all observations is proportional to a global indicator of spatial
association (Anselin, 1995).

4.3.3 Getis-Ord G statistics
The global and local Getis-Ord G statistics measure the presence and magnitude
of spatial autocorrelation in dataset. The global form of the Getis-Ord G statistic (G) is
also called general G statistic, for it deals with the entire study area rather than a localized
area. In contrast, the local Getis-Ord G statistic (Gi*) identifies the location and degree of
clusters. The global G statistic is expressed as:
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where wij (d) is the spatial weight matrix with wij=1 when i and j are within a distance d
from each other and zero otherwise, and the observations zi, zj are in deviations from the
mean. Getis-Ord G statistics are calculated under the assumption of normality, which
indicates the significant local spatial association for each observation. Getis-Ord G
statistics can be easily implemented and visualized in GIS software. Moreover, these
statistics are particularly useful in the detection of potential non-stationarity, such as the
spatial clustering of similar values in a specific region of the study area. A positive GetisOrd G statistic means clustering of high values and a negative one indicates clustering of
low values (Getis & Ord, 1992; Anselin, 1996).
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The expected value of G and Gi* under Complete Spatial Randomness (CSR) is:
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where n is the number of points or zones in the study area, and W is the sum of the
weights. The equivalent expected value for the local variant is:

w

ij

E (Gi *) 

j

(n  1)



W
(n  1)

where n is the number of points or zones within the threshold distance for point or zone i.
This produces the z-score, which allows the significance test of the global and local G
statistics (De Smith, Goodchild, & Longley, 2009).

4.3.4 Hotspot analysis
Hotspot analysis is ArcGIS tool that identifies statistically significant spatial
clusters of high values (hot spots) and low values (cold spots). By creating a new feature
containing z-score and p-value for each feature, hotspot analysis determines whether the
null hypothesis can be rejected or not. The z-score is calculated on the basis of
randomization. The null hypothesis for the pattern analysis is complete spatial
randomness (CSR). Under the CSR, the theoretical pattern is assumed that (1) objects are
located independently of each other, and (2) a study area has an equal chance of receiving
an object (Getis, 1999). Since p-value is a probability, a small p-value means low
probability that the observed spatial pattern is the result of a random process. In this case,
the null hypothesis of a random pattern can be rejected.
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As a result of hotspot analysis, a high z-score and a small p-value indicates a
spatial clustering of high values. On the contrary, a low negative z-score and a small pvalue indicate a spatial clustering of low values. The higher or lower the z-score, the
more intense the clustering; however, a z-score near zero means no apparent spatial
clustering.
In order to find the patterns of voucher holders‟ spatial concentration, this study
employs hotspot analysis utilizing Getis-Ord G statistics as a means of detecting spatial
autocorrelation. There are several statistics to identify spatial autocorrelation such as the
Moran‟s I, Geary C, and Getis-Ord G statistic. One of the frequently used statistics is
Moran‟s I. Both Moran‟s I and Getis-Ord G statistics of global spatial autocorrelation
indicate that there is spatial autocorrelation in voucher distribution in the study area.
After detecting global spatial autocorrelation, the location of clusters should be searched
to identify the locations of clusters. In this study, I employ the Gi* statistic and hotspot
analysis to identify the locations of clusters, instead of using Moran‟s I statistic and LISA
maps. First, both statistics allow the inference of local spatial autocorrelation. Second, the
spatial clusters shown in the LISA cluster map only refer to the core of the cluster based
on the comparison under spatial randomness. Unlike the Moran‟s I, the Getis-Ord G
statistic identifies the degree to which high or low values cluster together. Third, hotspot
analysis is useful to examine changes of spatial concentration patterns for a particular
area over time (Anselin, 2005; Wang & Varady, 2005).
The biggest difference between the two is that Moran‟s LISA map identifies both
spatial clusters and spatial outliers while hotspot analysis focuses on spatial clusters
rather than outliers. Considering the focus of the study with spatial clusters, the hotspot
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analysis fits for serving the purpose of my study which is to identify the presence and
locations of spatial concentration. In addition, the study will examine not only the spatial
concentration of voucher recipients, but also the change of spatial pattern over time, so
hotspot analysis fits for purpose of this study.

4.4 Spatial regression analysis

4.4.1 Spatial autocorrelation and spatial regression analysis
Regression analysis will be used to identify the factors affecting voucher
concentrations. Spatial regression analysis will be considered to account for the spatial
dependence of whether the presence of voucher holders in a block group increases the
likelihood of voucher recipients in neighboring areas.
Spatial regression deals with the incorporation of spatial effects (spatial
autocorrelation and spatial heterogeneity) in regression models (Anselin, 1988). As Can
(1990) put,
Spatial dependence refers to the possible occurrence of interdependence among
observations that are viewed in geographic space, and violates the assumption of
uncorrelated error terms … Spatial heterogeneity … refers to the systematic
variation in the behavior of a given process across space, and usually leads to
heteroskedastic error terms. (p.256)

Any systematic patterns in the spatial distribution of a variable indicate the
presence of spatial autocorrelation. If the value of nearby or neighboring areas are similar,
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then it implies positive spatial autocorrelation. On the contrary, negative autocorrelation
describes patterns when the values of neighboring areas are dissimilar. Spatial
autocorrelation is important because the presence of spatial autocorrelation signifies the
violation of assumption in traditional econometric models, which assumes that the values
of observations in each sample are independent each other. Thus, if the observations are
spatially clustered in some way, the estimates obtained from the ordinary least squares
regressions (OLS) will be biased and cannot be precise because OLS estimators are based
on the assumption that the observations have been selected randomly (Anselin, 1988; De
Smith et al., 2009; Oakley & Burchfield, 2009).
Statistically significant spatial autocorrelation implies that the regression model is
not properly specified and that one or more new variables should be entered into the
regression model (Getis, 1999). Anselin (2002) claimed that the essence of spatial
regression models is the incorporation of spatially lagged variables in the regression
specification. The new variables could be a dependent variable, a explanatory variable, or
a regression error terms, depending on the spatial externalities (Anselin, 2005a).
GeoDa is one of the most intensively used tools developed for dealing with spatial
data. It starts with mapping and geovisualization, proceeds through ESDA and spatial
autocorrelation analysis, and ends up with spatial regression. The core functionality of
spatial regression in GeoDa is centered on diagnostics for spatial autocorrelation,
maximum likelihood estimation of the spatial lag and spatial error model. The estimation
and specification of spatial regression models in GeoDa are based on the maximum
likelihood method (Anselin, 2005a).
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Diagnostics for spatial autocorrelation and running the relevant spatial regression
model are straightforward in GeoDa. First, statistically significant Moran‟s I indicates a
problem with spatial autocorrelation. The Moran‟s I statistic has great power in detecting
model misspecification, however, it is not useful to determine which model is appropriate.
Second, Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistics decide the relevant model. There are five
LM test statistics: LM-Lag, Robust LM-Lag, LM-Error, Robust LM-Error, and LMSARMA. When none of the LM statistics are significant, there is no need to run a spatial
regression model; OLS results are appropriate and precise. On the other hand, when
either of the LM-Lag or LM-Error statistic is significant, then the significant one is the
model to be run. If the LM test shows that the LM-Lag statistic is significant, then the
spatial lag model is the proper alternative; while if the LM-Error statistic is significant,
the spatial error model should be considered. In the case where both statistics (LM-Lag
and LM-Error) are significant, Robust LM diagnostics will be examined. Typically, one
of the Robust LM statistics will be significant, or one will be more significant than the
other in terms of the magnitude such as small p-value. The decision is straightforward
that estimates the spatial regression model as matching the significant statistic or the most
significant one (Anselin, 2005b).

4.4.2 Spatial lag model and spatial error model
A general multiple regression with incorporating spatial lags is formulated as:

y  Wy  X  u

(Equation 1)

y is an n×1 vector of observations on a dependent variable, X is an n×k matrix of
observations on independent variables, β is k×1 vector of regression coefficients, u is an
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n×1 vector of independent and identically distributed random error terms, and W is the
n×n exogenous spatial weights matrix that specifies the assumed spatial structure or
connections between the observations. Wy is the spatially lagged dependent variable to
account for spatial dependence. The parameter  refers to spatial correlation or a spatial
dependence parameter. The value of  is equal to zero in a traditional linear regression
model. Equation (1) for y is expressed as:

y  ( I  W ) 1 X  ( I  W ) 1 u

(Equation 2)

I is the n×n identity matrix. Two inverse expressions in Equation 2 indicate spatial
multipliers (Anselin, 2003). A spatial lag model is useful to account for spatial
autocorrelation in the dependent variable and prevents a parameter estimate from bias and
inconsistency that could happen in OLS regression.
When spatial autocorrelation is present in residuals, a spatial error model
specification is relevant to improve the precision of the estimated parameters. A general
version of a spatial error model can be formulated as (Anselin, 2003):

y  X   ,

where   W  u

W is the weight matrix and λ (Lambda) is a spatial autoregressive parameter to be
estimated jointly with the regression coefficients. The two vectors of errors are assumed
to be uncorrelated. The above equation can be solved for ε and expressed as:

y  X  ( I  W ) 1 u

(Equation 3)

Inverse matrix in Equation (3), ( I  W ) 1 , is called a spatial multiplier. Equation 3
indicates that the value of the dependent variable for each location is affected by the
stochastic errors at all locations through the spatial multiplier.
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4.5 Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR)

4.5.1 Spatial heterogeneity
There are two types of spatial issues when dealing with spatial data: spatial
autocorrelation and spatial heterogeneity. While the spatial lag or the spatial error model
is appropriate to deal with spatial autocorrelation, Geographically Weighted Regression
(GWR) is utilized to account for spatial heterogeneity.
OLS regression estimates regard each individual area independently of the values
of its neighbors; however, in general, contiguous areas share similar social and market
conditions than areas that are far apart. Therefore, the results from the OLS regression
can only be interpreted as generating average parameter values for the study area as a
whole. In this sense, estimates from OLS present a global characteristic of the
relationship between dependent and independent variables (Fotheringham, Brunsdon, &
Charlton, 2002). Hence, OLS results cannot detect spatial variation or local differences.
Contrary to conventional OLS, GWR allows coefficients to vary across space.
GWR applies the linear regression model at the local level, so that local parameters are
estimated. Instead of a global parameter in OLS, local parameters are estimated and
present a way of accommodating spatial heterogeneity. For each point in the dataset, it
uses a subset of the data surrounding the point of interest to estimate locally linear
regression parameters. Thus, at each data point, GWR provides a different parameter
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estimate and t statistics, allowing us to see how the relationship between dependent and
explanatory variables change over space.9

4.5.2 Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR) model
Fotheringham et al. (2002) provides a detailed description of GWR. A
conventional multiple regression, so called global regression, can be presented as,

y   0    k xik   i

(Equation 4)

k

where the prediction of the dependent variable (y) is obtained through a linear
combination of the independent variables.  k is the parameter estimate for variable k, xik
is the value of the kth variable for i, and  i is the error term. The OLS estimator takes the
form of

ˆ  ( X T X ) 1 X T y
where ̂ is the vector of estimated parameters, X is the matrix that contains the values of
the independent variables, y is the vector of observed values, and (XTX)-1 is the inverse of
the variance-covariance matrix.
The global model estimates a single regression equation for all observations.
Contrarily, GWR constructs a separate regression equation for each observation, and each
equation uses different weighting of observations. The global model shown in Equation 4
can be rewritten as GWR in Equation 5

9

True spatial regression models should deal with both characteristics of spatial data (spatial autocorrelation

and spatial heterogeneity). At present, no spatial regression methods are effective for both issues of spatial
data. However, for a properly specified GWR model, spatial autocorrelation is typically not a problem
(ArcGIS, 2010).
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y   0 (ui , vi )    k (ui , vi ) xik   i

(Equation 5)

k

where  0 is the intercept, (ui , vi ) indicates the coordinates of the ith point in space, xik is
the value of the explanatory variable k (Fotheringham et al., 2002). The parameter
estimates in GWR are taken from the weighting that is based on the spatial proximity to
the specific location under consideration. Since the weighting of an observation is not
constant over space, the GWR model can estimate the local variation of parameters. The
estimator of the parameter vector for regression point i is:

ˆ (ui , vi )  ( X T W (ui , vi ) X ) 1 X T W (ui , vi ) y

(Equation 6)

where ̂ is an estimate of  , X is a matrix of independent variables, W is a weighting
matrix. Diagonal elements of W represent the geographical weighting of each observed
data for regression point i, and off-diagonal elements of W equal to zero (Fotheringhan et
al., 2002).

 wi1
0

wi   0
.
0


0
...
wi 2 ...
0 wi 3
.
.
0
0

0
0 
0
. 
win 

where win is the weights of the data point n in the calibration of the model for location i.
The weighting matrix acts in a way that data near to location i are weighted more than
data from observations far away.
Charlton and Fotheringham (2009) propose two kernel types to determine the
weighting matrix: fixed and adaptive kernel. A fixed kernel type is useful when the
observations are regularly positioned in the study area, while an adaptive kernel type is
appropriate when the observations are clustered, so that the density of observation varies
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over space. For a fixed kernel with a Gaussian function, Wij is represented as a continuous
function of dij that denotes Euclidean distance between observation i and j.

 (d / b) 2 
wij  exp ij

2 

where b refers to a bandwidth, j represents a specific point in space at which data is
observed, and i indicates any point in space for which parameters are estimated.
Choosing a bandwidth b is important, for there is a trade-off between the bias and the
variance in GWR estimation. A low bandwidth helps reduce the bias, but increase the
variance because the sample size around each estimated coefficient will be low. On the
other hand, a larger bandwidth provides more smooth results. An adaptive kernel that
uses the bi-square function is expressed as



wij  1  (d ij / b) 2



2

if dij≤b, otherwise wij=0

where j represents a point in space at which data are observed, i represents any point in
space for which parameters are estimated, dij is the Euclidean distance between point i
and j, and b is the bandwidth. This function is called “adaptive” because the trace of the
weight matrix is allowed to expand and contract, conditional upon a given location.
The measure of goodness of fit in GWR is the corrected Akaike Information Criterion
(AICc) score, given as
 n  tr ( S ) 
AICc  2n log e (ˆ )  n log e (2 )  n 

 n  2  tr ( S ) 

where n is the number of observations in the dataset, ̂ is the estimate of the standard
deviation of the residuals, and tr(S) is the trace of the hat matrix of the GWR, which is
defined as

106

yˆ  Sy
where y and ŷ is the vector of the dependent variable and the GWR estimated value,
respectively. The AICc is advantageous in terms of taking into account the different
degrees of freedom among models. In addition to comparison models with different
independent variables, the AICc is useful to compare the global OLS model with a local
GWR model. When the difference between the two AICc values is less than 3, then the
two different models are considered to be equivalent (Charlton & Fotheringham, 2009).

4.6 Summary

The purpose of the dissertation consists of invoking two sets of research
questions: patterns and factors of voucher holders‟ spatial concentration. In terms of
spatial patterns of voucher holders, the presence and location of spatial concentration are
examined by hotspot analysis through global and local indicators of spatial
autocorrelation. Next, factors of influencing their location outcomes are identified by the
regression analysis. OLS regression analysis will provide the degree of statistical
significance of factors, such as availability of affordable housing, race, vacancy rates,
poverty rates, and the accessibility of public transportation. Moreover, the spatial
regression analysis will capture the presence and the effect of spatial autocorrelation on
each factor identified in OLS regression. Finally, GWR will detect local variations of a
factor, which could not present by either OLS or spatial model. Comparing results from
OLS and GWR will shed light on the importance of spatial variation and local difference
derived from the spatial heterogeneity.
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CHAPTER V
PATTERNS OF SPATIAL CONCENTRATION OF VOUCHER
RECIPIENTS

This chapter presents the findings from both a-spatial and spatial analysis. The
demographic characteristics of voucher recipients from CMHA administrative data are
reported, along with their neighborhood conditions in terms of income level, poverty
rates, and racial composition. Followed by a-spatial description, the spatial analysis
indentifies voucher holders‟ location and spatial concentration pattern by race, ethnicity,
and income level from 2005 to 2009. This chapter concludes with the results from the
hotspot analysis, showing significant spatial concentration of voucher recipients.

5.1 A-spatial analysis

5.1.1 Demographics of voucher recipients
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5.1.1.1 Race, ethnicity, and housing type
This study analyzes voucher information provided by Cuyahoga Metropolitan
Housing Authority (CMHA) from 2005 to 2009. CMHA is the housing agency that
administers the Housing Choice Voucher Program in Cuyahoga County. Charted in 1933,
CMHA is the first housing authority in the United States, and it is one of the ten largest
housing authorities in the country (CMHA, 2009a). CMHA provided the voucher
information for this study including the address, race, ethnicity, income, and rent level
from 2005 to 2009.
During the five-year study period, a total of 68,515 vouchers were issued by
CMHA. On average, 13,703 vouchers are issued annually. By race, the majority of
voucher recipients are African American comprising 89.2%, white 10.3%, and other race
less than 1%. By ethnicity, Hispanic origin comprises of 3.4%. In terms of housing type,
one half of voucher holders live in a single family house while the other half lives in
either a multi-family or apartment type of dwelling. These characteristics are shown in
Table 5-1 below.
Table 5-1 Demographics of voucher holders
Year

2005

Ethnicity

House

2007

2008

2009

mean

count

%

count

%

count

%

count

%

count

%

%

13720

100

13095

100

14039

100

13618

100

14043

100

13703

White

1458

10.6

1385

10.6

1410

10

1376

10.1

1416

10.1

10.3

Black

12191

88.9

11644

88.9

12547

89.4

12167

89.3

12548

89.4

89.2

AI/AN

31

0.2

28

0.2

31

0.2

30

0.2

31

0.2

0.2

Asian

40

0.3

38

0.3

51

0.4

45

0.3

48

0.3

0.3

Hispanic

436

3.2

420

3.2

491

3.5

484

3.6

510

3.6

3.4

Non
Hispanic

13284

96.8

12675

96.8

13548

96.5

13134

96.4

13533

96.4

96.6

Single Family
House

6497

47.4

6253

47.8

6496

46.3

7602

55.8

7674

54.6

50.4

Multifamily

7223

52.6

6842

52.2

7543

53.7

6016

44.2

6369

45.4

49.6

Total

Race

2006

Source: Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA)
Note: AI/AN indicates American Indian/ Alaska Native populations
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5.1.1.2 Income and rent level
The income level of voucher recipients is extremely low, $10,737 on average.
During the five year research period, income and rent levels have been stable: under
$11,000 and around $650 respectively.

Table 5-2 Average value of income and rent
Year

2005

2006

2007

2008

Income
$10,474
$10,650
$10,725
$10,950
Rent
$644
$641
$636
$649
Source: Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA)

2009

mean

$10,886
$654

$10,737
$645

Based on the guidelines developed by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD, 2007b), voucher holders‟ income levels can be grouped into four
categories: extremely low, very low, low, and above low. The income levels correlate
with less than 30%, less than 50%, less than 80%, and above of the area‟s median income.
Poverty cutoffs are approximately 30% of area median income even though they cannot
be compared directly to the Federal poverty line.10 Area median incomes in Cuyahoga
County, collected from HUD for 2005 to 2009, categorize the income level of voucher
recipients. Area median income level for 2005 was $60,200, and increases to $64,800 in
2009.

10

The poverty line for a family of four is approximately equivalent to 33% of Area Median Income. Based

on this criteria, as of 2007, 46% of very low income households and 81% of extremely low income
households were considered as poor (HUD, 2010b)
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Table 5-3 Area median income level during 2005 to 2009
Year

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Area Median Income
Source: HUD (2010e)

$60,200

$61,400

$60,700

$62,100

$64,800

Table 5-4 illustrates that 83.3% of voucher recipients fall into the extremely low
income group, while less than 0.1% of households have an income above 80% of the area
median income. Income distributions reflect HUD‟s requirements for income targeting: at
least 75% of the families should be extremely low-income, which equivalent for incomes
below 30% of the AMI (HUD, 2001).

Table 5-4 Income group of voucher recipients
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Mean

Income group

count

%

count

%

count

%

count

%

count

%

%

Extremely low

11458

83.5

10892

83.2

11603

82.6

11183

82.1

11905

84.8

83.3

Very low

2012

14.7

1942

14.8

2142

15.3

2141

15.7

1907

13.6

14.8

Lower

239

1.7

249

1.9

279

2

276

2

227

1.6

1.9

Above Lower

11

0.1

12

0.1

15

0.1

18

0.1

4

0

0.1

Source: Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA)

5.1.1.3 Central city proportion
As Table 5-5 indicates, over half of voucher households live in the central city.
This is a significantly high concentration when it compared to the proportion of
households in Cuyahoga County as a whole. A third of households live in the central city,
while over the half of voucher households reside in the city of Cleveland. When taking
into account two neighboring cities of Cleveland (Euclid and East Cleveland), the
proportion rises up to 75% in 2006, for example.
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Table 5-5 Central city proportion of voucher households
Total

Cleveland

%

Cleveland, Euclid,
and East Cleveland

%

2005

13,720

7,943

57.9

10,152

74.0

2006

13,095

7,825

59.8

9,867

75.3

2007

14,039

7,902

56.3

10,134

72.2

2008

13,618

8,072

59.3

10,013

73.5

2009

14,043

7,393

52.6

9,669

68.9

571,457

190,638

33.4

226,201

39.6

Year
Voucher households

Total Households
2000

2009*
520,657
181,779
34.9
214,029
41.1
Source: 2000 household data is from Census 2000; 2009 household data is based on 2009
estimated data from Geolytics.

5.1.2 Distribution of voucher recipients

5.1.2.1 Distribution by neighborhood income level
Where do voucher recipients live in terms of neighborhood income level? Are
they living in low income neighborhoods? If they turned out living in poor
neighborhoods, it would be hard to say that the intended goal of the voucher program is
achieved since the voucher program tries to deconcentrate poverty through the choice of
residence. Answering this question requires neighborhood grouping whether the
residences of voucher recipients are poor neighborhoods. In order to categorize
neighborhoods by income level, HUD‟s (2007b) criteria is adopted, which is consistent
with grouping voucher recipients‟ income group. In this case, block groups are
considered as a neighborhood since block groups are a finer and smaller geographic
entity used to obtain various socioeconomic data than the census tract, giving a rich and
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detailed picture of neighborhoods.11 Block groups with a median income of less than 30%
of HUD area median income (AMI) are defined as extremely low neighborhoods; block
groups with a median income of 50 to 80 % of AMI are defined as low income
neighborhoods; block groups with a median income of 80 to 100% of AMI are defined as
moderate neighborhoods; block groups with a median income higher than 100% of AMI
are defined as middle income neighborhoods.
Two time periods of neighborhood income level is also considered: 2000 and
2009. As of 2009, Census 2000 data is only available comprehensive data, but it seems
too outdated. Recent data from a 2009 estimation provided by Geolytics is also
considered in categorizing neighborhood income group in order to fill the gap between
decennial census periods and also to mirror the present conditions of neighborhoods.
Due to the differences of HUD area median incomes between 2000 and 2009,
direct comparison between two years might not be appropriate until the new 2010 census
is released. Rather, comparison of the share of vouchers‟ location from 2005 to 2009
reflects how many vouchers reside in poor neighborhoods.
As shown in Table 5-6, voucher recipients tend to live out of poor neighborhood
during a five year period. Neighborhood income levels are categorized by comparing
2009 HUD area median income and 2009 block group level median income. In 2005,
almost 20% of voucher recipients lived in the extremely low income neighborhoods, but
the proportion has lowered to 15.4% in 2009, with an average of 17.5% over five years.
Also, voucher holders living in very low income neighborhoods have decreased from
11

Block groups generally contain between 600 and 3,000 people with an optimum size of 1,500 people. A

census tract, which clusters of one to nine block groups, typically has between 1,500 and 8,000 people,
with an average size of about 4,000 people (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008)
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47.7% to 45.3%, in 2005 and 2009 respectively. The most promising changes have
happened in low income neighborhoods, from 28.6% to 34.9% in the same period.
However, proportions of living in moderate or middle income neighborhoods are almost
consistent during the last half decade. This is quite surprising considering the fact that
over 83% of voucher holders are extremely low income, almost 15% are very low income
and less than 1% is of the moderate or middle income group.

Table 5-6 Distribution of voucher holders by neighborhood income level (2009)
2009 Neighborhood

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Average

count

%

count

%

count

%

count

%

count

%

%

Extremely Low

2,659

19.5

2,396

18.4

2,431

17.5

2,252

16.6

2,160

15.4

17.5

Very low

6,495

47.7

6,064

46.6

6,540

47

6,207

45.7

6,342

45.3

46.4

Low

3,897

28.6

3,981

30.6

4,330

31.1

4,492

33.1

4,884

34.9

31.7

Moderate

408

3

417

3.2

438

3.1

461

3.4

450

3.2

3.2

Middle

169

1.2

156

1.2

177

1.3

167

1.2

166

1.2

1.2

Total

13,628

100

13,014

100

13,916

100

13,579

100

14,002

100

100

Note: Neighborhood types derived based on 2009 data from Geolytics

Using 2000 census income data indicates a similar story with only a few
differences. Neighborhood income level is constructed by comparing 2000 HUD area
median income with 2000 block group level median income. If the neighborhood income
level is constant during ten years and the proportion of voucher recipients in each
neighborhood category changes, it would imply that the voucher holders have changed
their residence to less poor neighborhoods. This shows more promising results than
above. Proportions of vouchers living in extremely low income neighborhoods have
decreased from 12.5% to 10.2%; proportions of vouchers living in very low income
neighborhoods have also dropped from 42.7% to 36.0%. On the other hand, voucher
114

recipients living in low income neighborhoods have grown from 35.1% to 43.2%, and
voucher recipients in moderate income neighborhoods have also increased.

Table 5-7 Distribution of voucher holders by neighborhood income level (2000)
2000 Neighborhood

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Average

count

%

count

%

count

%

count

%

count

%

%

Extremely Low

1,707

12.5

1,549

11.9

1,582

11.4

1,460

10.8

1,430

10.2

11.3

Very low

5,825

42.7

5,308

40.8

5,578

40.1

5,206

38.3

5,040

36.0

39.6

Low

4,789

35.1

4,835

37.2

5,341

38.4

5,455

40.2

6,046

43.2

38.8

Moderate

931

6.8

946

7.3

1,037

7.5

1,120

8.2

1,152

8.2

7.6

Middle

376

2.8

376

2.9

378

2.7

338

2.5

334

2.4

2.6

Total

13,628

100

13,014

100

13,916

100

13,579

100

14,002

100

100

Note: Neighborhood types derived based on 2000 census data

Comparing voucher holders‟ race with neighborhood types indicates that African
American voucher holders are more likely to live in poorer neighborhoods than White
voucher holders. Over one half of Black voucher users live in neighborhoods with very
low income levels (extremely low or very low compared to AMI), while one third of
White voucher users do. Both races have moved out of extremely low income toward low
income neighborhoods during last five years (Table 5-8 and Table 5-9).

Table 5-8 African American voucher holders by neighborhood income level
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Mean

Neighborhood

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

%

Extremely Low

1565

12.9

1439

12.4

1477

11.9

1371

11.3

1344

10.7

11.8

Very low

5383

44.4

4905

42.4

5177

41.6

4825

39.8

4640

37.1

41.0

Low

4063

33.5

4117

35.6

4597

37.0

4698

38.7

5249

41.9

37.4

Moderate

806

6.7

825

7.1

901

7.2

981

8.1

1021

8.2

7.5

Middle

296

2.4

291

2.5

287

2.3

261

2.2

259

2.1

2.3

Total

12113

100.0

11577

100.0

12439

100.0

12136

100.0

12513

100.0

100
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Table 5-9 White voucher holders by neighborhood income level
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Mean

Neighborhood

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

%

Extremely Low

137

9.5

108

7.9

100

7.2

84

6.1

84

6.0

7.3

Very low

408

28.3

373

27.2

374

26.8

356

26.0

375

26.6

27.0

Low

702

48.6

692

50.4

706

50.6

722

52.8

757

53.7

51.2

Moderate

118

8.2

117

8.5

127

9.1

131

9.6

121

8.6

8.8

Middle

79

5.5

82

6.0

88

6.3

75

5.5

73

5.2

5.7

Total

1444

100.0

1372

100.0

1395

100.0

1368

100.0

1410

100.0

100

In sum, the analysis of voucher location by neighborhood‟s income levels reveals
the tendency of moving out of extremely poor neighborhoods toward less poor
neighborhoods. Even though the proportions are slightly different between the two time
periods (2000 and 2009), the overall story looks similar – voucher recipients tend to live
in less poor neighborhoods.

5.1.2.2 Poverty rate and voucher concentration in Cuyahoga County
In the case of Cuyahoga County, most of the voucher recipients in suburban areas
live in low poverty neighborhoods with less than 20% of poverty rate.12 At the same time,
suburban voucher recipients living in high poverty neighborhoods are only 10.3%, while
37.9% of voucher holders in the central city live high poverty areas with over 30% of
12

With regard to poverty level, there is no absolute threshold above which poverty level can be said to

adversely affect the welfare of all voucher families. Nevertheless, the 40% level has been frequently cited
as a threshold for extreme poverty concentration and the 30% level as a threshold for moderate
concentration. Families and neighborhoods are assumed to be negatively affected when poverty
concentrations reach these levels. Therefore, the location of voucher families are described here in
reference to the 30% and 40% poverty thresholds as well as to the entire continuum of poverty
concentration (Jargowsky, 1997; Galster, 2002; HUD, 2007b).
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poverty rate. Not surprisingly, as shown other research (such as Devein et al., 2003),
suburban families are much less likely than central city families to live in high poverty
neighborhoods. Finding suggests that the voucher program seems to achieve poverty
deconcentration goal in the study area since over three quarter of voucher recipients
avoid to live in high-poverty neighborhoods which are poverty rate over 30%.

Table 5-10 Neighborhood poverty level and voucher concentration
Poverty level

Total vouchers

Cleveland

Suburbs

N

%

N

%

N

%

Under 10%

3475

24.8

611

8.3

2864

43.3

10-20%

3798

27.1

1699

23.0

2099

31.8

20-30%

3249

23.2

2279

30.9

970

14.7

30-40%

2253

16.1

1740

23.6

513

7.8

40% or higher

1218

8.7

1054

14.3

164

2.5

Total

13993*

100.0

7383

100.0

6610

100.0

Notes: Number of vouchers is 2009 data, poverty rate data is from 2000 Census data.
*There are 9 missing information due to the availability of poverty rate in block
group from 2000 Census data

5.1.2.3 Distribution by neighborhood racial composition
Where do voucher holders live in terms of racial makeup in neighborhoods? Do
black voucher holders live in neighborhoods with the same color? Location Quotient
(LQ) is used to investigate the distribution of vouchers by neighborhood racial
composition. The LQ is calculated as the ratio between the share of race groups of all of
the population in the block group and the similar share in the entire county. A LQwhite of
more than 1 indicates that the white population is overrepresented in the block group
when compared to the entire county. Conversely, a LQwhite of less than 1 implies that the
white population is underrepresented in the block group when compared to the entire
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County. The LQ value of 1 means a block group contains a fair share of race group when
compared to the entire County. LQ is calculated as follows:
LQwhite=

(White population in block group) / (total population in block group)
(White population in County) / (total population in County)

LQblack=

(Black population in block group) / (total population in block group)
(Black population in County) / (total population in County)

Based on the LQ calculation, neighborhoods are categorized as white, black, and
mixed neighborhoods. A neighborhood is designated as white when LQwhite is equal to or
greater than 1 and LQ black is less than 1; a black neighborhood is when LQblack is equal to
or greater 1 and LQwhite is less than 1; a mixed neighborhood occurs when both LQs are
either over 1 or less than 1.

Table 5-11 Types of neighborhoods based on LQ

LQblack≥1
LQblack<1

LQwhite ≥1

LQwhite<1

Mixed neighborhoods
White neighborhoods

Black neighborhoods
Mixed neighborhoods

Based on 2000 census data, the majority of voucher recipients live in black
neighborhoods. On average, 69.8% of voucher holders reside in black dominant
neighborhoods, however, the trend shows the proportion decreased over time from 72.4%
in 2005 to 67.9% in 2009. Meanwhile, voucher recipients living in white dominant
neighborhoods are growing from 23.5% to 28.2% during the same time. Mixed
neighborhoods have only 4% of vouchers but the rate is consistent over time.
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Table 5-12 Distribution of voucher holders by neighborhood racial type (2000)
Neighborhood
Racial type

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

average

count

%

count

%

count

%

count

%

count

%

%

Black

9,871

72.4

9,237

71

9,670

69.5

9,298

68.5

9,502

67.9

69.8

Mixed

559

4.1

514

3.9

578

4.2

567

4.2

540

3.9

4.0

White

3,198

23.5

3,263

25.1

3,668

26.4

3,714

27.4

3,953

28.2

26.1

Total

13,628

100

13,014

100

13,916

100

13,579

100

14,002

100

100

As of 2009, the picture of voucher location is not much different from 2000. The
same approach divides neighborhoods into three types using 2009 race data: dominantly
black, dominantly white, and mixed neighborhood. When comparing neighborhood
proportions from 2000 data, Table 5-13 indicates that a slightly higher percentage of
vouchers live in black dominant neighborhoods; at the same time, more vouchers reside
in white neighborhoods as well. However, mixed neighborhoods only comprise 1% of
vouchers, which is the biggest difference between the two tables using different time data.

Table 5-13 Distribution of voucher holders by neighborhood racial type (2009)
Neighborhood
Racial type

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Average

count

%

count

%

count

%

count

%

count

%

%

Black

9,945

73.0

9,304

71.5

9,746

70.0

9,382

69.1

9,595

68.5

70.4

Mixed

150

1.1

136

1.0

170

1.2

166

1.2

155

1.1

1.1

White

3,533

25.9

3,574

27.5

4,000

28.7

4,031

29.7

4,245

30.3

28.4

Total

13,628

100

13,014

100

13,916

100

13,579

100

14,002

100

100

When neighborhood racial composition is compared with voucher holders‟ race,
the majority of voucher recipients tend to live in the similar type of neighborhood in
terms of race. On average, 76.4% of African American voucher holders live in black
dominant neighborhoods (Table 5-14) while 74.5% of white voucher holders live in
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white neighborhoods (Table 5-15). The number of voucher holders living in
neighborhoods of a different color indicates that African American vouchers tend to live
more in white neighborhoods while white vouchers tend to live less in black dominant
neighborhoods over time. Overall, 20.3% of African Americans live in white dominant
neighborhoods, 15.3% of white vouchers live in black neighborhoods. Interestingly,
black vouchers living in white neighborhoods are growing over time; conversely, white
vouchers living in black neighborhoods are decreasing at the same time. In addition,
white voucher holders are more likely to live in mixed neighborhoods than African
American voucher holders. On average 20% of white, and 3.3% of black voucher
recipients live in mixed neighborhoods.

Table 5-14 Distribution of African American voucher holders by neighborhood racial
type (2000)
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

average

Neighborhood
Racial type

count

%

count

%

count

%

count

%

count

%

Black

9,606

79.3

9,011

77.8

9,441

75.9

9,080

74.8

9,277

74.1

76.4

Mixed

385

3.2

360

3.1

431

3.5

427

3.5

398

3.2

3.3

White

2,122

17.5

2,206

19.1

2,567

20.6

2,629

21.7

2,831

22.6

20.3

Total

12,113

100.0

11,577

100.0

12,439

100.0

12,136

100.0

12,513

100.0

100.0

%

Note: Neighborhoods racial types are classified by LQ using 2000 census data

Table 5-15 Distribution of White voucher holders by neighborhood racial type (2000)
Neighborhood
Racial type

2005
count

2006
%

count

2007
%

count

2008
%

count

2009
%

count

average
%

%

Black

250

17.3

210

15.3

206

14.8

198

14.5

207

14.7

15.3

Mixed

164

11.4

147

10.7

138

9.9

130

9.5

130

9.2

10.1

White

1,030

71.3

1,015

74.0

1,051

75.3

1,040

76.0

1,073

76.1

74.5

Total

1,444

100.0

1,372

100.0

1,395

100.0

1,368

100.0

1,410

100.0

100.0

Note: Neighborhoods racial types are classified by LQ using 2000 census data
120

Based on the analysis of racial distribution, it is hard to confirm that the voucher
program contributes to race desegregation since over 70% of voucher recipients live in
the neighborhoods of the same color. However, the degree of race segregation tends to
decrease over time. While the majority resides in the same color neighborhood, the more
voucher recipients choose neighborhoods with different color from 2005 to 2009.
Specifically, 20% of black and 15% of white voucher recipients live in neighborhoods
that the other color is dominant.

5.1.2.4 Affordable housing units and voucher distribution
Voucher holders in Cuyahoga County occupy relatively higher shares of
affordable units when compared with 50 MSAs as a whole. On average, 8.4% of
affordable units are occupied by voucher holders, which is 2% point higher than 50
MSAs in previous research. According to Devine et al (2003), the housing choice
voucher program utilizes only a very modest portion of the affordable housing stock, just
over 6%, within the 50 largest MSAs. The proportion of voucher holders to affordable
housing is not very different between suburbs and the central city, which is 6.4% in the
former and 6.2% in the latter (Devine et al., 2003).
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Table 5-16 Affordable housing units and voucher concentration
Total

Central city

Suburbs

Total occupied units (2000) (A)

571,457

191,278

380,179

Total affordable units (2000) (B)

166,036

86,361

79,675

Total voucher units (2009) (C)

14,002

7,392

6,610

Affordable units/occupied units (B/A)

29.1%

45.1%

21.0%

Voucher units/ occupied units (C/A)

2.5%

3.9%

1.7%

Voucher units/ affordable units (C/B)
8.4%
8.6%
8.3%
Note: Central city indicates the city of Cleveland, and suburbs are the rest of the cities in
Cuyahoga County
Affordable rental units are estimated by comparing rent levels in 2000 census data
with Fair Market Rents (FMRs), which indicate the rents that include units costing up to
the 40th percentile of rents for the metropolitan area, controlling for bedroom size. As of
2010, FMRs in the Cleveland metropolitan area are $735 for a two-bedroom unit. Based
on this rent, affordable rent units are calculated by summing up the rental units under rent
level $749 from the 2000 Census data, which is the most reliable and recent data
available at the time of analysis. 13
Affordable rental units comprise about 30% of total occupied housing units and
voucher holders utilize a moderate share (8.4%) of affordable housing. Interestingly,
there is no significant difference between the central city and suburbs in terms of the
proportion of voucher recipients to the affordable housing units. An 8.6% of affordable
housing units in the central city and an 8.3% of those in the suburbs are occupied by
voucher holders.

13

However, the affordable rental units do not necessarily represent the total number of units available for

voucher holders unless all landlords having affordable units participate in the voucher program.
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5.2 Spatial Analysis

5.2.1 Dot mapping

5.2.1.1 Dot mapping results
In order to identify the voucher locations, ArcGIS is utilized to geocode the
addresses. The address matching function, which compared the street name and house
number with voucher address point, identified the voucher holder‟s addresses. This
process identified locations for 68,134 out of 68,515 addresses from 2005 to 2009,
representing 99.4% match on average.

Table 5-17 Address matching results by year
year

Total

Matched addresses

% of matching

2005

13,720

13,627

99.3

2006

13,095

13,014

99.4

2007

14,039

13,916

99.1

2008

13,618

13,577

99.7

2009

14,043

14,001

99.7

Sum

68,515

68,134

99.4

Figure 5-1 shows the address matching result of vouchers from 2005 to 2009.
Each voucher holder is represented as a point in an ArcGIS shapefile. As shown below,
many vouchers look clustered in the middle of the county. However, it is hard to tell the
differences between years. Although simple dot mapping has advantage to show spatial
pattern geographically, dots on the same address cannot be shown because of overlapping.
Thus, dot mapping can mislead to find the areas with high concentration of voucher
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recipients. In order to improve understanding of spatial distribution of voucher recipients,
it is necessary to investigate different approach taken density into account.

5.2.1.2 Limitation of dot mapping
Although the density variable has advantage representing the spatial distribution
over simple dot mapping, it also has a limitation. Density, based on census tract or block
group boundaries, is calculated by the number of vouchers divided by the area where they
belong. Since the boundaries of each census tract or block group are artificially
delineated, the density map could also be misleading. Census tract or block group
boundaries usually correspond to streets (Wang & Varady, 2005). Vouchers concentrated
across the street cannot be calculated in the same equation if they are designated into the
different census tract or block group. In addition, the effect of clustering voucher houses
on the side of the census tract will decrease because the density takes total area into
account. Unless the voucher houses are evenly distributed over the census tract, the
density should be considered in different way. Thus, density based on the same size of
area will adjust the problem caused by areal unit.
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Figure 5-1 Address matching results by year

2005

2007

2009
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5.2.2 Density mapping

5.2.2.1 Method of density mapping
In order to calculate the voucher density, Cuyahoga county area was divided into
small grid cells of equal size. Points that fall within the search area are summed, and then
divided by the search area size to get each cell‟s density value. Both cell size and search
distance affect the result of density calculation.
The cell size determines how coarse or fine the patterns will appear. The smaller
the cell size, the smoother the surface will be. In general, cell size between 10 and 100
cells per density unit is recommended (Mitchell, 1999). Based on this, cell size would be
between 500 and 1,700 feet since the density unit is number of voucher units per square
mile. Therefore, Cuyahoga County was divided into 500 by 500 feet cells.
The size of the search area affects the level of generalization. The larger the
search radius, the more generalized the patterns will be. A smaller search radius usually
shows more local variation while it may not show broader patterns due to very low
density values which derived from the small search radius (Mitchell, 1999). However,
increasing the radius will not greatly change the calculated density values. Although
more points will fall inside the larger neighborhood, this number will be divided by a
larger area when calculating density. The main effect of a larger radius is that density is
calculated considering a larger number of points, which can be farther from the center of
cell. This results in a more generalized output (Allen, 2009; De Smith et al., 2009). After
conducting a series of different search radii from a quarter mile to two miles, I found a
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half mile radius to be an optimum choice large enough to show spatial pattern yet small
enough to show details.
In this process, the GIS defines a neighborhood based on a search radius specified
around each cell center. Then, it totals the number of points that fall within that
neighborhood and divides that number by the area of the neighborhood. That value is
assigned to the cell. Next, it moves to the next cell and does the same thing until it is
completed. This creates a running average of features per area, creating a smoothed
surface (Mitchell, 1999).

5.2.2.2 Result of density mapping
Density calculation indicates that maximum density decreased from 729
households per square mile in 2005 to 680 households per square mile in 2009. However,
mean density is almost the same at 18 and 19 in 2005 and 2009 respectively. When it was
compared to other places, as of 2005, overall voucher density in New York was 55
households per square mile; Los Angeles was 13; and Baltimore was 8 (Wang et al.,
2008).
The darkest areas represent the high density places which hold over 200 voucher
units per square mile. The white part indicates no vouchers. In general, the vouchers‟
spatial pattern tends to become less concentrated during the study period. From 2005 to
2009, the high concentrated areas have become less conspicuous in the east-northern side
of the county while more places have been occupied by voucher recipients in the outer
part of the county. Density maps of 2005 and 2009 show that voucher recipients tend to
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live more in suburbs in 2009 than in 2005. The spatial pattern of vouchers, based on
density, show a trend of spreading out of the central city into the rest of the county.

Figure 5-2 Voucher density map by year

2005

2009
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5.2.3 Hotspot analysis

5.2.3.1Getis-Ord G statistics
General and local G statistics identify the presence of clustering and the locations
of clusters. The General G statistic measures concentrations of high or low values over
the entire study area. It is termed “General” because it deals with the entire study area
rather than a localized area. The distance is critical in seeing the compactness of the
grouping, and will be used later in the hot-spot analysis. Running the analysis at various
distances will determine the maximum z-score, confidence level, and distance band for
clustering. The distance that produces the largest z-score will be the distance with the
most significant clustering (Allen, 2009). In this case, the null hypothesis for the analysis
is that the voucher locations are evenly distributed across the county.
After Getis-Ord G statistic (General G) found out that there is a statistically
significant clustering in the study area, then local Getis-Ord statistics (Gi*) will identify
the hotspots that high values are clustered by high values. Hotspot analysis in ArcGIS
spatial statistical tools is applied to show the hotspots and their changing patterns from
2005 to 2009. The Hot Spot analysis tool in ArcGIS calculates the Gi* statistic for each
feature. The Gi* statistic is given as:
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where xj is the attribute value for feature j, wij is the spatial weight between feature i and j,
n is equal to the total number of features and:
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The Gi* statistic produces z-score, allowing to visualize which locations are significant at
the given level of confidence interval (Allen, 2009; De Smith et al., 2009).
To be a statistically significant hotspot, a feature will have a high value and be
surrounded by other features with high values as well. The local sum for a feature and its
neighbors is compared proportionally to the sum of all features; when the local sum is
much different than the expected local sum, and that difference is too large to be the
result of random chance, a statistically significant z-score will be provided. For
statistically significant positive z-scores, the larger the z-score is, the more intense the
clustering of high values (hotspot). Contrarily, for statistically significant negative zscores, the smaller the z-score is, the more intense the clustering of low values (coldspot).
In sum, Getis-Ord G statistics test the null hypothesis that there is no clustering in
a study area. Once clustering is found, the Global G index shows a significant level. This
leads to questions of hot spot locations. Local Gi* statistic is utilized to answer this
question. In this study, a hot spot analysis in ArcGIS was used to identify hot spots
during the five year periods.
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5.2.3.2 Process of hotspot analysis
From the density mapping, it is hard to tell that the high clustered areas are
statistically meaningful or significant. So the spatial statistical approach is required.
Spatial autocorrelation detection has two steps. First voucher addresses are spatially
joined after geocoding into block group layer in order to count vouchers in the block
group. Then, the spatial weights matrix generates the weight in measuring the General G
index. It is termed “General” because it deals with the entire study area rather than a
localized area. Series of calculation indicate that there is less than 1% likelihood that the
clustering of high values could be the result of random chance. Spatial weights matrix
results in the highest z-score of 30.41 (p <0.001) among several options of spatial
relationship which include inverse distance, inverse squared distance, and fixed distance.
Choosing spatial weights matrix is reasonable to further hot-spot analysis, because the
option that produces the largest z-score will be the one with the most significant
clustering (Allen, 2009).
Instead of using a grid cell of equal size to construct a polygon grid over the
voucher locations, block group layer is used to analyze hot spot analysis. Using grid cell
or fishnet is good to show the number of vouchers falling within each grid. However, it is
not possible to get any socioeconomic data for each cell. The block group is
geographically smaller than a census tract allowing socioeconomic data. This allows
further investigation of relationships between the voucher clustering and the
characteristics of the area. Employing block group level data will provide more detailed
and richer outcomes compared to using a census tract level analysis.
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5.2.3.3 Hotspot analysis results
Voucher recipient‟s location pattern does not show even distribution. Global
spatial autocorrelation statistics (General G) indicates a significant clustering during five
years. General G index results are summarized in Table 5-15. High z scores and small pvalues imply that the clustering of voucher recipients are statistically significant, meaning
that there is less than 1% likelihood that the clustering of vouchers could be the result of
random chance. Results shown in Table 5-18 are calculated spatial weight matrix. Other
spatial relationships to calculate General G index are also considered including inverse
distance, inverse distance square, and fixed distance. These results are also similar in
terms of significant spatial clustering (high z scores and small p-values), and presented in
Appendix A.

Table 5-18 General G index by year
Year

G index

Z score

P value

2005

0.002

30.41

0.0000*

2006

0.001

30.61

0.0000*

2007

0.001

30.42

0.0000*

2008

0.001

30.01

0.0000*

2009

0.001

28.36

0.0000*

Note: * indicates that there is less than 1% likelihood that the clustering of high values
could be the result of random chance.

Since Global G index shows significant spatial clustering, then local statistics
(Gi*) will find the clusters of voucher recipients. Hotspot analysis based on Gi*
calculation clearly indicates the concentration of voucher holders and their changing
pattern over time. A Series of maps shown in Figure 5-3 presents hotspots of voucher
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users. The dark areas represent clustering of high values, and the hatched areas and areas
in dots represents clustering of low values, which are number of voucher recipients.
This is a dramatic result having two significant implications. First, hot spots and
cold spots are divided by the downtown area; vouchers are highly concentrated in the
eastern part of the county while low values are clustered in the western part. Second,
location patterns spread out from the central city from 2005 to 2009. The lower part of
the hot spot is getting longer toward the south-east direction, and the upper part of the hot
spot is stretching to the end of the county. This pattern clearly indicates that the
concentration of vouchers still exists even though the locations of concentration spread
out to the suburb.
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Figure 5-3 Hotspot maps for total voucher holders by year

a. 2005

b. 2007

c. 2009
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Based on hotspot analysis employed Getis-Ord global and local statistics, the first
research question on the presence of spatial clustering of voucher recipients can be
rejected. The high z-scores and small p-values indicate the presence of spatial clustering
of voucher holders during the study period from 2005 to 2009. In addition, hotspot
analysis with local Gi* statistic identify the locations of voucher concentration. Clusters
of high value (hotspot) are found in the eastern side of the study area, and they are
moving toward the suburbs from 2005 to 2009.

5.2.3.4 Hotspot analysis by race
Getis-Ord G and Gi* statistics along with hotspot maps show the presence of
spatial clustering and the locations of clusters over space during five years. First, GetisOrd global G index by race suggests that there is significant clustering of voucher holders
by their race. Table 5-19 indicates that both races (White and African Americans) of
voucher holders are clustering together. A small p-value in each year means that the
chances are less than 1% that clustering is occurred by randomly.
Identifying the presence of spatial clustering by race is followed by investigation
of clusters by each race. Hotspot maps based on local Gi* calculation are presented in
Figure 5-4. Hotspot analysis by race finds that White and African American voucher
holders are living in different side of the county. White voucher holders concentrate in
the west and the south part of the region, while African American voucher recipients
cluster in the east and the north side of the study area. From 2005 to 2009, hotspots of
both races have spread toward the suburbs.
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Table 5-19 General G index by race
Year

Race

G index

Z score

P value

2005

White

0.002

13.99

0.0000*

African American

0.002

36.42

0.0000*

White

0.002

16.92

0.0000*

African American

0.001

36.34

0.0000*

White

0.002

17.01

0.0000*

African American

0.001

35.39

0.0000*

White

0.002

18.09

0.0000*

African American

0.001

34.90

0.0000*

White

0.002

19.28

0.0000*

2006
2007
2008

2009

African American
0.001
32.64
0.0000*
Note: * indicates that there is less than 1% likelihood that the clustering of high values
could be the result of random chance.

Hotspot analysis enables us to answer the second research questions on the
presence and the locations of spatial concentration by race. Global G statistic results in
significant spatial clustering of voucher recipients by race; White and African American
voucher holders are significantly concentrated. Local Gi* statistic and hotspot maps
provide the locations and patterns of spatial concentration by race. Both races are
clustered in different side of the county, and they tend to spread out to the suburbs over
time.
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Figure 5-4 Hot spot maps by race

2005

2007

2009
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5.2.3.5 Hotspot analysis by ethnicity
Analyzing hotspot by ethnicity also indicates significant clustering and different
hotspots by ethnic group. Hispanics tend to cluster in the central city while non Hispanics
live in the northeast side of the county. However, spatial pattern of Hispanic group does
not spread out from 2005 to 2009 as non Hispanic does. Table 5-20 and Figure 5-5
illustrate the results of General G statistic and hotspots by ethnicity. Based on the General
G statistic and hotspot analysis, it can be inferred that voucher recipients tend to cluster
with the same ethnic group and non Hispanic voucher holders have spread out to suburbs
from 2005 to 2009 while Hispanic voucher holders have concentrated in the central city.

Table 5-20 General G index by ethnicity
Year

Ethnicity

G index

Z score

P value

2005

Hispanic

0.003

53.25

0.0000*

Non Hispanic

0.001

31.09

0.0000*

Hispanic

0.003

54.01

0.0000*

Non Hispanic

0.001

31.35

0.0000*

Hispanic

0.003

57.64

0.0000*

Non Hispanic

0.001

31.18

0.0000*

Hispanic

0.003

55.39

0.0000*

Non Hispanic

0.001

30.84

0.0000*

Hispanic

0.003

55.04

0.0000*

2006
2007
2008
2009

Non Hispanic
0.001
29.21
0.0000*
Note: * indicates that there is less than 1% likelihood that the clustering of high values
could be the result of random chance.
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Figure 5-5 Hot spot maps by ethnicity

2005

2007

2009

Strong spatial concentration of Hispanic voucher holders is somewhat consistent
with finding from HPS 2000 study that Housing discrimination against minority
especially Hispanic renters has not declined over the decade (Turner & Ross, 2005). In
2000 the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) launched national
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paired-testing study (shortened here to HPS 2000) to measure patterns of racial and
ethnic discrimination in urban housing markets nationwide. This was the third time since
the 1977 Housing Market Practices Study and the 1989 housing discrimination study
conducted. HPS 2000 was designed to rigorously assess the extent of progress in the fight
against housing discrimination. Findings indicate that African Americans and Hispanics
still face significant discrimination in both rental and sales markets in metropolitan areas
nationwide even though the degree of discrimination has generally declined since 1989.
However, Hispanic renters are the only group that discrimination has not declined over
the decade. In addition, while overall levels of discrimination against minority
homebuyers are falling, there are still subtle ways of discrimination in geographic
steering and unequal assistance with mortgage finance (Turner & Ross, 2005).

5.2.3.6 Hotspot analysis by income level
In order to investigate the question regarding whether voucher holders spatial
patterns differ by income level, voucher recipients are divided into four groups,
consistent with categories adopted in previous analysis. They are extremely low income,
very low income, low income, and above low income group. These income groups
correspond with less than 30%, 30-50%, 50-80%, and above 80% of the area‟s median
income. Results of general Getis-Ord G statistic are presented in Table 5-21. Most
income group shows spatial clustering during five years, except above low income group.
Similarly to findings by race and ethnicity, clustering of different income groups happens
with high probability.
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Hotspot analysis is conducted for those three income groups: extremely low, very
low, and low income group. Figure 5-6 shows how each income group clusters together;
however, the spatial patterns do not clearly distinguished since those income groups
clusters in the northeastern regions. Regarding research question and hypotheses, there is
statistically significant spatial clustering by income group among voucher holders;
however, spatial patterns are not clearly differentiated among different income group.

Table 5-21 General G index by income group
Year

Income Group
G index
Z score
P value
Extremely low
0.00133
27.44
0.00000*
Very low
0.00136
38.03
0.00000*
2005
Low
0.00131
12.46
0.00000*
Above low
0.00139
0.91
0.36384
Extremely low
0.00129
27.84
0.00000*
Very low
0.00127
33.38
0.00000*
2006
Low
0.00141
15.59
0.00000*
Above low
0.00134
0.91
0.36285
Extremely low
0.00127
27.70
0.00000*
Very low
0.00128
34.92
0.00000*
2007
Low
0.00127
14.56
0.00000*
Above low
0.00121
0.89
0.37591
Extremely low
0.00125
26.59
0.00000*
Very low
0.00126
36.57
0.00000*
2008
Low
0.00131
13.79
0.00000*
Above low
0.00139
1.370
0.17080
Extremely low
0.00125
26.00
0.00000*
Very low
0.00128
33.24
0.00000*
2009
Low
0.00123
10.30
0.00000*
Above low
0.00000
-0.397
0.69164
Note: * indicates that there is less than 1% likelihood that the clustering of high values
could be the result of random chance.

141

Figure 5-6 Hot spot maps by income group

2005

2007

2009

5.3 Summary of findings

A-spatial analysis of voucher recipients in Cuyahoga county shows that the vast
majority of voucher recipients are in the lowest income group, of an African American
racial profile, and live in the central city. In terms of neighborhood racial composition,
voucher families are likely to live in neighborhoods that the same racial group is
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predominant. Over 75% of African American voucher holders reside in dominantly black
neighborhoods, White voucher holders are also likely to live in dominantly white
neighborhoods. Both African American and White voucher users have moved into
dominantly white neighborhoods over time.
Many voucher recipients live in poor neighborhoods. Three quarters of voucher
families do not live in neighborhoods that are at or above the moderate poverty thresholds,
Black voucher families are more likely than White households to live in poor
neighborhoods. However, families who live in suburban locations are much less likely to
live in high-poverty neighborhoods. About one third of voucher recipients in the central
city live in neighborhoods with a poverty level less than 20%, while almost two thirds of
voucher holders in suburbs are living in the same neighborhood conditions in terms of
poverty level. Both African American and White voucher recipients have moved out of
extremely poor neighborhoods over time. Thus, voucher users have lived in poor
neighborhoods, with neighborhoods of the same racial background; however, over time,
they have moved into less poor neighborhoods and into white dominant neighborhoods.
Spatial analysis allows testing the first set of research questions. The first research
question asks if there is spatial concentration of voucher recipients. The hypothesis is that
there is no spatial concentration of voucher recipients in Cuyahoga County. This question
is important because the housing choice voucher program intends to de-concentrate and
desegregate poor and minority families. Identifying spatial concentrations, which are
statistically significant, assists in evaluating the program‟s goal achievement. Hotspot
analysis answers the first research question on whether there is spatial concentration of
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voucher users. Voucher recipients are likely to concentrate in specific locations such as
the northeast part of the county, but they tend to scatter as time goes on.
The second research question asks if there is any difference in spatial patterns
between different races, different ethnic backgrounds, and different income levels. The
hypothesis is that there is no difference of spatial patterns between these variables. If
African American and/or low income families tend to cluster, it increases the necessity
for further investigation into a relationship between voucher recipient characteristics and
neighborhood characteristics. Spatial analysis suggests that African Americans tend to
cluster in the northeast part of the county while White populations tend to live the west
side of the downtown. A strong spatial concentration of Hispanic voucher holders was
identified by hotspot analysis. They tend to cluster in the central part of the Cleveland.
Spatial clustering was also found by different income levels; however, spatial patterns
were not significantly different from other income groups.
The a-spatial approach is good for a quick understanding of the general tendency
of location outcomes, while it is hard to account for the real locations in which spatial
clustering occurs. Hence, spatial approach overcomes the limitation of a-spatial
description. Analysis of spatial distribution, including dot mapping, density map, and
hotspot analysis, offers insight into the pattern of spatial concentration of voucher
recipients; however, this is probably not the most effective research method for exploring
factors contributing to spatial concentration of voucher recipients. Thus, in order to
overcome the shortcomings of exploratory spatial data analysis, the next chapter will
utilize spatial regression analysis in exploring factors influencing voucher concentration
in Cuyahoga County.
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CHAPTER VI
FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH VOUCHER RECIPIENTS’
CONCENTRATIONS

6.1 Model and variables

6.1.1 Regression model
Regression analysis is conducted to identify the degree of significance of factors
explaining voucher recipients‟ location outcome. Previous literature and theories
identified several factors such as the availability of affordable housing, race, vacancy
rates, poverty rates, and the accessibility of public transportation.
The regression model incorporating these factors is specified as follow.
Y   0  1 AFFORDH   2 BLACK   3 ASIAN   4 HISPANIC 

 5VACANCY   6 POVERTY   7TRANPORT  
Where,
Y

=

proportion of voucher recipients;

AFFORDH

=

availability of affordable housing;

BLACK, ASIAN, and HISPANIC =

proportion of each group of minority;
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VACANCY

=

rental vacancy rates;

POVERTY

=

poverty rates;

TRANSPORT =

accessibility to public transportation;

β

=

parameters to be estimated;

ε

=

error term.

6.1.2 Descriptive statistics of variables
In regression model, dependent variable (y) represents housing units that are
occupied by voucher recipients as a proportion of total occupied housing units in a block
group. As of 2009, a total of 14,043 vouchers were issued by CMHA. There are 1,261
block groups in Cuyahoga County. ArcGIS is utilized to calculate the number of voucher
holders in block groups through conducting geocoding and spatial join function.
Geocoding is employed to identify every single address of voucher recipients in the study
area. Then spatial join function allows us to count the number of vouchers in each block
group layer. Results of geocoding address show a 99.7% match; 14,001 out of 14,043 are
identified. Summing up all voucher holders in the block group is then divided by the total
number of occupied housing units in order to get the proportion of voucher housing in
each block group. The mean value of the dependent variable is 2.5 with a maximum of
25.8. So, there is a block group where voucher users are one out of four households in
neighborhoods.
As an independent variable, AFFORDH represents the availability of affordable
housing as the proportion of rental housing below FMR among all occupied housing units
in the block group. Affordable rental housing unit is defined as renter occupied housing
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units with cash rent under $749.14 So, availability of affordable housing is calculated as
the affordable rental housing units divided by total occupied housing units in the block
group. Availability of affordable housing below FMR is 29.1% on average. When using
central city and suburbs dichotomy, only 21% of the dwellings in suburbs have rents
below the FMR, compared with 45% of dwellings in the city of Cleveland.15 Accordingly,
twice as many voucher holders are located in the central city than the suburbs among
total occupied housing units (3.9% vs. 1.7%). In contrast, when considering affordable
housing units below the FMR, voucher holders show a relatively even distribution
between the central city and suburbs; 8.6% in the central city and 8.3% in the suburbs.

14

FMR for two-bedroom unit in Cuyahoga County changes from $619 to $752 during 2000 and 2010.

Thus, threshold $749 might slightly overestimate the actual housing stock below FMR. So, it is hard to
assert that rental units under rent of $749 reflect the exactly correct number of actual affordable housing for
voucher holders. However, this is not a significant overestimate considering the fact that payment standard
for rental subsidies is set up to 110% of FMRs. Furthermore, previous studies also have used similar
criteria to estimate the number of affordable housing below FMR (Pendall, 2000a; Finkel & Buron, 2005).
Year
Efficiency ($) 1 bedroom ($) 2 bedrooms ($) 3 bedrooms ($) 4 bedrooms ($)
2000
398
500
619
787
887
2001
442
555
687
874
984
2002
467
587
726
924
1040
2003
481
603
748
951
1070
2004
483
606
752
956
1075
2005
508
578
703
916
980
2006
488
566
682
874
929
2007
502
583
702
900
956
2008
518
602
725
929
987
2009
496
576
694
890
945
2010
526
610
735
942
1001
Fair Market Rents by bedroom size in Cuyahoga County
Source: http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/fmr.html
15
Ladd and Ludwig (1997) estimated similar finding in Baltimore study: only 15% of the dwellings in
suburban Baltimore have rents below the HUD-established limits, compared with 30% of dwellings in the
city.
147

Table 6-1 Availability of affordable housing and voucher distribution

Affordable units/total occupied units

Total

Central city

Suburbs

29.10%

45.1%

21.0%

2.50%

3.9%

1.7%

Voucher units/ total occupied units

Voucher units/ affordable units
8.40%
8.6%
8.3%
Note: Central city refers to the city of Cleveland; Suburbs mean the rest of cities except
the city of Cleveland in Cuyahoga County.

BLACK, ASIAN, and HISPANIC respectively indicate the proportion of each
minority population among all population in the block group. On average, minorities
comprised of 31.9% of African Americans, 1.7% of Asian, and 3.8% of Hispanic.
VACANCY represents the rental vacancy rates which are calculated as the
proportion of rental vacant housing units among all housing units in block group. There is
an average 7.4% of rental vacancy rates in the study area.
POVERTY represents the poverty rates in block group, which is the proportion of
person living below the poverty level. In Cuyahoga County, almost 15% of the
population is living under the poverty level.
TRANSPORT represents the accessibility to public transportation, which is
calculated as the proportion of area accessible to public transportation in a quarter mile
distance divided by the total area of the block group. ArcGIS geo-processing tools create
a buffer area from the public transportation line with the radius of a quarter mile. A
quarter mile is adopted as a walking distance based on C. Perry‟s (1929) Neighborhood
Unit concept. Perry organized the neighborhood unit around several physically oriented
ideals such as location of school in the center of the neighborhood so that a child can
walk to school without crossing a major arterial street. The distance for a child‟s walk to
school is only about one-quarter of a mile. The area covered by a quarter mile buffer is
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divided by the total area of the block group to get the accessibility of public
transportation. On average, 76% of the area is accessible to public transportation.
Descriptive statistics of variables for regression model is shown in Table 6-2.

Table 6-2 Descriptive statistics of regression variables
Variables

Name

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Standard Deviation

Dependent

Voucher
AFFORDH

0.00
0.00

25.81
100.00

2.81
28.56

3.37
25.39

BLACK

0.00

100.00

31.94

38.58

ASIAN

0.00

57.89

1.65

3.83

Independent HISPANIC

0.00

59.86

3.77

8.06

VACANCY
POVERTY

0.00
0.00

100.00
100.00

7.39
14.95

7.51
15.67

TRANSPORT

0.00

100.00

76.47

30.49

6.2 OLS regression

6.2.1 OLS base model results
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis is utilized to estimate the
coefficient of each independent variable and to identify the statistical significance and the
degree of effect. Base model refers to OLS regression model that specified previously,
which includes seven independent variables (affordable housing, race, vacancy rates,
poverty rates, and transportation). The dependent variable is proportion of units occupied
by voucher holders divided by total occupied housing units in a block group. In order to
confirm the functional form of the dependent variable, several types are tested, including
original raw data (number of voucher), logarithm (ln(number of voucher)), proportion
(percentage of voucher among occupied housing units), density (number of vouchers per
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square mile), and concentration (LQ of voucher, ((Vouchers in block group)/(Vouchers in
County))/((Housing units in block group)/(Housing units in County))). As a result of
testing various forms of the dependent variable, the form of proportion is selected as the
most relevant and appropriate type of the dependent variable.
Two regression models are considered with different time period of the dependent
variables. The results of the previous chapter show that voucher holders are spatially
concentrated and their locations are changing from 2005 to 2009. Thus, regressions with
different time (the dependent variable in 2005 and 2009) would result in different
coefficient estimates if voucher holders‟ locations have substantially changed. In this case,
the different coefficients would reflect the changing relationship between voucher
locations and neighborhood conditions. Also, analysis with 2005 voucher data decreases
the time gap with 2000 census data.
OLS base model results show that in both years all dependent variables are
significant and have the same direction of effects. They are statistically significant at least
at a 95% confidence interval, except the poverty rates in the 2005 model, which is
significant at a 90% level. In both models, Asian population and poverty levels are
negatively associated with voucher holders. Contrarily, availability of affordable housing,
African American population, Hispanic population, vacancy rates, and accessibility of
public transportation are positively associated with voucher recipients. For example,
holding other constant, a 10% affordable housing increase is associated with a 0.17% and
0.21% increase of voucher recipients in 2005 and 2009, respectively. A 10% increase of
African American population is related with a 0.56-0.57% increase of voucher holders
under the same condition of other variables.
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Table 6-3 OLS base model results
Base Model

2005

2009

Estimate

Std Err

t-value

Prob

-0.1176

0.2097

-0.5607

0.5756

0.0573

0.0027

20.9566

0.0000

-0.0608

0.0205

-2.9689

HISPANIC

0.0623

0.0108

AFFORDH

0.0174

POVERTY
VACANCY

Intercept
BLACK
ASIAN

TRANSPORT
2

Adjusted R

sig

Estimate

Std Err

t-value

Prob

0.0613

0.1999

0.3067

0.7591

***

0.0557

0.0026

21.3882

0.0000

***

0.0030

***

-0.0396

0.0195

-2.0273

0.0428

**

5.7783

0.0000

***

0.0738

0.0103

7.1833

0.0000

***

0.0049

3.5808

0.0004

***

0.0208

0.0046

4.4970

0.0000

***

-0.0167

0.0088

-1.8836

0.0600

*

-0.0474

0.0084

-5.6210

0.0000

***

0.0306

0.0133

2.3077

0.0212

**

0.0270

0.0127

2.1318

0.0332

**

0.0065

0.0029

2.2390

0.0253

**

0.0087

0.0028

3.1512

0.0017

***

0.4642

sig

0.4239

Note: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

6.2.2 Regression diagnostics
Multiple regression analysis is based on several assumptions known as GaussMarkov assumptions. These multiple linear regression (MLR) assumptions can be listed
as follows: Assumption MLR.1 (linear in parameters); Assumption MLR. 2 (random
sampling); Assumption MLR. 3 (no perfect collinearity); Assumption MLR. 4 (zero
conditional mean); and Assumption MLR. 5 (homoskedasticity) (Wooldridge, 2006).
Under Assumption MLR. 1 through MLR. 5, the OLS estimator is the best linear
unbiased estimator (BLUE). Regression diagnostics are necessary to detect whether the
regression coefficients are estimated under the above mentioned assumptions.
First, residual analysis is conducted to check the possibility of whether there are
variables suspect to suffer a misspecification problem. Examining residual plots implies
that one independent variable in the 2005 model and four independent variables in the
2009 model should be included as a form of square terms in each regression model since

151

their residuals show quadratic forms of distribution (refer to Appendix B). These are
availability of affordable housing, poverty rates, vacancy rates, and accessibility of public
transportation in the 2009 model and vacancy rates in the 2005 model. In order to address
a model misspecification issue based on residual analysis, those variables are
incorporated in the model along with square terms. Then, these variables are run through
the regression equation. Including square terms in the model is verified by the residual
plots which provide a relatively flat form compared the initial curved form (Appendix C).
Second, Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is calculated to identify the presence and
degree of multicollinearity. The VIF measures the impact of collinearity among the
variables in a regression model. In the 2005 model, the VIF for each variables is less than
6, suggesting no multicollinearity issue (refer to Appendix D). In the 2009 model, the
average VIF shows 10.81, implying some collinearity problems in this model (refer to
Appendix E). However, Assumption MLR. 3 rules out perfect multicollinearity. Thus,
there should be no exact linear relationship among independent variables. Regression can
suffer collinearity to some degree; multicollinearity is a matter of degree. The VIF score
of this model indicates no huge multicollinearity problem.
Third, F tests are conducted to find out whether the model includes irrelevant
variables. A series of restricted models are constructed and tested using the F statistic.
None of the tests reveal statistically insignificant results (refer to Appendix F). Thus,
there is no reason to drop any of the variables in the regression model. A significant pvalue of the F statistic and the Wald statistic indicate overall model significance (F
statistic 133.7 and Wald statistic 888.2 are both significant at the 95% level in the 2009
model, for example).
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6.2.3 Revised model results
The revised model contains relevant square terms based on regression diagnostics.
Table 6-4 shows the results from the revised model. In both years, the revised model
performs better than the previous base model. Regression coefficients are all significant
at the 95% confidence interval, except two variables in the 2009 model. In the 2005
model, poverty and vacancy rates increase their significance and magnitude of impact
compared to the base model. Coefficient estimates of other variables tend to decrease
more than the previous model. The adjusted R2 has slightly increased in the revised
model.
Similar to the results from the base model, several factors influence voucher
concentration in a positive way: African American population, Hispanic population, the
availability of affordable housing, vacancy rates, and transportation accessibility.
Minority population is a good indicator of voucher concentration. African American and
Hispanic populations are positively related with voucher holders‟ concentration, while
the Asian population is negatively associated. So, voucher recipients tend to live in
neighborhoods that minorities are concentrated in. This implies that the voucher program
has not performed well in terms of race desegregation. Poverty rates show mixed results
in both years. In the 2005 model, poverty rates reveal a negative relationship with
voucher concentration, implying the voucher program has been successful to
deconcentrate poverty in this study area. However, as shown on the right side of Table 64, the 2009 revised model results in a quadratic relationship with poverty rates and
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voucher holders. Until poverty rates reach 22%, the relationship is positive; however,
when poverty rates in block groups are over 22%, then the relationship is reversed.16

Table 6-4 Revised model results
Revised Model

2005

2009

Estimate

Std Err

t-value

Prob

Sig

Intercept

-0.3224

0.2107

-1.5304

0.1265

BLACK

0.0547

0.0027

19.9344

0.0000

ASIAN

-0.0598

0.0202

-2.9528

HISPANIC

0.0552

0.0107

AFFORDH

0.0116

POVERTY

Estimate

Std Err

t-value

Prob

Sig

-0.5873

0.2735

-2.1476

0.0319

**

***

0.0471

0.0027

17.3601

0.0000

***

0.0032

***

-0.0431

0.0189

-2.2855

0.0224

**

5.1444

0.0000

***

0.0442

0.0105

4.2055

0.0000

***

0.0049

2.3567

0.0186

**

0.0370

0.0115

3.2270

0.0013

***

-0.0218

0.0088

-2.4813

0.0133

**

0.0749

0.0190

3.9467

0.0000

***

VACANCY

0.1378

0.0236

5.8474

0.0000

***

0.0451

0.0230

1.9656

0.0497

**

TRANSPORT

0.0065

0.0029

2.2696

0.0234

**

0.0236

0.0104

2.2720

0.0231

**

SQ_VACANCY

-0.0021

0.0004

-5.4752

0.0000

***

-0.0005

0.0004

-1.2846

0.1996

SQ_AFFORDH

-

-

-

-

-0.0003

0.0001

-2.5846

0.0099

***

SQ_POVERTY

-

-

-

-

-0.0017

0.0003

-6.5232

0.0000

***

SQ_TRANPORT

-

-

-

-

-0.0002

0.0001

-1.9433

0.0520

*

Adjusted R2

0.4767

0.4637

Note: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

The threshold effect should be mentioned since several variables in the 2009
model show a quadratic relationship with the dependent variable. These quadratic form
variables include public transportation, affordable housing, vacancy, and poverty rates.
Based on the revised OLS model results, accessibility of public transportation is
positively associated with voucher location until 59% of the area is accessible to public
16

However, when square term of poverty rates are added in the 2005 revised model, the direction of

coefficients are consistent with the results from the 2009 revised model. So, it is safe to say that the
threshold effect is possible rather than asserting a linear relationship with voucher concentration and
poverty rates.
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transportation; however, after that point, the relationship between public transportation
and vouchers is reversed. Similarly, the proportion of affordable housing stock and
voucher holders are positively related until 62% of housing is affordable, and then the
relationship is negative. Poverty rates affect voucher locations in a positive way to the
point at which poverty rates reach 22%; however, the direction of association reverses
past that point. Vacancy rates are also positively related with voucher holders until
neighborhood vacancy rates reach 45%, and after that point the relationship turns
negative.
Positive association of public transportation with voucher location suggests that
improving accessibility to public transportation in suburbs will contribute to spreading
voucher holders to suburban areas. However, this is the case until public transportation
serves 60% of the neighborhood area within a quarter mile distance. 17 Similarly, vacancy
rates, affordable housing, and poverty rates show the threshold like relationship. Vacancy
rates are used as a proxy for landlords‟ participation in the program. Under the weak
housing market conditions, vacancy rates are high and it is hard for landlords to find
tenants, so they will consider participating in the voucher program that will ensure stable
rents. The threshold might be 45%; however, the relationship would be interpreted as
linear rather than quadratic considering the fact that the square term of vacancy rates is
not significant and there is almost no observation that has vacancy rates over 45%.
The threshold effect of poverty implies that the voucher program is useful to
deconcentrate poor households with voucher subsidy. A positive relationship holds until

17

This might be explained by the fact that most of the downtown block groups are covered by public

transportation within a quarter mile distance. So, block groups near the downtown have 100% accessibility
of public transportation.
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poverty rates reach 22%, which means that voucher recipients are more likely to be found
in areas with low poverty rates since the relationship turns negative after that point. In
this regard, it can be inferred that the voucher program enables low-income households to
live out of extremely poor neighborhoods by utilizing rental assistance.
Abundance of affordable housing below FMRs does not necessarily attract
voucher users after passing some point since the coefficient of affordable housing shows
threshold point. Voucher holders are easy to find their house where there are plenty of
housing under the certain rent level. However, voucher recipients are supported part of
the rent by the government, they do not have to find an extremely low-rent house. As
Figure 6-1 indicates, the east side of the Cleveland near down is abundant of affordable
rental housing; over 60% of rental housing is below FMRs. However, not many voucher
holders live that region as shown in previous chapter. Plus, regression results confirm the
relationship is overturn when affordable housing comprises over 60% of total rental
housing. As Figure 6-2 shows, the regions that are overcrowded with affordable housing
is overlapped with the regions that are abundant of low rent level, such as rent level
below $400.18 Even though voucher holders are in extremely low-income households,
they are affordable to live in decent rental housing that meets their needs through rental
subsidies. Thus, the threshold effect implies that the voucher program enables voucher
families to live units that meet their housing needs regardless of their income level.

18

Distribution of affordable rental below $300 shows similar patterns.
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Figure 6-1 Distribution of affordable housing

Note: Data for affordable housing are based on 2000 Census results

Figure 6-2 Distribution of rental units below $400

Note: Data for rental units below $400 are based on 2000 Census results
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6.3 Spatial regression

6.3.1 Spatial model diagnostics
Estimation of the regression model with spatial data often violates the classic
regression assumptions. One of the OLS assumptions, independence of observations, is
not satisfied due to spatial autocorrelation in data. This leads to a biased estimation of the
standard errors of parameters, consequently misleading significance tests (Anselin, 1988).
In order to identify the types of spatial dependency, LM tests were conducted. As shown
in Table 6-5, a significant Moran‟s I indicates the presence of spatial autocorrelation,
subsequently requiring a spatial regression model to address the spatial autocorrelation
issue.

Table 6-5 Diagnostics for spatial dependence
2005 model
TEST
Moran's I (error)

MI/DF

Value

2009 model
Prob

MI/DF

Value

Prob

0.223417

14.1304

0.000000

0.236734

14.7020

0.0000000

Lagrange Multiplier (lag)

1

189.4334

0.000000

1

197.6614

0.0000000

Robust LM (lag)

1

11.3362

0.000760

1

9.9055

0.0016478

Lagrange Multiplier (error)

1

190.0554

0.000000

1

205.2978

0.0000000

Robust LM (error)

1

11.9529

0.000544

1

17.5218

0.0000281

Lagrange Multiplier (SARMA)

2

201.3916

0.000000

2

215.2033

0.0000000

Proper spatial regression is selected by the results of spatial dependence
diagnostics. OLS regression results show that both of the standard LM statistics are
significant, so Robust LM statistics are examined. Both Robust statistics are significant at
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the level of p<0.05. In this case, the magnitude of significance will be criteria to select
the relevant spatial model. Following the rule addressed by Anselin (2005b), the spatial
error model is selected as the appropriate model (the Robust LM statistic for error is
significant p<0.0001 compared to p<0.001 of the Robust LM statistic for lag in 2009, for
example).

6.3.2 The spatial error model and spatial weight matrix
Spatial autocorrelation happens when the value at any one point in space is
dependent on values at the surrounding points. The coefficients estimated cannot be
unbiased or efficient in the presence of spatial autocorrelation, because OLS assumes the
independence among all variables.
If there is spatial autocorrelation in residuals, it means that the model is
systematically overestimating the observed values in some regions, and underestimating
the observed values in others. Presence of spatial autocorrelation indicates that the model
is not properly specified, thus the coefficients estimated by OLS are not unbiased.
Anselin (1988) described model forms that deal with spatial autocorrelation. A spatial
error model is appropriate when there appears to be a structure in the residual terms,
while a spatial lag model is appropriate when a spatial structure is present in the variables
in the model. Unbiased parameter estimates can be derived from both model types when
maximum likelihood is applied as the fitting method.
This study conducts the spatial error model based on the spatial diagnostics. The
spatial error model that includes a spatial autoregressive error term is specified as,

y  X   ,

with   W  u
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where y is a vector of observations on the dependent variable, W is the spatial weight
matrix, X is a matrix of observations on the explanatory variables, ε is a vector of
spatially autocorrelated error terms, µ is a vector of iid (independent and identically
distributed) errors, and λ and β are parameters. Based on the above equation, the spatial
error model for the study is written
y  1 AFFORDH   2 BLACK   3 ASIAN   4 HISPANIC 

 5VACANCY   6 POVERTY   7TRANSPORT  ( I  W ) 1 u
where ( I  W ) 1 is a spatial multiplier.
There are several options to create a spatial weights matrix in the GeoDa software,
which are contiguity-based, distance-based, and neighborhood-based spatial weights. A
contiguity-based spatial weight matrix is used for a polygon shape file to include
neighboring spatial entities with shared boundaries, and a distance-based spatial weight
matrix is useful for a point shape file to calculate the distance between points. Plus, a
neighborhood based spatial weight matrix, such as k-nearest neighbor criterion, ensures
that each observation has exactly the same number (k) of neighbors (Anselin, 2005b).
Since the base map for this analysis is a shapefile, a contiguity-based option is
selected to create a spatial weight matrix. There are also two different options in
contiguity-based spatial weights: rook contiguity and queen contiguity weight matrix. A
spatial weight matrix with queen contiguity criterion can include all neighborhoods that
do not have a full boundary in common, while rook criterion often eliminates those
neighborhoods which have a full boundary segment in common. The queen criterion
determines neighboring units as those that have any point in common, including both
common boundaries and common corners. Therefore, the number of neighbors for any
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given unit according to the queen criterion will be equal to or greater than that of using
the rook criterion (Anselin, 2005b). Thus, this analysis will employ the queen contiguity
type as constructing a spatial weight matrix because the queen method can include
neighborhoods where full boundaries are not in common.

6.3.3 Spatial error model results
Estimates and measures of fit are given in Table 6-6, showing the results from the
spatial error model. In the Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation, the R2 listed in the
results is a pseudo-R2, which is not directly comparable with the measure given for OLS
results. The proper measures of fit are the Log likelihood, AIC (Akaike Info Criterion)
and SC (Schwarz Criterion). AIC and SC are methods of comparing alternative
specifications by adjusting the number of coefficients in the model and value of log
likelihood.19 The higher the log likelihood, the better the model fit. On the contrary, the
lower AIC and SC are, the better the model specification (Anselin, 2005b).
Spatial error model estimation presents better performance in terms of Log
likelihood, AIC, and SC. When compared with OLS results, we notice an increase in the
Log-Likelihood from -3013 (for OLS) to -2942 in the 2005 year model. Compensating
the improved fit for the added variable (the spatial autoregressive error term), the AIC
(from 6044.94 to 5902.40) and SC (from 6091.19 to 5948.65) both decrease relative to
OLS, suggesting an improvement of fit for the spatial error specification.

19

In GeoDa software, AIC is calculated as AIC=-2L+2K, where L is the log likelihood and K is the number

of parameters in the model. SC is measured as SC=-2L+Kln(N), where ln is the natural logarithm and N is
sample size (Anselin, 2005b).
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Table 6-6 Comparison of revised model performance between OLS and the Spatial model
2005 model

2009 model

OLS

Spatial Error

OLS

Spatial Error

R (Adjusted/ Pseudo)

0.4767

0.5569

0.4641

0.5580

Log likelihood

-3013.47

-2940.46

-2920.76

-2836.84

Akaike info criterion

6044.94

5898.91

5865.52

5697.67

Schwarz criterion

6091.19

5945.17

5927.19

5759.35

2

Table 6-7 shows the results of the Maximum Likelihood estimation of a spatial
error model of voucher concentration. The spatial autoregressive coefficient is estimated
as 0.4565 and 0.5039 in 2005 and 2009 respectively, and both are highly significant
(p<0.0000). The results confirm a strong positive and significant spatial autoregressive
coefficient. Relative to the OLS results, the coefficient for POVERTY (in the 2005 model)
has become insignificant. This implies that inferences based on OLS estimates may be
misleading because OLS cannot account for spatial autocorrelation. The value of the
coefficient estimates is slightly smaller in terms of the absolute value relative to the OLS
results, except for VACANCY (in the 2009 model), where the change occurs from 0.0451
to 0.0557.
The threshold effect still remains in the spatial error model. In the 2005 model,
vacancy rates (VACANCY) are associated with voucher concentration in a positive way
until vacancy rates reach 30.4%, and then the relationship reverses.20 In the 2009 model,
AFFORDH and POVERTY show the quadratic relationship with voucher concentration.
The affordable housing and poverty rates affect positively on voucher location until
20

This threshold for OLS model is estimated 32.8%. The difference reflects the consideration of spatial

autocorrelation in model estimation.
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affordable housing reaches 50.2% and poverty rates reach 23.3%, and reverse impact past
that point. As is the case in the 2005 model estimation, the 2009 spatial error model
results in slightly different coefficients from ones estimated by OLS. For the 2009 model,
OLS regression presents that four variables (AFFORDH, POVERTY, VACANCY, and
TRANSPORT) have the threshold effect. The threshold point is estimated differently. For
example, the threshold of affordable housing decreases from 61.7% (OLS) to 50.2%
(spatial error model), while the threshold of poverty rates increases from 22.0% (OLS) to
23.3% (spatial error model).

Table 6-7 Spatial error model estimation
Spatial Model

2005 Spatial Error Model

2009 Spatial Error Model

Estimate

Std Err

z-value

Probability

Intercept

-0.1579

0.2736

-0.5771

0.5639

BLACK

0.0508

0.0036

13.9619

0.0000

ASIAN

-0.0490

0.0211

-2.3165

HISPANIC

0.0521

0.0137

AFFORDH

0.0087

POVERTY

Estimate

Std. Err

z-value

Probability

-0.3655

0.3171

-1.1527

0.2490

***

0.0448

0.0036

12.5950

0.0000

***

0.0205

**

-0.0390

0.0196

-1.9938

0.0462

**

3.7972

0.0001

***

0.0344

0.0131

2.6218

0.0087

***

0.0048

1.8004

0.0718

*

0.0301

0.0110

2.7249

0.0064

***

-0.0087

0.0086

-1.0038

0.3155

0.0560

0.0177

3.1623

0.0016

***

VACANCY

0.1033

0.0221

4.6690

0.0000

***

0.0557

0.0210

2.6471

0.0081

***

TRANSPORT

0.0066

0.0032

2.0554

0.0398

**

0.0182

0.0104

1.7519

0.0798

*

SQ_VACANCY

-0.0014

0.0004

-3.9258

0.0000

***

-0.0004

0.0003

-1.1842

0.2363

SQ_AFFORDH

-0.0003

0.0001

-2.2144

0.0268

**

SQ_POVERTY

-0.0012

0.0002

-5.1396

0.0000

***

SQ_TRANSPORT

-0.0001

0.0001

-1.3231

0.1858

0.5039

0.0349

14.4535

0.0000

Lambda

0.4734

Pseudo R2

0.5569

0.0359

13.1536

0.0000

Sig

***

0.5580

Note: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Sig

***

Moran scatter plots for the spatial error model are visualized as shown below. For
residuals of the spatial error model, the Moran‟s I test statistic is -0.0146 (in the 2005
model) and -0.0127 (in the 2009 model), showing essentially zero. This indicates that
including the spatially autoregressive error term in the model has eliminated all spatial
autocorrelations.

Figure 6-3 Moran scatter plots for residuals from OLS and Spatial error models
Moran‟s I = 0.2229
(OLS, 2005)

Moran‟s I = -0.0146
(Spatial error model, 2005)

Moran‟s I = 0.2367
(OLS, 2009)

Moran‟s I = -0.0127
(Spatial error model, 2009)
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6.4 Geographically weighted regression (GWR)

6.4.1 GWR analysis
Coefficient estimates from the OLS regression do not incorporate spatial effects.
Spatial regression analysis accounts for spatial autocorrelation; however, it still assumes
that spatial effects are constant over the study area. So, coefficient estimates from the
spatial regression indicate the mean value that does not vary over space. Contrarily,
GWR is relevant to capture spatially varying relationships between the dependent and
independent variables.
The GWR model to identify the factors influencing voucher location is specified
as follows:
y (u i , vi )   0 (u i , vi )  1 AFFORDH (u i , vi )   2 BLACK (u i , vi )   3 ASIAN (u i , vi ) 
 4 HISPANIC (u i , vi )   5VACANCY (u i , vi )   6 POVERTY (u i , vi )   7TRANPORT (u i , vi )   i

where β0 is the intercept, (ui,vi) is the coordinates of the ith point in space, and β1 through
β7 are the parameter estimates changing across the space.
GWR statistical software (GWR 3.0) developed by Fotheringham et al. (2002)
provides locally varying parameter estimates and their significance based on a Monte
Carlo test. There are several options to conduct GWR estimation: choosing kernel type,
bandwidth, and type of significance test. An adaptive kernel, a corrected Akaike
Information Criterion (AICc) minimization methods, and a Monte Carlo significance test
are adopted to conduct GWR. When choosing kernel types, there are two types such as
fixed or adaptive. An adaptive kernel is utilized to provide the geographic weighing in
the model. If the observations are regularly distributed in the study area, a fixed kernel is
appropriate. However, if the observations are clustered so that the density of observations
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varies over the study areas, then an adaptive kernel is appropriate. In this regard, the
adaptive kernel type is relevant for this study, since voucher recipients show spatial
concentration over the study area. Also, the AICc method finds the bandwidth which
minimizes the AICc value. The AICc method is recommended due to interaction between
the bandwidth and the complexity of the model. Finally, Monte Carlo tests are utilized to
determine the significance of the spatial variability in the local parameter estimates.
Testing individual parameter stationarity is essential to determine whether the observed
variation is sufficient to reject the hypothesis that the parameter is globally fixed. As a
consequence, if the results of Monte Carlo tests on the local estimates are significant, this
indicates that there is significant spatial variation in the local parameter estimates for the
variable (Fotheringham et al., 2002; Charlton & Fotheringham, 2009).

6.4.2 GWR model performance
GWR provides better performance than OLS. Diagnostic information is listed in
Table 6-8. In both year models, GWR provides a significantly low value of the residual
sum of squares, which is the difference between an observed y-value and its estimated
value returned by the GWR model. AICc is useful to compare the measure of model
performance. The model with the lower AICc value provides a better fit to the observed
data because AICc is a measure of spatial collinearity within the model data. GWR
models show significantly better performance level in terms of AICc, indicating a
decreasing value from 380 (2005 model) to 160 (2009 model). These big differences are

166

strong evidence of an improvement in the fit of the model to the data.21 More intuitively,
an adjusted R2 confirms a substantial improvement of GWR compared to OLS.
Specifically, in the 2005 model, it increases from 0.4762 to 0.7103, indicating that the
OLS model explains less than a half of the variance of the data while the GWR explains
over 70% of the variance.

Table 6-8 GWR model performance
2005

Residual sum of squares

OLS

GWR

OLS

8788.99

3866.60

7587.30

6216.90

9

265

12

55

2.65

1.97

2.46

2.27

6047.09

5666.10

5867.81

5707.22

0.4763

0.7103

0.4637

0.5449

Effective number of parameters
Sigma
Akaike Information Criterion
Adjusted r-square

2009
GWR

Table 6-9 Results of ANOVA test for GWR over OLS
Year

2005

Source

SS

OLS Residuals
GWR Improvement
GWR Residuals

8789.0

DF

2009

MS

F

SS

DF

MS

9.0

7587.3

12.0

922.4 255.9 19.2346

1370.4

42.8 32.0063

3866.6 996.1

3.8818 4.9551 6216.9 1206.2

F

5.1542 6.2098

ANOVA results also reports that the GWR model improves significantly over the
OLS counterpart. The ANOVA tests the null hypothesis that the GWR model represents
no improvement over a global model (Fotheringham, et al., 2002). High F-values in
Table 6-9 suggest that the local model has a significant improvement over the global
21

As a rule of thumb, if the AICc difference between two models is less than 3 to 4, then there is no

significant improvement and there is little evidence to choose one over the other.
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model in determining the relationship between voucher concentration and the various
factors.

6.4.3 GWR results
Table 6-10 and Table 6-11 summarize the results of OLS and GWR analysis. The
Monte Carlo test calibrated for the GWR model finds that most of explanatory variables
displayed significant spatial non-stationarity in the case of 2005 model. Seven
independent variables (BLACK, ASIAN, HISPANIC, POVERTY, VACANCY, and
TRANSPORT) turn out to be significant in terms of spatial variation. These variables are
also significant in OLS analysis; however, the significant local parameters indicate that
the locally varying impact of these independent variables on the dependent variable. Thus,
in some areas the influence of the variable might be stronger than in other areas.
Furthermore, the 2005 GWR model explain 71% of the variance, so GWR
provides better explanatory power than the global OLS model (Adjusted R 2=0.4763). The
local R2 of each individual GWR model ranges from 0.1064 to 0.9305, with a mean of
0.5465. Only about 35% of the local R2 values are lower than the global OLS value, and
over 60% are higher than 0.5. Based on the GWR results, it can be inferred that the
relationship between voucher concentration and factors affecting voucher holders‟
location choice is better captured by the GWR model in the study area.
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Table 6-10 GWR results (2005 model)
OLS

GWR

Estimate

Std Err

t

Intercept

-0.3224

0.2107

-1.5304

BLACK

0.0547

0.0027

19.9344

ASIAN

-0.0598

0.0202

HISPANIC

0.0552

AFFORDH

Min

Median

Max

p-value

Sig

-6.8339

-0.0040

14.7082

0.0000

***

***

-0.2245

0.0338

0.1461

0.0000

***

-2.9528

***

-1.0737

-0.0264

1.7689

0.0000

***

0.0107

5.1444

***

-0.6815

0.0357

0.7152

0.0000

***

0.0116

0.0049

2.3567

**

-0.0862

0.0035

0.1910

0.2300

POVERTY

-0.0218

0.0088

-2.4813

**

-0.1389

0.0100

0.4744

0.0000

***

VACANCY

0.1378

0.0236

5.8474

***

-1.9763

0.1212

1.1364

0.0000

***

TRANSPORT

0.0065

0.0029

2.2696

**

-0.1455

0.0013

0.0688

0.0000

***

-0.0021

0.0004

-5.4752

***

-0.0361

-0.0048

0.1530

0.0000

***

SQ_VACANCY
Adjusted R2

Sig

0.4763

0.7103

Note: Significance ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
GWR Significance based on Monte Carlo test for spatial non-stationarity

Table 6-11 GWR results (2009 model)
OLS

GWR

Estimate

Std Err

t

Sig

Min

Median

Max

p-value

Intercept

-0.5873

0.2735

-2.1476

**

-0.9464

-0.4455

0.2939

0.4300

BLACK

0.0471

0.0027

17.3601

***

0.0229

0.0438

0.0719

0.0000

***

ASIAN

-0.0431

0.0189

-2.2855

**

-0.2301

-0.0389

0.0811

0.0000

***

HISPANIC

0.0442

0.0105

4.2055

***

0.0061

0.0448

0.1037

0.0700

*

AFFORDH

0.0370

0.0115

3.2270

***

0.0024

0.0331

0.1409

0.0300

**

POVERTY

0.0749

0.0190

3.9467

***

-0.0587

0.0900

0.1508

0.1100

VACANCY

0.0451

0.0230

1.9656

**

-0.0917

0.0592

0.1595

0.5700

TRANSPORT

0.0236

0.0104

2.2720

**

-0.0202

0.0219

0.0928

0.0100

SQ_VACANCY

-0.0005

0.0004

-1.2846

-0.0055

-0.0010

0.0097

0.1600

SQ_AFFORDH

-0.0003

0.0001

-2.5846

***

-0.0015

-0.0003

0.0004

0.1400

SQ_POVERTY

-0.0017

0.0003

-6.5232

**

-0.0032

-0.0016

0.0003

0.3500

SQ_TRANPORT

-0.0002

0.0001

-1.9433

*

-0.0008

-0.0001

0.0002

0.0100

2

Adjusted R

0.4637

0.5449

Note: Significance ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
GWR Significance based on Monte Carlo test for spatial non-stationarity
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Sig

***

***

The 2009 model also shows similar results regarding model performance and
spatial non-stationarity of variables. The explanatory power of the model has been
improved from 0.4637 (OLS) to 0.5449. Six out of eleven independent variables turn out
to be significant in terms of spatial variation. These variables include race variables,
affordable housing, and public transportation. Thus, the influence of these variables over
space might be varying locally, which is contrary to the results from OLS that assumes a
constant estimate over the study area.

6.4.3.1 Local R2 variation
Local R2 in the 2005 model ranges from a minimum of 0.1064 to a maximum of
0.9305. Local R2 indicates how well the local regression model fits the observed y-value.
Very low values indicate that the local model is performing poorly, while high values
report that the local model fits well. The local R2 map reveals a local variation in the
performance of the model across space. The 2005 GWR model explains at least 50% of
variation in the north regions and the eastern part of the county. These cities include
Euclid, Richmond Heights, Cleveland Heights, Garfield Heights, Shaker Heights,
Warrensville Heights, and Mayfield Heights. However, the model fits poorly in the area
around the east side of Cleveland and southwestern suburbs, such as Parma and
Strongsville. These local variations cannot be detected by the OLS and Spatial error
model estimations.
Local R2 in the 2009 model indicates spatial variation of model fitness; however,
it has a different pattern when compared to the 2005 model. Local R 2 in the 2009 model
ranges from 0.3664 to 0.6518. The model fits well in the south suburbs such as Parma
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and Parma Heights. Also, the model explains more than half of the variation in the east
and the west suburbs. Spatial variation of the local R2 in the 2005 and 2009 models is
mapped in Figure 6-4 and Figure 6-5.

Figure 6-4 Spatial variation of local R2 (2005 GWR model)

Figure 6-5 Spatial variation of local R2 (2009 GWR model)
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6.4.3.2 African American population
Local coefficient estimates for BLACK are shown in Figure 6-6 through Figure 69. The coefficient estimate of BLACK in the 2005 global model was 0.0547, with a
standard error of 0.0027. The map of the local coefficients variation reveals that the
influence of the BLACK variable in the 2005 GWR model varies considerably over
Cuyahoga County. The influence of black population on voucher concentration is strong
on the east side of the county such as in East Cleveland, South Euclid, Cleveland Heights,
University Heights, Shaker Heights, Garfield Heights, Lyndhurst, Mayfield, Mayfield
Heights, Bedford, and Bedford Heights. In these areas, voucher holders‟ concentrations
are positively related to African American population. Except those areas and the west
part of the Cleveland near Brooklyn, the relationship is not significant at a 95%
confidence interval, as shown in Figure 6-7.
Figure 6-8 presents the BLACK parameter distribution in the 2009 model. The
global estimate of BLACK is 0.0448 with a standard error of 0.0036 in the 2009 revised
OLS. The local coefficients vary from 0.0229 to 0.0719 and show significant spatial
variation based on the Monte Carlo test. The northeast and the southwest part of the
regions have larger coefficient estimates than the regions in the middle; however, the tvalue map discovers that the BLACK parameters are significant in all regions at the 95%
level. Thus, it can be inferred that black population significantly influences voucher
locations, and impacts are stronger in suburban regions.
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Figure 6-6 BLACK parameter variation (2005 GWR model)

Figure 6-7 BLACK t-value variation (2005 GWR model)
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Figure 6-8 BLACK parameter variation (2009 GWR model)

Figure 6-9 BLACK t-value variation (2009 GWR model)
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6.4.3.3 Asian population
GWR analysis shows how the relationship between Asian population and voucher
holders varies over space, while the global OLS model shows the relationship is linear
and negative. The 2005 GWR model indicates that several cities have a negative impact
of Asian population on voucher locations, such as part of Euclid, Cleveland, and
Richmond Heights. Few areas have a positive effect of Asian population in the 2005
GWR model.
The 2009 GWR model exhibits a different pattern of effect. Many of the eastern
regions show a significant negative relationship, implying that increase of Asian
population is negatively associated with voucher holders‟ location outcomes.

Figure 6-10 ASIAN parameter variation (2005 GWR model)
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Figure 6-11 ASIAN t-value variation (2005 GWR model)

Figure 6-12 ASIAN parameter variation (2009 GWR model)
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Figure 6-13 ASIAN t-value variation (2009 GWR model)

6.4.3.4 Hispanic population
Hispanic variable is significant in the 2005 GWR model, and it shows significant
t-values in several regions. A positive impact exists in the middle of City of Cleveland,
Brooklyn, and part of Cleveland Heights. On the contrary, a negative effect is found in
the north part of City of Cleveland, the west side of Shaker Heights.
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Figure 6-14 HISPANIC parameter variation (2005 GWR model)

Figure 6-15 HISPANIC t-value variation (2005 GWR model)
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6.4.3.5 Affordable housing below FMRs
The Monte Carlo test for spatial non-stationarity shows that there is significant
spatial variation in the local parameter estimates for the variable AFFORDH in the 2009
model. As expected, voucher holders‟ locations are positively related with the availability
of affordable housing, which is rental housing whose rent level is below the FMRs. Based
on GWR model, the relationship is especially significant in the northeast regions, such as
the east side of the City of Cleveland, East Cleveland, Cleveland Heights, Richmond
Heights, and Euclid. Spatial variation of local parameters and significance are shown in
Figure 6-16 and Figure 6-17 for the 2009 GWR model.

Figure 6-16 AFFORDH parameter variation (2009 GWR model)

179

Figure 6-17 AFFORDH t-value variation (2009 GWR model)

6.4.3.6 Poverty rates
The 2005 GWR model confirms the local variation of poverty variable. The
global estimate of the poverty variable was -0.0218 with the standard deviation of
0.0088; GWR parameter ranges from -0.1389 to 0.4744. As shown in Figure 6-19, the
relationship between voucher concentration and poverty rates are negative in some areas
near City of Cleveland. In these areas, voucher recipients tend to live in low poverty
neighborhoods, implying that the voucher program works relatively well in terms of
poverty deconcentration. In contrast, there is a different type of story in suburban areas.
Poverty rates influence voucher concentrations in a positive way in the north regions
(Euclid and Richmond Heights) and the south regions (Bedford, Bedford Heights,
Warrensville, and Maple Heights). In these suburbs, the poverty coefficient is estimated
positively significant, suggesting that voucher recipients tend to live in high poverty
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neighborhoods, which is contrary to what is expected to be achieved through the voucher
program. In general, the voucher program in Cuyahoga county has achieved the poverty
deconcentration goal based on the 2005 global model, since it shows negative
relationship. However, it is hard to assert that poverty deconcentration has achieved in all
areas because the GWR model results show substantial variation both in local coefficients
and t-values. Based on both global and GWR model, it can be inferred that voucher
holders living in or near the central city tend to find their house in neighborhoods with
low poverty rates; however, voucher holders in suburbs are likely to end up
neighborhoods with high poverty rates, even though the absolute level of poverty rates in
suburbs are significantly lower than those of in the central city.

Figure 6-18 POVERTY parameter variation (2005 GWR model)
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Figure 6-19 POVERTY t-value variation (2005 GWR model)

6.4.3.7 Vacancy rates
Vacancy rates have a positive effect on voucher concentration and their impacts
vary over space. Vacancy rates in the 2005 global model had a significant positive impact
on voucher concentration with the coefficient of 0.1378. The map for the local
coefficients of the variable indicates that the influence varies significantly. The
relationship between voucher concentration and vacancy rates are negative and
significant in the north suburbs such as Euclid and Richmond Heights. Contrarily, several
regions reveal a positive relationship. These areas include the east side of the Cleveland,
East Cleveland, Cleveland Heights, the southern part of Shaker Heights, and Bedford
Heights.
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Figure 6-20 VACANCY parameter variation (2005 GWR model)

Figure 6-21 VACANCY t-value variation (2005 GWR model)
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Vacancy rates in this model are incorporated to account for landlords‟
participation in the program. Research found that landlords have more incentives to
participate in the voucher program where vacancy rates are high, so they have difficulty
in finding tenants. Local parameter variation of vacancy rates implies that location choice
of voucher holders in and near the central city is positively influenced by vacancy rates
(or landlords‟ participation, or weak market conditions). However, vacancy rates and
voucher holders are positively related in the north suburbs.
The comparison of global (OLS) and local (GWR) models provides enhanced
understanding of the relationship between voucher locations and vacancy rates. Based on
the global model (2005 revised OLS), vacancy rates affect voucher holders location
outcomes in a positive way until vacancy rates reach 32.8%; after that point, the
relationship is negative. The 2005 GWR model identifies the place where the relationship
is positive or negative.

6.4.3.8 Accessibility to public transportation
Accessibility to public transportation has a different degree of influence across the
study area. The 2009 GWR model shows distinct patterns. In general, areas more
accessible to public transportation have more voucher holders living in them. This
phenomenon is especially true for the northeast regions, such as the east side of the
Cleveland, Cleveland Heights, South Euclid, Euclid, Shaker Heights, and University
Heights. Also, the voucher location is explained well by the accessibility of public
transportation in the south suburbs, such as Maple Heights, Bedford, and Bedford
Heights.
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Figure 6-22 TRANSPORT parameter variation (2005 GWR model)

Figure 6-23 TRANSPORT t-value variation (2005 GWR model)
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Figure 6-24 TRANSPORT parameter variation (2009 GWR model)

Figure 6-25 TRANSPORT t-value variation (2009 GWR model)
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6.5 Summary of findings

A series of regression analyses are conducted to identify the factors explaining
voucher location outcomes. The OLS regression model, spatial regression model, and
GWR model are considered in order to find the relevant functional forms, to incorporate
spatial autocorrelation, and to account for spatial heterogeneity. OLS regressions point
out the threshold effect of several variables such as affordable housing, poverty, vacancy,
and public transportation. Analyzing spatial data requires spatial diagnostics to prevent
biased estimates. Spatial diagnostics show that the error model is relevant for this study.
Incorporating the spatial autoregressive error term confirms the results obtained by OLS.
Also, it eliminates all of the spatial autocorrelation issues noticed in the OLS models. In
addition, the GWR model is adopted to deal with spatial heterogeneity issues. The Monte
Carlo tests confirm that spatial patterns of several variables vary significantly over space.
Comparing and contrasting the findings from GWR (local model) with OLS
(global model) sheds light on the local variation of influential factors on voucher location.
The global model results are only average across the study areas and can hide many
interesting spatial variations in a relationship that is illuminated in the local analysis. The
results of the OLS model are hard to visualize and give a global parameter estimate for
each variable that is applied to every point in the study area regardless of location. This is
an issue when relationships between variables change over space. In this regard, the
GWR model is appropriate in terms of estimating local fit in multiple locations and of
visualizing the local variation.
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With regard to policy implication, a statistically significant global variable that
has little local variation informs region-wide policy. On the contrary, statistically
significant global variables that exhibit strong regional variations suggest local policy
(Charlton & Fotheringham, 2009). As results from the global model show, all
independent variables are statistically significant; however, there are significant local
variations of the variable.
The 2005 GWR model substantially improves the explanatory power compared to
global OLS model (from 0.4763 to 0.7103). Most of the factors identified as significant
in the global OLS model are also found out to be significant and show a spatial nonstationarity. Local variation of explanatory power in the 2005 GWR model is mostly well
explained by the variable BLACK. Poverty rates account for the local variations in the
north and the southeast suburbs, and vacancy rates fit well in regions from the east side of
the central city to the north suburbs. Explanatory power of the accessibility of public
transportation also varies over the study area.
The 2009 GWR model also increases the ability of explaining variation compared
to global OLS (from 0.4637 to 0.5449). Several factors turn out to be significant in terms
of spatial variations, which include minority population, affordable housing, and public
transportation. The 2009 GWR model fits relatively better in the east and the south part
of suburban regions. African American population is positively and significantly related
with voucher outcomes. Spatial variations of affordable housing availability are well
aligned with regions stretched from the center to the north end of the Cuyahoga County.
Also, public transportation plays a positive role in locating voucher holders in the area
from the northeast to southeast part of the study area.
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Considering policy goal achievement, the results are mixed in terms of poverty
and race deconcentration through the voucher program. Minority populations are a
significant predictor of voucher concentration, which implies that the voucher recipients
tend to live in neighborhoods with the high proportion of minorities (African American
and Hispanic, but not Asian). In this case, it is hard to assert that the voucher program has
contributed to race desegregation considering the facts that the majority of voucher
holders are minorities and they tend to live in predominantly minority neighborhoods. In
terms of poverty deconcentration, however, the voucher program has contributed to
dispersing poor households with rental subsidies. The poverty rates variable is a
significant and meaningful predictor of voucher concentration and has a threshold point
of 23%. Poverty rates of suburban areas are usually less than 23%. This implies that the
voucher recipients are more likely to live in low poverty neighborhoods and less likely to
live in high poverty ones since the relationship between voucher holders and poverty
rates are positive until the threshold point of 23%.
The availability of affordable housing and vacancy rates are positively related
with concentration of voucher recipients. The voucher program allows voucher recipients
to find a house whose rent levels are below the FMRs. Therefore, the positive
relationship between the availability of affordable housing and voucher concentration has
confirmed the fact that voucher holders‟ location choice is limited by the local housing
market conditions in terms of affordable housing. Vacancy rates also result in a positive
relationship with voucher concentration. The higher the vacancy rates, the more choices
for tenants to find a house. In this situation, landlords would have more incentives to
participate in the voucher program and fewer incentives to discriminate against voucher
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holders. Based on the findings, weak housing markets provide voucher users with more
chances to find their housing units.
Public transportation plays a less important role than expected in explaining
voucher holders‟ location outcomes. OLS reveals a positive effect of public
transportation; however, when considering spatial autocorrelation, the effect is significant
at a 90% level. The positive effect of public transportation confirms the fact that voucher
holders‟ housing choice is dependent on the accessibility to public transportation due to
their low income level.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

7.1 Importance of the topic

Nearly one out of four renters, 18.6 million households as of 2008, face severe
cost burdens that spend more than half of their incomes on housing (Joint Center for
Housing Studies of Harvard University, 2010). Voucher holders in Cuyahoga County live
with less than $11,000 income on average. At this level, their monthly housing costs
would have to be no more than $275 in order to meet the affordability standard, which is
30% of income toward housing cost. Regardless of their extremely low income levels,
voucher holders have lived in decent quality houses whose rent levels are around $650
since the differences have been subsidized. In this way, the Housing Choice Voucher
Program contributes to decreasing the income-housing cost mismatch for low-income
renters who otherwise struggle to meet their housing needs.
The voucher program is the single largest housing subsidy in the nation, serving
almost two million low-income households. Using the household‟s choice, the program
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intends to disperse minority and low-income households in neighborhoods where they
could have better living environments such as safety, schools, employments, and public
services. Thus, there has been an increasing interest in the voucher program achievements,
whether it has contributed to deconcentrating the poor and minorities. At the same time,
growing concerns have been raised on voucher recipients‟ concentration in poor
neighborhoods and re-concentration in less-poor neighborhoods. However, not much has
been investigated in the Cleveland area where poverty and minority segregation remains
strikingly high. Therefore, Cleveland is the place that needs the program the most to
promote racial and economic integration in its neighborhoods. In these regards,
identifying locations of individual voucher recipients and examining spatial distribution
over space are critical to evaluate the program performance. Where have voucher
recipients lived? Are spatial patterns of voucher recipients different by their race, income,
and over time? What factors have influenced their spatial concentration? Do relationships
between variables vary across space? This dissertation explored these questions by
analyzing data of voucher recipients from the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority.
This dissertation makes a contribution to the literature because it is the first work
conducted in the Cleveland area and to incorporate various spatial statistical approaches
in identifying spatial concentration and influential factors. Contrary to most previous
research that adopted a-spatial analysis, this study considered both a-spatial and spatial
aspects by utilizing spatial analyses such as hotspot analysis, spatial regression, and
Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR).
Methodological improvements should be mentioned. Limited knowledge has been
reported among previous works that examined the relationship between voucher
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concentration and neighborhood characteristics. Only a handful of studies dealt with
spatial autocorrelation issues in regression analysis. Among others, GWR is a relatively
new methodology that accounts for spatial heterogeneity in spatial data. GWR enables
researcher to capture spatially varying relationships over space and make it visualize by
using maps. With improved methodology, this dissertation not only examined the
relationships between variables, but also visualized local variations that cannot be
identified by OLS nor spatial regression models. Policy implications can be drawn based
on local differences of effects, whether region-wide policy or local policy would be
appropriate for addressing voucher concentration.

7.2 Summary of key findings

7.2.1 Patterns of voucher recipients’ locations
This study aims to find patterns of voucher holders‟ spatial outcomes
incorporating both a-spatial and spatial analysis. In terms of a-spatial approach,
descriptive analysis presents that voucher users tend to move from extremely poor
neighborhoods to less poor neighborhoods from 2005 to 2009. However, over half of the
voucher recipients still live in very poor neighborhoods where a median income level is
less than 50% of the area median income. Regarding racial makeup in neighborhoods, the
majority of voucher users are living in neighborhoods where African American
population is dominant. At the same time, the trends show that voucher holders are
moving toward neighborhoods that the majority population is white. Even though
descriptive statistics provide general understanding of voucher holders‟ living
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environments, it is hard to identify where they live, whether they are concentrated, and
whether the concentrations are statistically significant. Spatial analysis is necessary to
answer the above questions.
Hotspot analysis shows that voucher recipients are concentrated and they are
moving toward suburban areas from 2005 to 2009. Hotspot analysis is useful to detect
spatial concentration and to examine changes of concentration patterns for a particular
area over time. Voucher recipients tend to cluster in the east side of the county. African
American voucher holders are especially concentrated in the northeastern areas while
white voucher holders are clustered in the western regions. Spatial patterns of both racial
groups have spread toward suburban areas from 2005 to 2009. Hispanic voucher holders
are also concentrated in the Cleveland. Investigating spatial patterns by income levels
show spatial clustering; however, spatial clusters by income levels are not significantly
different from other income groups. This might be attributed to the fact that the majority
of voucher holders are extremely low income households and they tend to move from
extremely poor neighborhoods to ones that are less poor.
Combining the a-spatial description and spatial analysis provides better
understanding on how voucher holders are distributed over space. The a-spatial approach
is good for a quick understanding of the general tendency of location outcomes while
hard to identify the place where spatial clustering occurs. The spatial analysis is useful to
test statistical significance whether the clustering is significantly different enough to
reject the null hypothesis. The spatial approach overcomes the limitation of a-spatial
description, and suggests that voucher holders are clustered in specific areas and their
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clusters have changed over time. Moreover, spatial concentrations of voucher holders are
significantly different by race and ethnicity but not by income level.

7.2.2 Factors associated with voucher recipients’ spatial concentration
A series of regression analyses explored which factors related to voucher holders‟
spatial concentrations. Starting from traditional OLS, spatial regression analysis was
utilized to account for spatial autocorrelation. In addition, GWR was conducted in order
to incorporate spatial heterogeneity and to provide spatially varying relationship.
Several factors were tested their significance on voucher concentrations, these
factors included availability of affordable housing, minority populations, poverty rates,
vacancy rates, and accessibility to public transportation. Consistent with previous
research, minority populations were significant predictors for voucher concentrations.
This finding implies that voucher holders tend to live in minority neighborhoods. Based
on this result, it is hard to assert that the voucher program is successful to make
neighborhood diverse in terms of racial composition. On the other hand, poverty rates
turned out to be significant and showed the threshold point. Based on this relationship, it
can be inferred that the voucher program has contributed to dispersing poor households
into better neighborhoods in terms of poverty rates. As expected in hypotheses,
availability of affordable housing, vacancy rates, and public transportation are
significantly associated with voucher concentration. OLS and spatial error model
estimation confirmed that several variables showed a threshold effect on voucher
concentration. The thresholds were at 50%, 23%, and 30% of affordable housing, poverty
rates, and vacancy rates, respectively.
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GWR results account for spatial heterogeneity, providing local variation of
significant factors on voucher locations. The GWR model substantially improved the
explanatory power compared to the OLS model. Most of the factors identified as
influential in global OLS model were also found out to be significant and showed a
spatial non-stationarity by Monte Carlo tests. Significantly different local variations were
found in minority populations, affordable housing, poverty, vacancy rates, and public
transportation. Spatial variations of affordable housing availability were well aligned
with regions stretched from the central city to the north; poverty rates accounted for the
local variation in the north and the southeastern suburbs; vacancy rates fitted well in
regions where cover from the east side of the central city to the north part of suburbs;
public transportation explained well in areas from the northeast to southeast suburbs.

7.3 Policy implications

Results presented here on patterns and factors of voucher concentration provide
several policy implications. Consistent with previous findings, this study also shows that
the voucher program has played a substantial role in poverty deconcentration based on
the fact that the voucher recipients tend to live in less poor neighborhoods over time from
the extremely low income neighborhoods. This is important considering the fact that the
majority (over 80%) of the recipients is in the extremely low income group. Thus, the
findings reflect that the voucher program performs well in terms of dispersing poor
tenants. Furthermore, statistical analysis finds that poverty rates are meaningful
predictors of voucher location outcomes but the effects vary across space. The
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relationship with voucher locations and poverty rates is positive until poverty rates reach
23%, and the relationship turns negative. Places with lower poverty rates (below 23%)
correspond with suburban communities and higher poverty areas are found in areas near
the central city. Considering both findings from regression analyses and distribution of
neighborhood poverty rates, it can be inferred that the voucher program has been
successful to disperse extremely low-income households toward suburbs. Voucher
holders are more likely to find their housing units in areas with low poverty rates.
Desegregating minority population seems to be hard to achieve through the
voucher program. Voucher users were found in neighborhoods where minorities are
predominant. African American and Hispanic populations were positively associated with
voucher users‟ concentrations. Spatial analysis confirmed their clustering in specific
neighborhoods, but they tend to move into suburbs during last five years. Descriptive
analysis also showed that voucher holders tend to move from black neighborhoods to
white neighborhoods. These findings reflected promising trends that voucher holders are
concentrated in specific neighborhoods but they have moved into suburban
neighborhoods where white are majority. Therefore, it can be inferred that the voucher
program has potential to desegregating minority with some limitations.
Overcoming spatial concentration of voucher holders will involve in encouraging
landlord‟s participation in the voucher program. Voucher holders have a limited choice
when landlords do not accept vouchers and rent levels are over FMRs. Vacancy rates as
proxies for landlords‟ participations reveal significant effects on voucher locations.
Landlord‟s participation will increase voucher recipients‟ choice, and subsequently
contribute to disperse them. Previous survey (US Census, 1998) found that landlords‟
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were reluctant to be in the program because of bureaucratic process, paper works and/or
unfamiliarity with the program itself. Thus, the federal and local agencies for the voucher
program should consider the way to inform landlords the merits and procedures of the
voucher program, especially for those who have housing units in suburban areas.
In addition, it is worth noting that making neighborhoods accessible to public
transportation will broaden voucher recipients‟ location choices. Voucher holders‟
location choices were increasing until a point that almost 60% of area in a neighborhood
is accessible to public transportation. This is especially well explained in the northeast
and the southeast regions of the study area. Thus, if policy makers have expected voucher
deconcentration to suburbs, they should consider making neighborhoods accessible to
public transportation.

7.4 Limitations and implications for future research

This dissertation explores how voucher recipients have utilized their choices in
the Cleveland area in terms of spatial patterns and limiting factors. This study identified
meaningful findings; however, there remain limitations and further research areas.
Outdated neighborhood data should be mentioned. Due to the time gap of census data,
neighborhood characteristics are hard to reflect the most recent changes that might occur
during ten years. Thus, analysis with newly released 2010 ACS (American Community
Survey) data will be necessary to confirm the findings obtained this study.
Analysis with disaggregated data will give an insight for the program
performance. This study used aggregated data at the level of block groups. If public

198

housing agencies had had records on previous locations of voucher recipients, researcher
could conduct study on mobility patterns and motivations. Changes of address will show
individual movement from place to place over time, so the mobility pattern will be
clearly demonstrated. Once mobility patterns are identified, researchers should consider
investigating factors that cause voucher recipients‟ residential choice. They might choose
to stay in their old neighborhoods simply because of the proximity to their acquaintances.
On the other hand, they might move their residence because of racial factors, accessibility
to public transportation, or the desire to live in a safe neighborhood. Conducting surveys
will help to understand whether the motivation lies in a personal or structural reason.
Motivation and mobility analysis will contribute to investigating how the program
operates at the individual level.
Moreover, tracking studies of voucher recipients will play a significant role in
understanding and evaluating the performance of the voucher program. Research efforts
related to dispersal programs have been devoted to compare the living conditions of the
underprivileged either by providing information on several sites simultaneously or by
tracking the locations of the former public housing tenants over time. For example, the
Gautreaux program developed the metropolitan-wide mobility program in Chicago, in
order to address discriminatory practices in public housing. Researchers have compared
mobility outcomes, both in personal benefits and neighborhood conditions, before and
after relocating residents, which inspired Congress to initiate MTO experiments. With
rigorous research designs and restrictions, the MTO program has helped scholars
investigate causal links in neighborhood conditions and the benefits gained, through the
comparison of experiences at several sites. On the other hand, HOPE VI programs have
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provided more systematic evidences through panel and tracking study. Compared to
Gautreaux and MTO program, HOPE VI is larger both in scale and in scope; it has been
implemented nationwide, involved more sites, and affected more residents and
neighborhoods. The HOPE VI Tracking Study has provided a snapshot of the living
conditions and well-being of former tenants of eight different sites. More importantly,
HOPE VI Panel Study provides comparative analyses with longitudinal data from five
sites. Thus, this panel study enables researchers and policy makers to evaluate the long
term effects of relocating former residents from their neighborhood conditions, physical
and mental health, and socioeconomic outcomes. However, panel data for voucher
recipients have not been available thus far, resulting in a lack of information on how
extremely low families fare with rental subsidies. Not much has been reported about the
long term effects of the voucher recipients on their living conditions and benefits that are
expected, while nearly one out of five voucher holders have stayed in the program for
more than ten years. At the local level, constructing systems that require PHAs identify
the former residences of voucher users is essential to understand the mobility pattern of
the beneficiaries. At the same time, comparing and contrasting the similarities and
differences from several sites will provide comprehensive and systematic information on
the performance of the voucher program. Given the significance of the program and the
potential benefits for the residents, it is critical to understand what has happened to these
vulnerable households since they chose their locations of residence.
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APPENDICIES

Appendix A. General G index results
Year

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Conceptualization of spatial relationships

Observed G

Expected G

Variance

Z score

P value

Inverse distance

0.00002

0.00001

0.00000

21.44992

0.00000

Inverse distance square

0.00000

0.00000

0.00000

18.32121

0.00000

Fixed distance

0.10701

0.05007

0.00001

20.93612

0.00000

Spatial weight matrix

0.00133

0.00079

0.00000

30.41131

0.00000

Inverse distance

0.00002

0.00001

0.00000

20.41566

0.00000

Inverse distance square

0.00000

0.00000

0.00000

17.25876

0.00000

Fixed distance

0.10165

0.05007

0.00001

20.01762

0.00000

Spatial weight matrix

0.00128

0.00079

0.00000

30.60887

0.00000

Inverse distance

0.00002

0.00001

0.00000

19.44786

0.00000

Inverse distance square

0.00000

0.00000

0.00000

16.59800

0.00000

Fixed distance

0.09835

0.05007

0.00001

18.99722

0.00000

Spatial weight matrix

0.00127

0.00079

0.00000

30.41952

0.00000

Inverse distance

0.00002

0.00001

0.00000

18.07948

0.00000

Inverse distance square

0.00000

0.00000

0.00000

15.30544

0.00000

Fixed distance

0.09431

0.05007

0.00001

17.70703

0.00000

Spatial weight matrix

0.00125

0.00079

0.00000

30.00792

0.00000

Inverse distance

0.00002

0.00001

0.00000

15.72959

0.00000

Inverse distance square

0.00000

0.00000

0.00000

13.06455

0.00000

Fixed distance

0.09018

0.05007

0.00001

15.53380

0.00000

Spatial weight matrix

0.00125

0.00079

0.00000

28.35731

0.00000
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Appendix B. Residual plots for regression model
Affordable housing (2009 model)

Poverty (2009 model)

Vacancy (2009 model)

Public transportation (2009 model)
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Appendix C. Residual plots after adding square terms
Affordable housing (2009)

Poverty (2009)

Vacancy (2009)

Public transportation (2009)
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Appendix D. VIF in 2005 model
Variable

Coefficient

Intercept

-0.3222

0.2107

-1.529

0.1265

BLACK

0.0547

0.0027

19.934

0.0000

***

2.0083

ASIAN

-0.0598

0.0202

-2.954

0.0032

**

1.0767

HISPANIC

0.0552

0.0107

5.144

0.0000

***

1.3433

AFFORDH

0.0116

0.0049

2.356

0.0186

**

2.8044

POVERTY

-0.0218

0.0088

-2.48

0.0133

**

3.4059

VACANCY

0.1377

0.0236

5.845

0.0000

***

5.6192

-0.0021

0.0004

-5.473

0.0000

***

3.5897

TRANSPORT
0.0065
0.0029
Note: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

2.269

0.0234

**

1.3695

SQ_VACANCY

Std. Error t value

Pr(>|t|)

Sig

VIF
----------

Appendix E. VIF in 2009 model
Variable

Coefficient Std. Error t value

Pr(>|t|)

Sig

VIF

Intercept

-0.5873

0.2735

-2.1473

0.03195

**

--------

BLACK

0.0471

0.0027

17.3631

0.00000

***

2.2745

ASIAN

-0.0431

0.0189

-2.2862

0.02239

**

1.0804

HISPANIC

0.0442

0.0105

4.2085

0.00003

***

1.4870

AFFORDH

0.0370

0.0115

3.2262

0.00130

**

17.5949

-0.0004

0.0001

-2.5830

0.00990

**

14.0668

0.0748

0.0189

3.9413

0.00009

**

18.3229

-0.0017

0.0003

-6.5179

0.00000

***

11.5517

0.0451

0.0230

1.9645

0.04969

**

6.1622

-0.0005

0.0004

-1.2835

0.19956

0.0236

0.0104

2.2737

0.02314

**

20.8296

SQ_TRANSPORT
-0.0002
0.0001
Note: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

-1.9450

0.052

*

21.5775

SQ_AFFORDH
POVERTY
SQ_POVERTY
VACANCY
SQ_VACANCY
TRANSPORT
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3.9113

Appendix F. F test results
Explanatory variables in restricted model

F value

Pr(>F)

AFFORDH+Sq_Affordh+BLACK+ASIAN+HISPANIC
+VACANCY+Sq_Vacancy+POVERTY+Sq_Poverty
+TRANSPORT+Sq_Tranport

100.2

< 2.2e-16

AFFORDH+Sq_Affordh+BLACK+ASIAN+HISPANIC
+VACANCY+Sq_Vacancy+POVERTY+Sq_Poverty

121.4

< 2.2e-16

AFFORDH+Sq_Affordh+BLACK+ASIAN+HISPANIC
+VACANCY+Sq_Vacancy+TRANSPORT+Sq_Tranport

110.6

< 2.2e-16

AFFORDH+Sq_Affordh+BLACK+ASIAN+HISPANIC
+POVERTY+Sq_Poverty+TRANSPORT+Sq_Tranport

121.7

< 2.2e-16

AFFORDH+Sq_Affordh+VACANCY+Sq_Vacancy
+POVERTY+Sq_Poverty +TRANSPORT+Sq_Tranport

71.44

< 2.2e-16

BLACK+ASIAN+HISPANIC+VACANCY+Sq_Vacancy
+POVERTY+Sq_Poverty+TRANSPORT+Sq_Tranport

120.3

< 2.2e-16
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